3.4 Incentives for the Conservation of PGRFA
Fig. 3.5. National and international equilibrium ofPGRFA conservation ex situ
MB
Me
q n
Note: MC: marginal costs; MB: marginal benefit
MBn I MBg: marginal costs on national I global level
MCn, g: marginal benefit on national and global level
Accessions
63
The expected and experienced national marginal benefit for the conservation of
PGRF A is determined by the state of development in the plant breeding and
biotechnology of each country. While countries with an improved capacity in
plant breeding and biotechnology potential (e.g., India and Brazil) may capture the
social benefit of PGRF A conservation at a national level (qn), smaller and poorer
states - without any or only with basic potential in plant breeding and
biotechnology - see few incentives in conserving a high level of diversity (von
Braun and Virchow, 1997). Hence, the compensation for these countries must be
higher because of lower national optimum. Sometimes countries also are not
capable to finance some functioning ex situ conservation facilities to secure
PGRF A at their national equilibrium. Furthermore, they are incapable of
distributing financial incentives to farmers for the in situ conservation of PGRF A.
Summarizing this section, it can be stressed that agrobiodiversity is mainly
produced by farmers as positive external effect without any costs. The farmers are
maintaining a level of agrobiodiversity through their farm-specific production
system according to the individual optima of the decision-making process at the
farm level. From the farm-level perspective, these positive external effects of such
activities would need to be identified as clearly as possible so as to permit their
Fig. 3.5. National and international equilibrium ofPGRFA conservation ex situ
MB
Me
q n
Note: MC: marginal costs; MB: marginal benefit
MBn I MBg: marginal costs on national I global level
MCn, g: marginal benefit on national and global level
Accessions
63
The expected and experienced national marginal benefit for the conservation of
PGRF A is determined by the state of development in the plant breeding and
biotechnology of each country. While countries with an improved capacity in
plant breeding and biotechnology potential (e.g., India and Brazil) may capture the
social benefit of PGRF A conservation at a national level (qn), smaller and poorer
states - without any or only with basic potential in plant breeding and
biotechnology - see few incentives in conserving a high level of diversity (von
Braun and Virchow, 1997). Hence, the compensation for these countries must be
higher because of lower national optimum. Sometimes countries also are not
capable to finance some functioning ex situ conservation facilities to secure
PGRF A at their national equilibrium. Furthermore, they are incapable of
distributing financial incentives to farmers for the in situ conservation of PGRF A.
Summarizing this section, it can be stressed that agrobiodiversity is mainly
produced by farmers as positive external effect without any costs. The farmers are
maintaining a level of agrobiodiversity through their farm-specific production
system according to the individual optima of the decision-making process at the
farm level. From the farm-level perspective, these positive external effects of such
activities would need to be identified as clearly as possible so as to permit their