62
3 Economic Framework of Conservation
more land (characterized as qp in Fig. 3.4) for the traditional variety than socially
adequate reflecting the opportunity costs at national level. Only 74%, 70%, and
57% of the area planted to rice, wheat, and maize in developing countries was
planted with modern varieties 27 (Alexandratos, 1995). Pretty (1995) estimates that
a total of almost 2 billion people are stilI not benefiting from modern agriculture.
Due to the area still under traditional varieties, where farmers grow the same set or
overlapping sets of varieties there is the negative external effect for the society as
whole (marked in Fig. 3.4. as area ABC). The private decisions may provide
optimal levels of on-farm production systems, thereby including a specific level of
agrobiodiversity. But it may also provide sub-optimal levels of PGRFA diversity
from a social perspective.
Until now, the analysis concentrated mainly on the in situ conservation and the
external effects emerging from the farmers' decisions making process. One further
important conservation issue must be highlighted below: the positive external
effects of a country's ex situ conservation activities at the international level.
Ex situ conservation is done primarily by national and international
organizations. The main objective of ex situ conservation is to freeze accessions as
carriers of genetically coded information. Taking into consideration that the
marginal benefit at the global level (MB g in Fig. 3.5. ) is higher than that at a
national level (MB.) and assuming that the marginal costs for ex situ conservation
(MC n ) are equal on both levels, two different optimal conservation levels are
evident (see Fig. 3.5. ). Individual countries can be expected to implement the
necessary measures for securing PGRFA at the respective national equilibrium of
qn' Global initiatives, however, are necessary to ensure the global optimum of
agrobiodiversity of qg in a specific country. This can be done either by
compensating countries with the necessary financial resources or by internalizing
the benefits. By choosing the compensation mechanism, countries need necessary
financial resources at least equivalent to ABC in Fig. 3.5. A represents a national
optimum because beyond this point national economic costs exceed the national
economic benefits. If the amount ABC is compensated for, then protection of
resources at level qg would also be optimal from the viewpoint of the national
economy. In addition to the mechanism of compensation with international
transfers (e.g., through international biodiversity funds), internalizing part of the
global benefit for national conservators is the other measures discussed for
safeguarding the global equilibrium of agrobiodiversity conservation. Hereby,
property rights of genetic resources have to be implemented and could serve as a
means of market formation. Both mechanisms will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 4.
21
As average figures they do not show the differences between countries or regions, so for
instance, in sub-Saharan Afica, modern wheat varieties are planted only on 52% of the wheat
area and in rice it may be even less.
3 Economic Framework of Conservation
more land (characterized as qp in Fig. 3.4) for the traditional variety than socially
adequate reflecting the opportunity costs at national level. Only 74%, 70%, and
57% of the area planted to rice, wheat, and maize in developing countries was
planted with modern varieties 27 (Alexandratos, 1995). Pretty (1995) estimates that
a total of almost 2 billion people are stilI not benefiting from modern agriculture.
Due to the area still under traditional varieties, where farmers grow the same set or
overlapping sets of varieties there is the negative external effect for the society as
whole (marked in Fig. 3.4. as area ABC). The private decisions may provide
optimal levels of on-farm production systems, thereby including a specific level of
agrobiodiversity. But it may also provide sub-optimal levels of PGRFA diversity
from a social perspective.
Until now, the analysis concentrated mainly on the in situ conservation and the
external effects emerging from the farmers' decisions making process. One further
important conservation issue must be highlighted below: the positive external
effects of a country's ex situ conservation activities at the international level.
Ex situ conservation is done primarily by national and international
organizations. The main objective of ex situ conservation is to freeze accessions as
carriers of genetically coded information. Taking into consideration that the
marginal benefit at the global level (MB g in Fig. 3.5. ) is higher than that at a
national level (MB.) and assuming that the marginal costs for ex situ conservation
(MC n ) are equal on both levels, two different optimal conservation levels are
evident (see Fig. 3.5. ). Individual countries can be expected to implement the
necessary measures for securing PGRFA at the respective national equilibrium of
qn' Global initiatives, however, are necessary to ensure the global optimum of
agrobiodiversity of qg in a specific country. This can be done either by
compensating countries with the necessary financial resources or by internalizing
the benefits. By choosing the compensation mechanism, countries need necessary
financial resources at least equivalent to ABC in Fig. 3.5. A represents a national
optimum because beyond this point national economic costs exceed the national
economic benefits. If the amount ABC is compensated for, then protection of
resources at level qg would also be optimal from the viewpoint of the national
economy. In addition to the mechanism of compensation with international
transfers (e.g., through international biodiversity funds), internalizing part of the
global benefit for national conservators is the other measures discussed for
safeguarding the global equilibrium of agrobiodiversity conservation. Hereby,
property rights of genetic resources have to be implemented and could serve as a
means of market formation. Both mechanisms will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 4.
21
As average figures they do not show the differences between countries or regions, so for
instance, in sub-Saharan Afica, modern wheat varieties are planted only on 52% of the wheat
area and in rice it may be even less.