255
The water law also foresaw the institution of a “Water Commissioner” whose task
was to monitor and allocate water rights. The Water Commission itself was supposed
to be composed of two thirds of the general public, but the commission was dominated by representatives from the agricultural sector receiving 13 out of the 39 representative positions allocated (Plaut 2000 ). Until 2000, the Minister of Agriculture
was the supreme statutory authority for the formulation of Israel’s water policy. Also
the Knesset Finance Committee, which was supposed to supervise the water policies,
was dominated by agricultural lobbying groups ( ibid. ). As a result of these policies,
water prices in the agricultural sector did not refl ect the scarcity of the resource.
Instead, the agricultural sector was highly subsidised, and crops with a high
water consumption rate such as cotton, citrus and fl owers became profi table. Not
only are these crops not adapted to the arid climatic conditions, but also they require
high quantitative and quality water (Lipchin 2007 ).
In his 1990 report, Israel’s state comptroller heavily criticised the existing water
policies. In addition, the 2000 report was very critical of government pollution prevention policies (Plaut 2000 ). In 1997, the Arlosoroff Commission recommended to
reduce agricultural water uses and change the institutional structures dominated by
the agricultural sector (Feitelson 2001, cited in Lipchin 2007 ). However, it took
nearly another decade and a couple of years of severe drought brought on by the
political lock-in until the propositions favouring agriculture were taken down. This
policy shift was underpinned by breaking up Mekorot’s monopoly as Israel’s only
water supplier (Feitelson 2013 ).
Since 2007, Israel has gradually implemented several measures to overcome the
water crisis. The main measures were:
1. Reform of the water management institutions
2. Enlargement of the water supply by different technical solutions (construction of
sea water desalination plants on the Mediterranean coast, upgrading existing and
construction of new wastewater recycling plants, use of the effl uents for
irrigation)
3. Introduction of economic incentives (water prices) to manage demand
4. A campaign to raise public awareness.
16.3 Reform of the Water Management Institutions
In 2007, the Israel Water Authority was created to replace the former Water
Commission. The “Governmental Authority for Water and Sewage” (Israel Water
Authority) gradually gathered all regulatory bodies concerning water issues under
its authority. The main objective of the 2007 reform was to
[…] enable the Authority implementing an integrative management of the whole ‘water chain’
and to transfer authorities from the political level of several ministers to one professional
board. (Israel Water Authority 2012a , p. 1)
This has come into reality and today the Israel Water Authority is in charge of the
management and regulation of the national water sector according to the water law.
16 Technologies, Incentives and Cost Recovery: Is There an Israeli Role Model?
The water law also foresaw the institution of a “Water Commissioner” whose task
was to monitor and allocate water rights. The Water Commission itself was supposed
to be composed of two thirds of the general public, but the commission was dominated by representatives from the agricultural sector receiving 13 out of the 39 representative positions allocated (Plaut 2000 ). Until 2000, the Minister of Agriculture
was the supreme statutory authority for the formulation of Israel’s water policy. Also
the Knesset Finance Committee, which was supposed to supervise the water policies,
was dominated by agricultural lobbying groups ( ibid. ). As a result of these policies,
water prices in the agricultural sector did not refl ect the scarcity of the resource.
Instead, the agricultural sector was highly subsidised, and crops with a high
water consumption rate such as cotton, citrus and fl owers became profi table. Not
only are these crops not adapted to the arid climatic conditions, but also they require
high quantitative and quality water (Lipchin 2007 ).
In his 1990 report, Israel’s state comptroller heavily criticised the existing water
policies. In addition, the 2000 report was very critical of government pollution prevention policies (Plaut 2000 ). In 1997, the Arlosoroff Commission recommended to
reduce agricultural water uses and change the institutional structures dominated by
the agricultural sector (Feitelson 2001, cited in Lipchin 2007 ). However, it took
nearly another decade and a couple of years of severe drought brought on by the
political lock-in until the propositions favouring agriculture were taken down. This
policy shift was underpinned by breaking up Mekorot’s monopoly as Israel’s only
water supplier (Feitelson 2013 ).
Since 2007, Israel has gradually implemented several measures to overcome the
water crisis. The main measures were:
1. Reform of the water management institutions
2. Enlargement of the water supply by different technical solutions (construction of
sea water desalination plants on the Mediterranean coast, upgrading existing and
construction of new wastewater recycling plants, use of the effl uents for
irrigation)
3. Introduction of economic incentives (water prices) to manage demand
4. A campaign to raise public awareness.
16.3 Reform of the Water Management Institutions
In 2007, the Israel Water Authority was created to replace the former Water
Commission. The “Governmental Authority for Water and Sewage” (Israel Water
Authority) gradually gathered all regulatory bodies concerning water issues under
its authority. The main objective of the 2007 reform was to
[…] enable the Authority implementing an integrative management of the whole ‘water chain’
and to transfer authorities from the political level of several ministers to one professional
board. (Israel Water Authority 2012a , p. 1)
This has come into reality and today the Israel Water Authority is in charge of the
management and regulation of the national water sector according to the water law.
16 Technologies, Incentives and Cost Recovery: Is There an Israeli Role Model?