231
15.1.3 Governance Shortcomings
Jordan’s water governance record provides a third perplexing perspective. With
vital national and human security interests at stake, Jordan has published strategies
and introduced donor-supported reforms, targeting demand management, over more
than two decades. But, these efforts have been insuffi cient to narrow worsening
water defi cits, protect groundwater and pre-empt the disaster to which the country
is heading. Consider the balance-sheet during the two decades to 2010.
15.1.3.1 Reducing Unsustainable Highlands Groundwater Abstraction
After 1997 demand management focused on reducing groundwater use for irrigated
agriculture especially in the Highlands, where it consumes up to half of abstracted
water. The landmark Groundwater By-Law No 85 (2002) sought to control abstraction through block tariffs, penalising the abuse of licensed withdrawal levels and
closing illegal wells (FOEME 2010 ).
3 These moves proved insuffi cient – in 2010,
withdrawals from renewable aquifers still exceeded safe yield by an average 55 %
(and by 176 and 215 % in the Amman-Zarqa and Azraq basins, according to (GIZ
2011 ; Subah and Habjoka 2011 ; MWI 2012 ). Water institutions acting alone lacked
the capacity – both authority and back-up from the ministries of interior and agriculture – to enforce regulations on drilling and private sales and to effectively monitor and close wells. Compounding matters and in the knowledge of donors, two
major donor-funded initiatives, the Water Demand Management Unit and the
USAID’s Instituting Water Demand Management failed to target agriculture (Yorke
2013 , p. 43).
4
15.1.3.2 Encouraging Effi cient Water Use
From 1997, the importance of pricing and incentives to encourage more effi cient
water use and to raise revenue was also recognised. Refl ecting Jordanian-donor collaboration, Jordan’s Water Strategy (JWS) of 2009 called for cost-refl ective tariffs
for the long term, and the USAID sought to raise awareness on the need to change
the way water is valued and allocated.
However, political, historical and social factors limited the sector’s capacity to
implement its plans, according to offi cials and water specialists interviewed by the
author (Yorke 2013 , pp. 43–44). Authority to alter water tariffs or remove tariffs on
3 The By-Law created a 150,000 m
3 /year quota of free abstraction for each well, with block tariffs
for further amounts abstracted. A 2004 amendment, providing for changes in these tariffs in 2008,
was not implemented.
4 According to the USAID Offi ce of Inspector General’s 2011 audit, USAID/Jordan had no project
focusing on agriculture’s water use and conditions precedent no longer required the government to
address water use in agriculture. Jordan offi cials had also requested the mission to drop the condition on closing 50 illegal wells.
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…
15.1.3 Governance Shortcomings
Jordan’s water governance record provides a third perplexing perspective. With
vital national and human security interests at stake, Jordan has published strategies
and introduced donor-supported reforms, targeting demand management, over more
than two decades. But, these efforts have been insuffi cient to narrow worsening
water defi cits, protect groundwater and pre-empt the disaster to which the country
is heading. Consider the balance-sheet during the two decades to 2010.
15.1.3.1 Reducing Unsustainable Highlands Groundwater Abstraction
After 1997 demand management focused on reducing groundwater use for irrigated
agriculture especially in the Highlands, where it consumes up to half of abstracted
water. The landmark Groundwater By-Law No 85 (2002) sought to control abstraction through block tariffs, penalising the abuse of licensed withdrawal levels and
closing illegal wells (FOEME 2010 ).
3 These moves proved insuffi cient – in 2010,
withdrawals from renewable aquifers still exceeded safe yield by an average 55 %
(and by 176 and 215 % in the Amman-Zarqa and Azraq basins, according to (GIZ
2011 ; Subah and Habjoka 2011 ; MWI 2012 ). Water institutions acting alone lacked
the capacity – both authority and back-up from the ministries of interior and agriculture – to enforce regulations on drilling and private sales and to effectively monitor and close wells. Compounding matters and in the knowledge of donors, two
major donor-funded initiatives, the Water Demand Management Unit and the
USAID’s Instituting Water Demand Management failed to target agriculture (Yorke
2013 , p. 43).
4
15.1.3.2 Encouraging Effi cient Water Use
From 1997, the importance of pricing and incentives to encourage more effi cient
water use and to raise revenue was also recognised. Refl ecting Jordanian-donor collaboration, Jordan’s Water Strategy (JWS) of 2009 called for cost-refl ective tariffs
for the long term, and the USAID sought to raise awareness on the need to change
the way water is valued and allocated.
However, political, historical and social factors limited the sector’s capacity to
implement its plans, according to offi cials and water specialists interviewed by the
author (Yorke 2013 , pp. 43–44). Authority to alter water tariffs or remove tariffs on
3 The By-Law created a 150,000 m
3 /year quota of free abstraction for each well, with block tariffs
for further amounts abstracted. A 2004 amendment, providing for changes in these tariffs in 2008,
was not implemented.
4 According to the USAID Offi ce of Inspector General’s 2011 audit, USAID/Jordan had no project
focusing on agriculture’s water use and conditions precedent no longer required the government to
address water use in agriculture. Jordan offi cials had also requested the mission to drop the condition on closing 50 illegal wells.
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…