271
tation of rivers is far from being given priority within the Israel Water Authority.
Israel’s water management is highly centralised and linked to its scientifi c technocratic embedment. At present water planning mostly originates from this background, one of the reasons why water strategies have been criticised openly by the
public and in politics. The civil society with its nature protection organisations and
consumer protection groups is currently not represented in the water commission. A
better representation of these groups might not make the decision-making process
easier or shorter but in the end might lead to a better understanding and higher consensus within the Israeli society.
Pricing policies and levies to address the scarcity of natural resources as an
incentive for water-saving measures are especially subject to differing interests and
the volatile nature of political processes.
Many municipalities refuse to participate in the overall water allocations system.
They expect a loss of independence and reduced potential for cross-subsidising
other sectors (Kan and Kislev 2011 ). Improving civil society involvement and participation in water management planning processes could also help to reprioritise
the objectives of water allocation and water pricing and increase support for unpopular measures within society.
Israel suffers not only from water shortages but also from increased income disparities and low welfare expenditures (Dahan and Hazan 2014 ). The outbreak of the
social protests in summer 2011 is a refl ection of these disparities. But water pricing
would be the wrong instrument to mitigate these disparities. Low-income groups
are supported by specifi c welfare programmes instead of lower water prices.
The restructuring process within Israel’s water management has still not come to
an end with regard to water corporations. Two specifi c problems are linked to this
issue: the fi rst is that there are far too many water companies in Israel, and the second is that under the uniform tariff structure system, companies who perform well
have to support the ones who perform less well (Kan and Kislev 2011 ). This is due
to water corporations with high water losses and high losses in water charges
(because of compliance problems in water price payments) paying lower prices to
Mekorot. To reemphasise – according to the equity principle, despite end-users’
respective water resource use, all water prices are identical – subsequently this
results in different costs in different regions. The government and Israel Water
Authority need to fi nd a way out of this dilemma ( ibid. ).
16.9 Can Israel Serve as a Role Model? 10 Lessons
to Be Learnt
Israel has a very specifi c water management and the specifi city of the availability of
its water resources, technical facilities and governance structures limits the transferability of the Israeli experiences to other countries. Nevertheless, some lessons can
16 Technologies, Incentives and Cost Recovery: Is There an Israeli Role Model?
tation of rivers is far from being given priority within the Israel Water Authority.
Israel’s water management is highly centralised and linked to its scientifi c technocratic embedment. At present water planning mostly originates from this background, one of the reasons why water strategies have been criticised openly by the
public and in politics. The civil society with its nature protection organisations and
consumer protection groups is currently not represented in the water commission. A
better representation of these groups might not make the decision-making process
easier or shorter but in the end might lead to a better understanding and higher consensus within the Israeli society.
Pricing policies and levies to address the scarcity of natural resources as an
incentive for water-saving measures are especially subject to differing interests and
the volatile nature of political processes.
Many municipalities refuse to participate in the overall water allocations system.
They expect a loss of independence and reduced potential for cross-subsidising
other sectors (Kan and Kislev 2011 ). Improving civil society involvement and participation in water management planning processes could also help to reprioritise
the objectives of water allocation and water pricing and increase support for unpopular measures within society.
Israel suffers not only from water shortages but also from increased income disparities and low welfare expenditures (Dahan and Hazan 2014 ). The outbreak of the
social protests in summer 2011 is a refl ection of these disparities. But water pricing
would be the wrong instrument to mitigate these disparities. Low-income groups
are supported by specifi c welfare programmes instead of lower water prices.
The restructuring process within Israel’s water management has still not come to
an end with regard to water corporations. Two specifi c problems are linked to this
issue: the fi rst is that there are far too many water companies in Israel, and the second is that under the uniform tariff structure system, companies who perform well
have to support the ones who perform less well (Kan and Kislev 2011 ). This is due
to water corporations with high water losses and high losses in water charges
(because of compliance problems in water price payments) paying lower prices to
Mekorot. To reemphasise – according to the equity principle, despite end-users’
respective water resource use, all water prices are identical – subsequently this
results in different costs in different regions. The government and Israel Water
Authority need to fi nd a way out of this dilemma ( ibid. ).
16.9 Can Israel Serve as a Role Model? 10 Lessons
to Be Learnt
Israel has a very specifi c water management and the specifi city of the availability of
its water resources, technical facilities and governance structures limits the transferability of the Israeli experiences to other countries. Nevertheless, some lessons can
16 Technologies, Incentives and Cost Recovery: Is There an Israeli Role Model?