during crisis) is not an unanticipated consequence of the existing water governance
system. Both scarcity and flooding events in the UK continue to be framed as
mismanagement and governance failures. This extends beyond the case study of
Somerset and reflects the nature of water management in England. For example,
drought events in England have historically been understood as a failure of planning and as such are seen as reflective of industry incompetence and a lack of
planning (e.g. Hope 2012). The need for greater investment in supply and sewerage
systems in order to create greater short and long-term resilience in the water
industry was in fact a large part of the justification for the privatisation of the water
industry in England (Bakker 2003, 2005; Maloney and Richardson 1994; Medd and
Marvin 2008; Moss et al. 2008). Walker (2014) argues that the forms of water
governance that have emerged from these conditions have actually created a (meta)
governance failure when it comes to the governance of water scarcity across
England (Walker 2014 drawing on Jessop 2000, 2003). The lasting legacies of these
historical forms of governance—and the conceptualization(s) of resilience that they
push forward and promote regarding infrastructures, nature and people—can be
witnessed throughout the events narrated in this chapter.
The Somerset case study—which reflects upon the policy aftermath of a period
of drought and flooding between 2010 and 2014—is an insight into how these
(meta) governance failures affect multiple areas of water management across
England. The fragmented nature of the English water sector splits multiple
responsibilities for different aspects across multiple actors (and due to the nature of
the Levels and Moors the water management in Somerset is particularly unique and
complex). The assessment of the governance context in Somerset has shown that
the long-term adaptation plans, and crisis management strategies and instruments
that are emerging in each of these boundaries of responsibilities for water management are strong and becoming increasingly clear (e.g. Environment Agency
2015a). However, it is how they unfold in locations and times of crisis that actually
reflect the entrenched meta-governance failures. Such emergency events often lead
to calls to renationalize the water services in England (e.g. Clark 2012; Gaines
2013)—stemming from a range of critiques of the neoliberalization of water sectors
internationally (e.g. Bakker 2013; de Gouvella and Scott 2012; Hall et al. 2013).
However, this is the governance system that has been inherited, and that is still
emerging (Walker 2014) in events such as those described in this chapter. The
events in Somerset reflect a deeper political failure to maintain strategies and
instruments that support water management both directions of climate change
extremes (drought and flood), and a failure to dovetail adaptation into connected
forms of policy and planning (such as land use planning).
A discussion of the types of solutions and actions that could proactively deal
with both drought and flooding is needed, at all political levels. In the aftermath of
the flooding it was difficult to see how such a measured debate could in fact be
initiated—after all these were lives and livelihoods that were devastated by the
flooding and many are still involved in the necessary long-term emotional and
physical work implicated in recovery from such extremes events (Medd et al. 2014;
Whittle et al. 2011). Discussing ‘drought and water scarcity’ at such times could be
5 Governing for Drought and Water Scarcity …
103
system. Both scarcity and flooding events in the UK continue to be framed as
mismanagement and governance failures. This extends beyond the case study of
Somerset and reflects the nature of water management in England. For example,
drought events in England have historically been understood as a failure of planning and as such are seen as reflective of industry incompetence and a lack of
planning (e.g. Hope 2012). The need for greater investment in supply and sewerage
systems in order to create greater short and long-term resilience in the water
industry was in fact a large part of the justification for the privatisation of the water
industry in England (Bakker 2003, 2005; Maloney and Richardson 1994; Medd and
Marvin 2008; Moss et al. 2008). Walker (2014) argues that the forms of water
governance that have emerged from these conditions have actually created a (meta)
governance failure when it comes to the governance of water scarcity across
England (Walker 2014 drawing on Jessop 2000, 2003). The lasting legacies of these
historical forms of governance—and the conceptualization(s) of resilience that they
push forward and promote regarding infrastructures, nature and people—can be
witnessed throughout the events narrated in this chapter.
The Somerset case study—which reflects upon the policy aftermath of a period
of drought and flooding between 2010 and 2014—is an insight into how these
(meta) governance failures affect multiple areas of water management across
England. The fragmented nature of the English water sector splits multiple
responsibilities for different aspects across multiple actors (and due to the nature of
the Levels and Moors the water management in Somerset is particularly unique and
complex). The assessment of the governance context in Somerset has shown that
the long-term adaptation plans, and crisis management strategies and instruments
that are emerging in each of these boundaries of responsibilities for water management are strong and becoming increasingly clear (e.g. Environment Agency
2015a). However, it is how they unfold in locations and times of crisis that actually
reflect the entrenched meta-governance failures. Such emergency events often lead
to calls to renationalize the water services in England (e.g. Clark 2012; Gaines
2013)—stemming from a range of critiques of the neoliberalization of water sectors
internationally (e.g. Bakker 2013; de Gouvella and Scott 2012; Hall et al. 2013).
However, this is the governance system that has been inherited, and that is still
emerging (Walker 2014) in events such as those described in this chapter. The
events in Somerset reflect a deeper political failure to maintain strategies and
instruments that support water management both directions of climate change
extremes (drought and flood), and a failure to dovetail adaptation into connected
forms of policy and planning (such as land use planning).
A discussion of the types of solutions and actions that could proactively deal
with both drought and flooding is needed, at all political levels. In the aftermath of
the flooding it was difficult to see how such a measured debate could in fact be
initiated—after all these were lives and livelihoods that were devastated by the
flooding and many are still involved in the necessary long-term emotional and
physical work implicated in recovery from such extremes events (Medd et al. 2014;
Whittle et al. 2011). Discussing ‘drought and water scarcity’ at such times could be
5 Governing for Drought and Water Scarcity …
103