2
Nicholas C. Flemming
graphic science experiments like the Tropical Ocean Global Atmosphere experiment (TOGA) and the World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE) promised to
strengthen the scientific justification for a Global Ocean Observing System
(GOOS), but the necessary political and socialjustification was stiH missing. How
could any country or UN Agency justify such expenditure without having any certainty of the benefits? Could the benefits be measured in fmancial terms at aH, or
were they principalIy social and environmental, which might be desperately important, but almost impossible to quantify? By the mid-1980s there was much popular
and political concern about global warming and climate change, but even these
threats could not be quantified, and so investment in GOOS was stiH postponed.
Above alI the question of costs and benefits plagued the subject and made it
almost impossible to proceed. If there was no single over-riding reason, no easily
identifiable single customer for the information, why was an ocean observing system needed? If there were thousands - or miHions - of smaH customers, how could
one identify the products they needed, and how would they pay? One can see that
national navies can justify a limited regional service based on local conditions
needed to plan and control submarine warfare, and major national factory fishing
fleets can use satellite images and operational oceanography to predict fronts and
fish shoals. But beyond this the case was difficult to define. Pure scientific
research, driven by curiosity to understand the ocean, did not justify permanent
investment on the scale which would probably be needed.
In this section 1 wiH examine the way in which different organisations at
national, regional, and globallevel, have evolved strategies for solving these problems, and for committing themselves at an appropriate level for the development of
operational oceanography. 1 will make some comparisons to the development of
meteorological services, and conclude with some pointers to the future.
1.2 Early developments, the comparison with meteorology
National meteorological offices existed in many countries a hundred years ago.
WMO was established in 1950 and the World Weather Watch in 1962. The value
of good meteorological forecasts was manifest from the start, since anybody could
see the value of forecasts to farmers wishing to harvest their crops, sailors trying to
avoid a storm, or road-builders planning to pour concrete. Commercial aviation at
a trans-oceanic scale demanded accurate forecasts which could make the difference
between success and failure, life or death, on a daily basis. The national meteorological offices therefore had an immediate, dominant, and politically visible customer from the 1950s onwards. Today the world weather forecasting system and
services costs about $2bn per year, and produces proven benefits which are many
times that.
Attempts to justify expenditure on meteorology in the 1960s and 70s were successful, showing that the benefits to aviation, shipping safety, agriculture and construction far outweighed the cost to the taxpayer. Furthermore, the aviation
Nicholas C. Flemming
graphic science experiments like the Tropical Ocean Global Atmosphere experiment (TOGA) and the World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE) promised to
strengthen the scientific justification for a Global Ocean Observing System
(GOOS), but the necessary political and socialjustification was stiH missing. How
could any country or UN Agency justify such expenditure without having any certainty of the benefits? Could the benefits be measured in fmancial terms at aH, or
were they principalIy social and environmental, which might be desperately important, but almost impossible to quantify? By the mid-1980s there was much popular
and political concern about global warming and climate change, but even these
threats could not be quantified, and so investment in GOOS was stiH postponed.
Above alI the question of costs and benefits plagued the subject and made it
almost impossible to proceed. If there was no single over-riding reason, no easily
identifiable single customer for the information, why was an ocean observing system needed? If there were thousands - or miHions - of smaH customers, how could
one identify the products they needed, and how would they pay? One can see that
national navies can justify a limited regional service based on local conditions
needed to plan and control submarine warfare, and major national factory fishing
fleets can use satellite images and operational oceanography to predict fronts and
fish shoals. But beyond this the case was difficult to define. Pure scientific
research, driven by curiosity to understand the ocean, did not justify permanent
investment on the scale which would probably be needed.
In this section 1 wiH examine the way in which different organisations at
national, regional, and globallevel, have evolved strategies for solving these problems, and for committing themselves at an appropriate level for the development of
operational oceanography. 1 will make some comparisons to the development of
meteorological services, and conclude with some pointers to the future.
1.2 Early developments, the comparison with meteorology
National meteorological offices existed in many countries a hundred years ago.
WMO was established in 1950 and the World Weather Watch in 1962. The value
of good meteorological forecasts was manifest from the start, since anybody could
see the value of forecasts to farmers wishing to harvest their crops, sailors trying to
avoid a storm, or road-builders planning to pour concrete. Commercial aviation at
a trans-oceanic scale demanded accurate forecasts which could make the difference
between success and failure, life or death, on a daily basis. The national meteorological offices therefore had an immediate, dominant, and politically visible customer from the 1950s onwards. Today the world weather forecasting system and
services costs about $2bn per year, and produces proven benefits which are many
times that.
Attempts to justify expenditure on meteorology in the 1960s and 70s were successful, showing that the benefits to aviation, shipping safety, agriculture and construction far outweighed the cost to the taxpayer. Furthermore, the aviation