reflect decisions that are both planned for (contingencies such as the National
Drought Framework discussed in Sect. 5.3, or the UK Civil Contingencies register),
and sets of decisions orchestrated at the time of an emergency or exceptional event
(Adey and Anderson 2011). The form that the ‘flood intervention’ took during this
period was highly politicised (McEwen et al. 2014), and reflected a militarization of
emergency water management. This is partly to do with the unexpected scale and
duration of the flood event. Also, as Gilbert (2012) states, such militarization of
climate change events “perpetuates an externalised concept of nature that is to be
commanded and controlled, with no real sense of ecological prioritization” (p. 10).
The discussions following the floods were dominated by conversations of infrastructure and engineering solutions such as dredging as longer term adaptation
options (Browne 2014). Catchment management for example—although promoted
by WFD, Defra and in the Flood Action Plan for the region (Cameron 2014)—did
not strongly feature in the development of formal policy in the region following the
floods (Environment Agency 2015b). Lead stakeholders in the Flood Action Plan
and SRA are, however, now promoting this agenda.
Recent research has shown that the winter floods increased British peoples’
perspectives that climate change was happening in the UK (Capstick et al. 2015). It
is a missed opportunity that such events were not used to encourage a public
discussion about the potential extreme climate and water futures of both flooding
and drought for the UK in public fora. A consequence of the policy outfall of this
extreme event was a siloing of flooding from wider water management issues,
partnerships, networks and adaptation activities already occurring in the region and
which had harnessed a more complete sense of the connection of drought and
flooding governance than that represented in the policies that emerged post the
floods of 2013/14. Encouragingly, this recognition of the need to integrate flood and
drought research, innovation, practice and policy development is now emerging in
the industry (see for example Wharfe (2015) UK Water Partnership report).
What is important to reflect upon, however, is the way that the flood recovery
and policy developments were framed, and how dealing with the flooding as an
extreme event in this way closed down certain lines of discussion about how to
connect water management adaptation activities in a more comprehensive way.
Butler and Walker-Springett (2015) have reflected on the complexities of the ways
floods are discussed within media and public fora, and how this obscures lived,
private experiences which then shapes particular (restricted) policy and implementation activities. This is also reflective of other work on the social dimensions of
flooding recovery (Medd and Marvin 2008; Whittle et al. 2011). Recovery from
extreme events is often framed in terms of infrastructural recovery and adaptation;
however, these are also missed opportunities to connect to a fuller understanding of
infrastructural resilience (e.g. connecting across areas of water management and
promoting climate change resilience more generally), and in creating greater
community resilience (e.g. as discussed by Medd and Marvin 2008, 2014; Whittle
et al. 2011, 2012).
Engagement with the critical literatures on water management in England
highlights that the siloing of these water management areas in this way (especially
102
A.L. Browne et al.
Drought Framework discussed in Sect. 5.3, or the UK Civil Contingencies register),
and sets of decisions orchestrated at the time of an emergency or exceptional event
(Adey and Anderson 2011). The form that the ‘flood intervention’ took during this
period was highly politicised (McEwen et al. 2014), and reflected a militarization of
emergency water management. This is partly to do with the unexpected scale and
duration of the flood event. Also, as Gilbert (2012) states, such militarization of
climate change events “perpetuates an externalised concept of nature that is to be
commanded and controlled, with no real sense of ecological prioritization” (p. 10).
The discussions following the floods were dominated by conversations of infrastructure and engineering solutions such as dredging as longer term adaptation
options (Browne 2014). Catchment management for example—although promoted
by WFD, Defra and in the Flood Action Plan for the region (Cameron 2014)—did
not strongly feature in the development of formal policy in the region following the
floods (Environment Agency 2015b). Lead stakeholders in the Flood Action Plan
and SRA are, however, now promoting this agenda.
Recent research has shown that the winter floods increased British peoples’
perspectives that climate change was happening in the UK (Capstick et al. 2015). It
is a missed opportunity that such events were not used to encourage a public
discussion about the potential extreme climate and water futures of both flooding
and drought for the UK in public fora. A consequence of the policy outfall of this
extreme event was a siloing of flooding from wider water management issues,
partnerships, networks and adaptation activities already occurring in the region and
which had harnessed a more complete sense of the connection of drought and
flooding governance than that represented in the policies that emerged post the
floods of 2013/14. Encouragingly, this recognition of the need to integrate flood and
drought research, innovation, practice and policy development is now emerging in
the industry (see for example Wharfe (2015) UK Water Partnership report).
What is important to reflect upon, however, is the way that the flood recovery
and policy developments were framed, and how dealing with the flooding as an
extreme event in this way closed down certain lines of discussion about how to
connect water management adaptation activities in a more comprehensive way.
Butler and Walker-Springett (2015) have reflected on the complexities of the ways
floods are discussed within media and public fora, and how this obscures lived,
private experiences which then shapes particular (restricted) policy and implementation activities. This is also reflective of other work on the social dimensions of
flooding recovery (Medd and Marvin 2008; Whittle et al. 2011). Recovery from
extreme events is often framed in terms of infrastructural recovery and adaptation;
however, these are also missed opportunities to connect to a fuller understanding of
infrastructural resilience (e.g. connecting across areas of water management and
promoting climate change resilience more generally), and in creating greater
community resilience (e.g. as discussed by Medd and Marvin 2008, 2014; Whittle
et al. 2011, 2012).
Engagement with the critical literatures on water management in England
highlights that the siloing of these water management areas in this way (especially
102
A.L. Browne et al.