only displaced the Newtonian universe, they replaced an entire corpse of scientific
beliefs corresponding to the well-established nineteenth century view that
Newtonian physics is the final and unchallengeable truth. Popper argued that there
is a far more important form of knowledge, namely, objective knowledge exemplified by the objectively formulated falsifiable theories in physics and astronomy
(Popper 1972; Pandit and Dosch 2013; Pandit 1982, 1991). Most important of all, a
physical theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable (Popper 1934). In the next step
that Popper took he argued for a radical alternative to the classical Plato-Descartes
epistemology, namely, an epistemology without a knowing subject that studies
objective knowledge (Popper 1972). The objective knowledge exists in the World3,
argued Popper. Thus, he distinguished the World3 of objective knowledge, first,
from the subjective World2 of minds, consciousness and beliefs, and second, from
the World1 of physical objects, processes and laws that, in fact, embeds the Earth’s
biodiverse world of wonderful ecosystems (Popper 1972).
How does ecology of knowledge, as I propose here to introduce it, emerge as a
new discipline on the intellectual horizon? It emerges as an inquiry into the
diversity of contexts/forms of knowledge whether understood in a subjective or an
objective sense. In either case, knowledge must be distinguishable from ‘information’ and ‘interpersonal communication’ that are far wider in scope. Within the
framework of these finer distinctions, it is now possible not only to turn Descartes’
tree of knowledge around but to bring the knowing subject with varied interests and
human situations back in. I have here in my mind the possibility of adopting the
standpoint of ecology of knowledge. One immediate consequence of doing so is
that morality and moral self-development assume priority over our roles as members of epistemic communities, i.e. as producers of knowledge and creators of
knowledge environments. This, in its turn, makes us more responsible as
problem-posing and problem-solving agents in whatever we want to create or
produce in order to secure a world in which we can live with freedom and dignity.
Moreover, instead of waiting for one and the same ‘tree’ of knowledge until it bears
fruit, we can now think of different ‘trees’, representing diverse forms of knowledge
and interpersonal communication. Some of these forms can be discovered in
interpersonal relations as these develop in the child’s knowledge of his/her mother
as also in the mother’s knowledge of her child, in friendship between persons and in
our knowledge of the world shaped by our personal experiences. Think of what
children can know about their mothers or what mother’s can know about their
children, and think of the adult’s knowledge of the world. In short, in what follows,
I want to propose that ecology of knowledge includes in its study a whole diversity
of forms of knowledge that can be studied as part of knowledge resources dynamics
(Pandit and Meusburger 2015). What is true of knowledge applies to interpersonal
communication generally. By arguing and requiring that all scientific knowledge
must be identified in terms of its developmental context (Pandit 1989, 2010a,
2012a; Pandit and Dosch 2013), we can expect the structure of knowledge to vary
according to the variable contexts of its development. In the context of my argument in this article, I shall redefine ‘knowledge’ as a context-dependent resource in
the following sense (Pandit and Dosch 2013).
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G.L. Pandit
beliefs corresponding to the well-established nineteenth century view that
Newtonian physics is the final and unchallengeable truth. Popper argued that there
is a far more important form of knowledge, namely, objective knowledge exemplified by the objectively formulated falsifiable theories in physics and astronomy
(Popper 1972; Pandit and Dosch 2013; Pandit 1982, 1991). Most important of all, a
physical theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable (Popper 1934). In the next step
that Popper took he argued for a radical alternative to the classical Plato-Descartes
epistemology, namely, an epistemology without a knowing subject that studies
objective knowledge (Popper 1972). The objective knowledge exists in the World3,
argued Popper. Thus, he distinguished the World3 of objective knowledge, first,
from the subjective World2 of minds, consciousness and beliefs, and second, from
the World1 of physical objects, processes and laws that, in fact, embeds the Earth’s
biodiverse world of wonderful ecosystems (Popper 1972).
How does ecology of knowledge, as I propose here to introduce it, emerge as a
new discipline on the intellectual horizon? It emerges as an inquiry into the
diversity of contexts/forms of knowledge whether understood in a subjective or an
objective sense. In either case, knowledge must be distinguishable from ‘information’ and ‘interpersonal communication’ that are far wider in scope. Within the
framework of these finer distinctions, it is now possible not only to turn Descartes’
tree of knowledge around but to bring the knowing subject with varied interests and
human situations back in. I have here in my mind the possibility of adopting the
standpoint of ecology of knowledge. One immediate consequence of doing so is
that morality and moral self-development assume priority over our roles as members of epistemic communities, i.e. as producers of knowledge and creators of
knowledge environments. This, in its turn, makes us more responsible as
problem-posing and problem-solving agents in whatever we want to create or
produce in order to secure a world in which we can live with freedom and dignity.
Moreover, instead of waiting for one and the same ‘tree’ of knowledge until it bears
fruit, we can now think of different ‘trees’, representing diverse forms of knowledge
and interpersonal communication. Some of these forms can be discovered in
interpersonal relations as these develop in the child’s knowledge of his/her mother
as also in the mother’s knowledge of her child, in friendship between persons and in
our knowledge of the world shaped by our personal experiences. Think of what
children can know about their mothers or what mother’s can know about their
children, and think of the adult’s knowledge of the world. In short, in what follows,
I want to propose that ecology of knowledge includes in its study a whole diversity
of forms of knowledge that can be studied as part of knowledge resources dynamics
(Pandit and Meusburger 2015). What is true of knowledge applies to interpersonal
communication generally. By arguing and requiring that all scientific knowledge
must be identified in terms of its developmental context (Pandit 1989, 2010a,
2012a; Pandit and Dosch 2013), we can expect the structure of knowledge to vary
according to the variable contexts of its development. In the context of my argument in this article, I shall redefine ‘knowledge’ as a context-dependent resource in
the following sense (Pandit and Dosch 2013).
140
G.L. Pandit