their side, while continuing to hold a cooperative public posture so as to preserve
their position as beneficiary. The consequent loss of the cumulative benefits due to
the individual’s covert actions will likely be miniscule (after all, the individual’s
contribution is a miniscule proportion, and the enterprise will not break down even
if there are a few defaulters), but the return to the defaulter will be disproportionately high. Of course, this sort of ‘free-riding’ will be penalized if it becomes
chronic and the community gets tired of it, so the individual may have to pay his
dues once in a while, just to maintain his membership in the community. The
enterprise can still be viable if the majority adheres to the rules, but sometimes a
few bad apples can spoil the whole lot.
Faced with this situation, one would have to resort either to some control from
outside (the state makes and enforces strict laws, for example), or the resource is
privatized so that both the costs and benefits are incident on the same entity (i.e.
externalities are internalized). There is, however, a possible third alternative
in-between state control and privatization (Dilip Kumar 1991), where the community and the state get together in a joint arrangement, an example of the ‘nested’
institutions that Elinor Ostrom recommended as the most conducive to successful
management of common property (pool) resources (e.g. see Ostrom 1990). In the
Indian forest scenario, this principle has been internalized in the Joint Forest
Management regime wherein the state forests are managed in partnership with the
communities, and conversely, communities also find it more effective to protect even
their own forest resources if there is support from the state (e.g. Dilip Kumar 2013).
This problem of ‘collective action’ is recognized by the “Climate Change 2014
Synthesis Report” (IPCC 2014c) in the following words:
Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own
interests independently. Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action
problem at the global scale… Cooperative responses, including international cooperation,
are therefore required…The evidence suggests that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to
more effective cooperation. (IPCC 2014c, p. 76; emphasis in original).
In our climate change scenario, what would be the rational choice for a country
like India, given this ‘logic of collective action’? We need to be clear about two
things: first, if India were to limit its GHG emissions (say at today’s levels), what
would be the impact on global climate change? India contributes a sizeable
quantum of current emissions (because, like China, it has a huge population,
although very low per capita levels), and it may be thought that a cap on aggregate
emissions at the current level would have a discernible impact, but in the world
situation this may be masked because other countries will continue to increase
emissions, and moreover, in spite of such caps, India and other economies will still
be adding sizeably every year to the carbon load in the atmosphere. Consider, for
example, India’s contribution to global CO 2 from the “energy and transformation
industries” in 2007 according to NATCOM-2 (Government of India 2012): taking
the figure as 749,617 Gg, or 749.6 mta (or 0.7496 Gt per annum), it constitutes a
small (if not exactly negligible) fraction of the annual contribution of 49 Gt in 2010
(globally) referred to above. Even if India wants to double the energy production,
32
P.J. Dilip Kumar
their position as beneficiary. The consequent loss of the cumulative benefits due to
the individual’s covert actions will likely be miniscule (after all, the individual’s
contribution is a miniscule proportion, and the enterprise will not break down even
if there are a few defaulters), but the return to the defaulter will be disproportionately high. Of course, this sort of ‘free-riding’ will be penalized if it becomes
chronic and the community gets tired of it, so the individual may have to pay his
dues once in a while, just to maintain his membership in the community. The
enterprise can still be viable if the majority adheres to the rules, but sometimes a
few bad apples can spoil the whole lot.
Faced with this situation, one would have to resort either to some control from
outside (the state makes and enforces strict laws, for example), or the resource is
privatized so that both the costs and benefits are incident on the same entity (i.e.
externalities are internalized). There is, however, a possible third alternative
in-between state control and privatization (Dilip Kumar 1991), where the community and the state get together in a joint arrangement, an example of the ‘nested’
institutions that Elinor Ostrom recommended as the most conducive to successful
management of common property (pool) resources (e.g. see Ostrom 1990). In the
Indian forest scenario, this principle has been internalized in the Joint Forest
Management regime wherein the state forests are managed in partnership with the
communities, and conversely, communities also find it more effective to protect even
their own forest resources if there is support from the state (e.g. Dilip Kumar 2013).
This problem of ‘collective action’ is recognized by the “Climate Change 2014
Synthesis Report” (IPCC 2014c) in the following words:
Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own
interests independently. Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action
problem at the global scale… Cooperative responses, including international cooperation,
are therefore required…The evidence suggests that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to
more effective cooperation. (IPCC 2014c, p. 76; emphasis in original).
In our climate change scenario, what would be the rational choice for a country
like India, given this ‘logic of collective action’? We need to be clear about two
things: first, if India were to limit its GHG emissions (say at today’s levels), what
would be the impact on global climate change? India contributes a sizeable
quantum of current emissions (because, like China, it has a huge population,
although very low per capita levels), and it may be thought that a cap on aggregate
emissions at the current level would have a discernible impact, but in the world
situation this may be masked because other countries will continue to increase
emissions, and moreover, in spite of such caps, India and other economies will still
be adding sizeably every year to the carbon load in the atmosphere. Consider, for
example, India’s contribution to global CO 2 from the “energy and transformation
industries” in 2007 according to NATCOM-2 (Government of India 2012): taking
the figure as 749,617 Gg, or 749.6 mta (or 0.7496 Gt per annum), it constitutes a
small (if not exactly negligible) fraction of the annual contribution of 49 Gt in 2010
(globally) referred to above. Even if India wants to double the energy production,
32
P.J. Dilip Kumar