if a bee knows that a field of flowers has been burned down, leaving no
pollen behind, would it accept or reject a dance indicating pollen at this
location a week after the burn? What about one month after the burn,
giving time for new growth? If an experimenter brings the bees to the lake
and allows them to feed from the boat, would they then follow the dancer
to this location? If a bee repeatedly lies about the location of pollen, does
it lose respect? Is it punished for falsely “crying” pollen?
We do not have answers to these questions. However, the critical aspect
of Gould’s work for the present discussion is that bees, and perhaps other
animals, can check on the veracity of a piece of information by comparing
what they are told with what they have experienced or are currently experiencing. If this interpretation is correct, then we should be able to turn reliable animals into unreliable ones, as we have already suggested.
Over the past ten years, primatologists have accumulated a large number
of anecdotes of potentially deceptive behavior. These observations are, as
pointed out by Andrew Whiten and Dick Byrne (Whiten and Byrne 1988;
Byrne and Whiten 1990), strikingly different from other cases of deception
in the animal kingdom in that they are rare events—they satisfy the prediction of rarity. Among the many examples cataloged, several are of the
form of a monkey or ape using a false alarm call to gain access to a resource
(food or mate) or to deflect an aggressive attack.These observations suggest
that nonhuman primates may have the capacity to create lies of commission. To address the problem of skepticism, Dorothy Cheney and Robert
Seyfarth designed an experiment with vervet monkeys, adopting a classic
technique from cognitive psychology—the habituation–dishabituation paradigm. Taking advantage of detailed acoustic analyses of the vervets’ vocal
repertoire, the general procedure started with a habituation series involving repeated playbacks of a single call type from one individual. Following
a fixed number of habituation trials, Cheney and Seyfarth then played back
either a different call type from the same individual or the same call type
from a different individual. Although these experiments were primarily
designed to examine the problem of referentiality, the nature of the design
was ideally suited to exploring the problem of deception and skepticism.
Specifically, the habituation series represents a case of experimental
slander: repeatedly play back an individual’s call in the absence of an appropriate context. For example, in one set of experiments, Cheney and Seyfarth
contrasted the vervets’ response to two calls given in the context of intergroup encounters, the “wrr” and “chutter.” Although these calls are acoustically distinctive, they are given in the same general context and thus convey
the same general message: that a competitive group is nearby. In one condition, subjects were repeatedly played A’s wrrs and then tested with A’s
chutter. In another condition, subjects were played A’s wrrs and then tested
with B’s wrr or chutter. Subjects habituated to repeated exposure to A’s
wrr, showing less response with successive playbacks. When they were then
tested with A’s chutter, they transferred the level of habituation. In con116
W.T. Fitch and M.D. Hauser
pollen behind, would it accept or reject a dance indicating pollen at this
location a week after the burn? What about one month after the burn,
giving time for new growth? If an experimenter brings the bees to the lake
and allows them to feed from the boat, would they then follow the dancer
to this location? If a bee repeatedly lies about the location of pollen, does
it lose respect? Is it punished for falsely “crying” pollen?
We do not have answers to these questions. However, the critical aspect
of Gould’s work for the present discussion is that bees, and perhaps other
animals, can check on the veracity of a piece of information by comparing
what they are told with what they have experienced or are currently experiencing. If this interpretation is correct, then we should be able to turn reliable animals into unreliable ones, as we have already suggested.
Over the past ten years, primatologists have accumulated a large number
of anecdotes of potentially deceptive behavior. These observations are, as
pointed out by Andrew Whiten and Dick Byrne (Whiten and Byrne 1988;
Byrne and Whiten 1990), strikingly different from other cases of deception
in the animal kingdom in that they are rare events—they satisfy the prediction of rarity. Among the many examples cataloged, several are of the
form of a monkey or ape using a false alarm call to gain access to a resource
(food or mate) or to deflect an aggressive attack.These observations suggest
that nonhuman primates may have the capacity to create lies of commission. To address the problem of skepticism, Dorothy Cheney and Robert
Seyfarth designed an experiment with vervet monkeys, adopting a classic
technique from cognitive psychology—the habituation–dishabituation paradigm. Taking advantage of detailed acoustic analyses of the vervets’ vocal
repertoire, the general procedure started with a habituation series involving repeated playbacks of a single call type from one individual. Following
a fixed number of habituation trials, Cheney and Seyfarth then played back
either a different call type from the same individual or the same call type
from a different individual. Although these experiments were primarily
designed to examine the problem of referentiality, the nature of the design
was ideally suited to exploring the problem of deception and skepticism.
Specifically, the habituation series represents a case of experimental
slander: repeatedly play back an individual’s call in the absence of an appropriate context. For example, in one set of experiments, Cheney and Seyfarth
contrasted the vervets’ response to two calls given in the context of intergroup encounters, the “wrr” and “chutter.” Although these calls are acoustically distinctive, they are given in the same general context and thus convey
the same general message: that a competitive group is nearby. In one condition, subjects were repeatedly played A’s wrrs and then tested with A’s
chutter. In another condition, subjects were played A’s wrrs and then tested
with B’s wrr or chutter. Subjects habituated to repeated exposure to A’s
wrr, showing less response with successive playbacks. When they were then
tested with A’s chutter, they transferred the level of habituation. In con116
W.T. Fitch and M.D. Hauser