(i) In advanced economies the information sector contributes around 50 % to
gross domestic product, and it has been the fastest growing sector over the
last twenty years.
(ii) Research, development and innovations are main contributors to economic
growth and explain up to 50 % of the increase of labour productivity.
(iii) Accounting for information poses a major challenge to economic theory in
almost all of its branches.
Yet I think that it is not helpful at all if we use the terms ‘knowledge’ and
‘information’ synonymously, as Clemenz, and many other scientists, are prone to
do, spelling out the following research agenda:
‘It has to be acknowledged that there is no such thing as a commodity “knowledge” which
can be treated as homogeneous at least to the same degree as cars or computers.
“Knowledge” is created in various forms, under various conditions and for various purposes, and it looks impossible to determine its properties and its handling in markets or
other institutions without specifying the context. So in some sense we are back at the old
and unsolved epistemological question what knowledge is. However, economic considerations along the lines presented above should be helpful. We should look at the type of
knowledge we are considering, and Machlup’s classification is probably a good starting
point. We should look at the technical conditions under which knowledge is produced, e.g.
the extent to which it can be modularized, and we should look at the ways in which it can
be utilized, commercially and otherwise. And finally, we should keep in mind that economics provides a useful way to look at things, but it needs to be supplemented by the
insights of other disciplines as well (Clemenz 2007, p. 9)’.
Let me make a digression by drawing attention to the classical Plato-Descartestradition (Pandit 1982, 1989, 1991, 2010a, 2012a). According to this tradition, all
knowledge can be represented, even if metaphorically, by a single tree symbolizing
its unity within the dualism of the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. In
the sense of subjective knowledge, all knowledge claims share the same standard
form within the Cartesian formalization as follows:
‘S knows/claims to know that p’, where ‘S’ symbolizes the knowing subject, whose personal identity, gender, interests, human situation, variable contexts and lifeworlds are
dogmatically assumed to be without a bearing on how we define ‘knowledge’; and ‘p’
symbolizes the individual proposition stating a relatively simple matter of fact.
With the universally identifiable knowing subject as its frame of reference,
epistemology in the classical Plato-Descartes-tradition takes off as an inquiry that
aims at analyzing the structure and properties of all knowledge claims that are
assumed to be reducible to this standard form. Not only does this tradition make the
knowing subject the owner of all kinds of knowledge, invariably it implies a denial
of the existence of objective knowledge (Popper 1972; Pandit 1982, 1991).
However, in the twentieth century, the methodologist of science Popper (1934)
became the first to challenge this classical tradition that reduces all knowledge to
the subjective states in the mind. Popper had the advantage of learning from
Einstein’s special and general theory of relativity (Popper 1934). These theories not
Knowledge-Based Climate Economy …
139
gross domestic product, and it has been the fastest growing sector over the
last twenty years.
(ii) Research, development and innovations are main contributors to economic
growth and explain up to 50 % of the increase of labour productivity.
(iii) Accounting for information poses a major challenge to economic theory in
almost all of its branches.
Yet I think that it is not helpful at all if we use the terms ‘knowledge’ and
‘information’ synonymously, as Clemenz, and many other scientists, are prone to
do, spelling out the following research agenda:
‘It has to be acknowledged that there is no such thing as a commodity “knowledge” which
can be treated as homogeneous at least to the same degree as cars or computers.
“Knowledge” is created in various forms, under various conditions and for various purposes, and it looks impossible to determine its properties and its handling in markets or
other institutions without specifying the context. So in some sense we are back at the old
and unsolved epistemological question what knowledge is. However, economic considerations along the lines presented above should be helpful. We should look at the type of
knowledge we are considering, and Machlup’s classification is probably a good starting
point. We should look at the technical conditions under which knowledge is produced, e.g.
the extent to which it can be modularized, and we should look at the ways in which it can
be utilized, commercially and otherwise. And finally, we should keep in mind that economics provides a useful way to look at things, but it needs to be supplemented by the
insights of other disciplines as well (Clemenz 2007, p. 9)’.
Let me make a digression by drawing attention to the classical Plato-Descartestradition (Pandit 1982, 1989, 1991, 2010a, 2012a). According to this tradition, all
knowledge can be represented, even if metaphorically, by a single tree symbolizing
its unity within the dualism of the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. In
the sense of subjective knowledge, all knowledge claims share the same standard
form within the Cartesian formalization as follows:
‘S knows/claims to know that p’, where ‘S’ symbolizes the knowing subject, whose personal identity, gender, interests, human situation, variable contexts and lifeworlds are
dogmatically assumed to be without a bearing on how we define ‘knowledge’; and ‘p’
symbolizes the individual proposition stating a relatively simple matter of fact.
With the universally identifiable knowing subject as its frame of reference,
epistemology in the classical Plato-Descartes-tradition takes off as an inquiry that
aims at analyzing the structure and properties of all knowledge claims that are
assumed to be reducible to this standard form. Not only does this tradition make the
knowing subject the owner of all kinds of knowledge, invariably it implies a denial
of the existence of objective knowledge (Popper 1972; Pandit 1982, 1991).
However, in the twentieth century, the methodologist of science Popper (1934)
became the first to challenge this classical tradition that reduces all knowledge to
the subjective states in the mind. Popper had the advantage of learning from
Einstein’s special and general theory of relativity (Popper 1934). These theories not
Knowledge-Based Climate Economy …
139