trast, when they were tested with B’s wrr or chutter, they dishabituated,
showing a renewed, strong response. In other words, if A is unreliable with
respect to the information conveyed by wrrs, she is also unreliable when
she produces chutters because these two calls are produced in the same
general context. However, the fact that A is unreliable about intergroup
encounters does not mean B is unreliable, as revealed by the vervets’ undiminished response to B’s chutter or wrr.
These results show that the attribute “unreliable” is assigned to individuals, not contexts. Moreover, experimenters can create unreliable individuals simply by playing back their vocalizations over and over again in the
absence of the relevant context. Because individuals habituate to repeated
vocalizations in the absence of a relevant context, a mechanism—“skepticism”—is in place for challenging lies of commission. Comparable evidence
has been found for vervet and diana monkey alarm calls as well as rhesus
monkey food and contact calls (Cheney and Seyfarth 1988; Seyfarth and
Cheney 1990; Rendall et al. 1996; Zuberbühler, Noe, and Seyfarth 1997;
Hauser 1998).
The habituation–dishabituation paradigm is ideally suited to pushing the
issue of skepticism further. For example, all of the playback experiments
take place over the course of less than an hour. What is lacking from all of
these experiments is the extent to which such experimental slandering
affects the individual’s subsequent social interactions and for how long.
Thus, if we make A unreliable about the presence of an eagle by repeatedly playing back his eagle alarm call, will others continue to ignore his
eagle alarm call if it is played back after an hour of silence? How about a
day later? Two weeks? If we play A’s eagle alarm call and then pair it with
the presence of an eagle, will this reinstate his reliability? If not, how many
times do we have to play back A’s alarm call in the presence of a predator
before the rest of the group trusts A? Moreover, we do not yet understand
the acoustic basis for distinguishing between call types or between individuals. An understanding of these factors (Section 2) will put us in a much
stronger position regarding design and implementation of playback experiments. These types of experiments are needed if we are to better understand the nature of deceptive interactions, the factors that lead to
skepticism, and ultimately how individuals acquire reputations as reliable
or unreliable signalers.
3.2. Lies of Omission
Before President Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky emerged into the
public’s awareness, it was a secret. By not mentioning their affair to other
interested parties (e.g., the First Lady), both the President and Ms.
Lewinsky committed lies of omission.
Nonhuman animals are also capable of committing lies of omission and
in fact may commit them more often than lies of commission (Cheney and
3. Unpacking “Honesty”
117
showing a renewed, strong response. In other words, if A is unreliable with
respect to the information conveyed by wrrs, she is also unreliable when
she produces chutters because these two calls are produced in the same
general context. However, the fact that A is unreliable about intergroup
encounters does not mean B is unreliable, as revealed by the vervets’ undiminished response to B’s chutter or wrr.
These results show that the attribute “unreliable” is assigned to individuals, not contexts. Moreover, experimenters can create unreliable individuals simply by playing back their vocalizations over and over again in the
absence of the relevant context. Because individuals habituate to repeated
vocalizations in the absence of a relevant context, a mechanism—“skepticism”—is in place for challenging lies of commission. Comparable evidence
has been found for vervet and diana monkey alarm calls as well as rhesus
monkey food and contact calls (Cheney and Seyfarth 1988; Seyfarth and
Cheney 1990; Rendall et al. 1996; Zuberbühler, Noe, and Seyfarth 1997;
Hauser 1998).
The habituation–dishabituation paradigm is ideally suited to pushing the
issue of skepticism further. For example, all of the playback experiments
take place over the course of less than an hour. What is lacking from all of
these experiments is the extent to which such experimental slandering
affects the individual’s subsequent social interactions and for how long.
Thus, if we make A unreliable about the presence of an eagle by repeatedly playing back his eagle alarm call, will others continue to ignore his
eagle alarm call if it is played back after an hour of silence? How about a
day later? Two weeks? If we play A’s eagle alarm call and then pair it with
the presence of an eagle, will this reinstate his reliability? If not, how many
times do we have to play back A’s alarm call in the presence of a predator
before the rest of the group trusts A? Moreover, we do not yet understand
the acoustic basis for distinguishing between call types or between individuals. An understanding of these factors (Section 2) will put us in a much
stronger position regarding design and implementation of playback experiments. These types of experiments are needed if we are to better understand the nature of deceptive interactions, the factors that lead to
skepticism, and ultimately how individuals acquire reputations as reliable
or unreliable signalers.
3.2. Lies of Omission
Before President Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky emerged into the
public’s awareness, it was a secret. By not mentioning their affair to other
interested parties (e.g., the First Lady), both the President and Ms.
Lewinsky committed lies of omission.
Nonhuman animals are also capable of committing lies of omission and
in fact may commit them more often than lies of commission (Cheney and
3. Unpacking “Honesty”
117