186
8 Summary
sufficient. Hence, the institutional aspects of an exchange system for PGRF A will
determine the future conservation.
The institutional framework for the exchange of PGRF A between supply and
demand is analyzed. In addition to the actors of conservation and exchange
activities and their divergent interests, the development of an institutional
framework is determined by the incentive system, to be based either on the
principle of compensation or on the principle of internalization. This debate takes
place between agrobiodiversity-rich and diversity-poor countries as well as
between technologically rich and poor countries, both agrobiodiversity-rich. This
discussion can be seen as the first step towards to a market or bilateral exchange
system, whereas the existing informal multi-lateral exchange system will most
likely evolve into a formal exchange system.
The demand for stronger property protection rights in the developing countries
by the private sector and industrialized countries will affect the free access to
PGRF A as well. The property rights will enable the agrobiodiversity-rich
countries to derive additional benefits from their genetic resources. Furthermore,
property rights protection will boost the development of the breeding sector,
thereby enabling agrobiodiversity-rich countries to benefit from the additionally
incorporated value of genetic resources, if those countries have a potential in
breeding technologies.
This study analyzes the costs of conservation of plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture (pGRF A), it assesses the conservation effectiveness, and the
efficiency of the different conservation instruments. The database assembled and
used for the empirical work consists of the costs at the level of storage facilities
(e.g., genebanks) as well as the costs for conservation programs at the national and
international level. The data utilized were extracted from a review published and
unpublished sources, personal interviews with people in charge of some storage
facilities, and from a questionnaire sent to all countries involved in the
international conservation process.
The average ex situ conservation cost for one accession can presently be
calculated with US $ 44. Costs vary significantly, however, because of the
different conservation methods and sites. In comparing the ex situ conservation
costs with those of in situ conservation programs as the "on-farm management" of
approximately US $ 500 per conserved landrace, it is suggested to promote such
programs only cautiously; especially as long as most of PGRF A still in situ are
conserved by farmers without any conservation costs. Consequently, a system of
competition is needed in which the conservation of landraces is safeguarded with
some institutional framework. A suggested "controlled in situ conservation"
system is based on a calculated areal minimum safety standard of less than 5
hectares for every landrace threatened by extinction. Consequently, it seems to be
a more cost -effective way of introducing the necessary in situ conservation.
In analyzing the costs of some representative countries, the results show that
some agrobiodiversity-rich but low-income countries spent as much for the
conservation management as some agrobiodiversity-poor but high-income
countries for the year 1995, if the expenditures were set into relation to the
country's average per capita income. The governments from the latter group see a
8 Summary
sufficient. Hence, the institutional aspects of an exchange system for PGRF A will
determine the future conservation.
The institutional framework for the exchange of PGRF A between supply and
demand is analyzed. In addition to the actors of conservation and exchange
activities and their divergent interests, the development of an institutional
framework is determined by the incentive system, to be based either on the
principle of compensation or on the principle of internalization. This debate takes
place between agrobiodiversity-rich and diversity-poor countries as well as
between technologically rich and poor countries, both agrobiodiversity-rich. This
discussion can be seen as the first step towards to a market or bilateral exchange
system, whereas the existing informal multi-lateral exchange system will most
likely evolve into a formal exchange system.
The demand for stronger property protection rights in the developing countries
by the private sector and industrialized countries will affect the free access to
PGRF A as well. The property rights will enable the agrobiodiversity-rich
countries to derive additional benefits from their genetic resources. Furthermore,
property rights protection will boost the development of the breeding sector,
thereby enabling agrobiodiversity-rich countries to benefit from the additionally
incorporated value of genetic resources, if those countries have a potential in
breeding technologies.
This study analyzes the costs of conservation of plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture (pGRF A), it assesses the conservation effectiveness, and the
efficiency of the different conservation instruments. The database assembled and
used for the empirical work consists of the costs at the level of storage facilities
(e.g., genebanks) as well as the costs for conservation programs at the national and
international level. The data utilized were extracted from a review published and
unpublished sources, personal interviews with people in charge of some storage
facilities, and from a questionnaire sent to all countries involved in the
international conservation process.
The average ex situ conservation cost for one accession can presently be
calculated with US $ 44. Costs vary significantly, however, because of the
different conservation methods and sites. In comparing the ex situ conservation
costs with those of in situ conservation programs as the "on-farm management" of
approximately US $ 500 per conserved landrace, it is suggested to promote such
programs only cautiously; especially as long as most of PGRF A still in situ are
conserved by farmers without any conservation costs. Consequently, a system of
competition is needed in which the conservation of landraces is safeguarded with
some institutional framework. A suggested "controlled in situ conservation"
system is based on a calculated areal minimum safety standard of less than 5
hectares for every landrace threatened by extinction. Consequently, it seems to be
a more cost -effective way of introducing the necessary in situ conservation.
In analyzing the costs of some representative countries, the results show that
some agrobiodiversity-rich but low-income countries spent as much for the
conservation management as some agrobiodiversity-poor but high-income
countries for the year 1995, if the expenditures were set into relation to the
country's average per capita income. The governments from the latter group see a