CHAPTER 16 • Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Venezuela: The Maracaibo System
309
The blame for the damages was put on PDVSA for the purported delay in launching the contingency plan and to a greater degree on the National Institute for Canalizations for alleged under par maintenance of the Maracaibo Channel. Public unrest
over this issue lasted several months, and finally it was funnelled into the conclusion
that the channel administration and maintenance should be regionalized and a deepwater harbor should be constructed on the Gulf of Venezuela. Coincidentally, these issues were also in the political agenda of the incumbent Governor of Zulia.
The Nissos Amorgos oil spill depicts the superficial minimalism of the domestic
conflicts over the aquatic component of the Maracaibo System. The incident, that should
have been kept a technical problem, attracted a swarm of opportunistic conducts, which
in the final run set up a trite mise en scene: artisanal fishermen - the John Does of the
Seas - defenceless faced the sly corporations. Meanwhile, politicians and headline seekers grabbed ripe benefits. To avoid a new battle of headlines and reach a fluid state of
negotiations, in the probable event of a new incident in the future, the agency designated as the crossroad for conflicts and lobbying groups and organizations, should use
a strategy whose backbone should aim at bringing together the actors to define the
problem, to derive solutions and to implement them cooperatively.
16.12
Outlook
According to Sorensen and Brandani (1987) all Latin American countries have used
sectoral single-purpose planning to manage various coastal resources or activities. The
evolution of coastal area management programs in national or subnational units seem
to follow a similar track: from initial awareness to program implementation in a fivestep progressive course. In 1987, only five countries had progressed beyond the second
stage and reached a national concern for coastal management. Venezuela was not one
of them. However, the situation has changed slightly. Although Clark (1996), in a thorough review, does not list any coastal zone management programme for Venezuela, he
does include a regional program for the State of Nueva Esparta in eastern Venezuela.
The Maracaibo System and specially Lake Maracaibo appear to be scenarios in the brink
of a full-fledged integrated coastal zone management programme.
Sorensen and Brandini (1987) and Sorensen and McCreary (1990) have discussed
the main attributes for a plan of action to be deemed as an ICZM programme
(Table 16.2). Items 6 and 7 are considered by Sorensen and Brandini (1987) as the key
elements in distinguishing coastal zone management and planning programs from
those that are not. The coastal area of the Maracaibo System meets most of the above
conditions.
The major matters of contention in the Maracaibo System are oil spills, fisheries and
the intervention of the uplands. Clark (1996) sustains that an integrated coastal management program should not include fisheries management. That guideline should
show itself appropriate when fisheries do not collide with other sectors. But in the
Maracaibo System scenario, the developmertt of artisanal fisheries, and as a matter of
fact their sheer survival, is not feasible without controlling two of the other actors: trawl
fisheries and the petroleum industries. In the long run, a successful management program should also face the degradation of the uplands; this will require international
collaborative efforts since some of those grounds are shared with Colombia.
309
The blame for the damages was put on PDVSA for the purported delay in launching the contingency plan and to a greater degree on the National Institute for Canalizations for alleged under par maintenance of the Maracaibo Channel. Public unrest
over this issue lasted several months, and finally it was funnelled into the conclusion
that the channel administration and maintenance should be regionalized and a deepwater harbor should be constructed on the Gulf of Venezuela. Coincidentally, these issues were also in the political agenda of the incumbent Governor of Zulia.
The Nissos Amorgos oil spill depicts the superficial minimalism of the domestic
conflicts over the aquatic component of the Maracaibo System. The incident, that should
have been kept a technical problem, attracted a swarm of opportunistic conducts, which
in the final run set up a trite mise en scene: artisanal fishermen - the John Does of the
Seas - defenceless faced the sly corporations. Meanwhile, politicians and headline seekers grabbed ripe benefits. To avoid a new battle of headlines and reach a fluid state of
negotiations, in the probable event of a new incident in the future, the agency designated as the crossroad for conflicts and lobbying groups and organizations, should use
a strategy whose backbone should aim at bringing together the actors to define the
problem, to derive solutions and to implement them cooperatively.
16.12
Outlook
According to Sorensen and Brandani (1987) all Latin American countries have used
sectoral single-purpose planning to manage various coastal resources or activities. The
evolution of coastal area management programs in national or subnational units seem
to follow a similar track: from initial awareness to program implementation in a fivestep progressive course. In 1987, only five countries had progressed beyond the second
stage and reached a national concern for coastal management. Venezuela was not one
of them. However, the situation has changed slightly. Although Clark (1996), in a thorough review, does not list any coastal zone management programme for Venezuela, he
does include a regional program for the State of Nueva Esparta in eastern Venezuela.
The Maracaibo System and specially Lake Maracaibo appear to be scenarios in the brink
of a full-fledged integrated coastal zone management programme.
Sorensen and Brandini (1987) and Sorensen and McCreary (1990) have discussed
the main attributes for a plan of action to be deemed as an ICZM programme
(Table 16.2). Items 6 and 7 are considered by Sorensen and Brandini (1987) as the key
elements in distinguishing coastal zone management and planning programs from
those that are not. The coastal area of the Maracaibo System meets most of the above
conditions.
The major matters of contention in the Maracaibo System are oil spills, fisheries and
the intervention of the uplands. Clark (1996) sustains that an integrated coastal management program should not include fisheries management. That guideline should
show itself appropriate when fisheries do not collide with other sectors. But in the
Maracaibo System scenario, the developmertt of artisanal fisheries, and as a matter of
fact their sheer survival, is not feasible without controlling two of the other actors: trawl
fisheries and the petroleum industries. In the long run, a successful management program should also face the degradation of the uplands; this will require international
collaborative efforts since some of those grounds are shared with Colombia.