228
Keywords Jordan water scarcity • Water governance shortcomings • Politics of
water • Shadow state networks • National and regional solutions • Cooperation •
Water security • Water demand • Water supply • RSDS Conveyance Project
15.1 Defi ning the Problem
15.1.1 Demand Exceeds Supply
In terms of numbers, the scale of the challenge facing Jordan to 2025 and beyond of
securing water to provide for its expanding population and meet its economic
growth aspirations is crystal clear. Recent demand and supply projections in studies
using different methodologies all show substantial defi cits (MWI and WRG 2011 ;
Coyne et Bellier 2012 ; USAID 2012 ). These differ in size, however. In order, therefore, to refl ect the extent of the problem as realistically as possible, alternative projections – based on the MWI’s annual water budget of 2012, but stripped of outdated
or uncertain assumptions (Yorke 2013 , pp. 25–27) – are provided at Fig. 15.2 .
They show widening defi cits, reaching 630 × 10
6 m
3 /year by 2025, the implications of which are well recognised: Jordan needs a costly new bulk supply source
for the long term and meanwhile demand will likely continue to be met by overabstracting valuable low-cost renewable supplies.
Jordan faces a deepening water crisis, aggravated over decades by climatechange impacts, regional confl ict, infl ows of migrants and poor governance.
Its people are among the most water-deprived worldwide, with 145 m
3 /year
per person (2008) (MWI 2009 , p. 3–1), a level projected to fall as the gap
between demand for water and renewable and fi nanced non-renewable supplies widens. Few in-country options remain to develop new water. Meanwhile,
with more than 80 % of available annual supply of up to 900 × 10
6 m
3 depending on unsustainable abstraction from groundwater aquifers and on diminishing transboundary surface fl ows, Jordanians could face absolute water poverty
by 2025, with only 90 m
3 per person (USAID 2012 , p. vii). MWI statistics for
1994–2010 (Fig. 15.1 ) also reveal continuing structural distortions in water
use: agriculture remained the dominant consumer (66 %), whilst contributing
only 3.5 % of GDP (MWI and WRG 2011 , p. 23); the municipal sector modestly increased its share (30 %) and industry/tourism use remained low
(4.5–7 %). Behind these data lie dangerous trends, namely continuing overpumping of groundwater aquifers; continuing ineffi cient water use in terms of
productivity and diminishing scope to cope with climate- change impacts.
V. Yorke
Keywords Jordan water scarcity • Water governance shortcomings • Politics of
water • Shadow state networks • National and regional solutions • Cooperation •
Water security • Water demand • Water supply • RSDS Conveyance Project
15.1 Defi ning the Problem
15.1.1 Demand Exceeds Supply
In terms of numbers, the scale of the challenge facing Jordan to 2025 and beyond of
securing water to provide for its expanding population and meet its economic
growth aspirations is crystal clear. Recent demand and supply projections in studies
using different methodologies all show substantial defi cits (MWI and WRG 2011 ;
Coyne et Bellier 2012 ; USAID 2012 ). These differ in size, however. In order, therefore, to refl ect the extent of the problem as realistically as possible, alternative projections – based on the MWI’s annual water budget of 2012, but stripped of outdated
or uncertain assumptions (Yorke 2013 , pp. 25–27) – are provided at Fig. 15.2 .
They show widening defi cits, reaching 630 × 10
6 m
3 /year by 2025, the implications of which are well recognised: Jordan needs a costly new bulk supply source
for the long term and meanwhile demand will likely continue to be met by overabstracting valuable low-cost renewable supplies.
Jordan faces a deepening water crisis, aggravated over decades by climatechange impacts, regional confl ict, infl ows of migrants and poor governance.
Its people are among the most water-deprived worldwide, with 145 m
3 /year
per person (2008) (MWI 2009 , p. 3–1), a level projected to fall as the gap
between demand for water and renewable and fi nanced non-renewable supplies widens. Few in-country options remain to develop new water. Meanwhile,
with more than 80 % of available annual supply of up to 900 × 10
6 m
3 depending on unsustainable abstraction from groundwater aquifers and on diminishing transboundary surface fl ows, Jordanians could face absolute water poverty
by 2025, with only 90 m
3 per person (USAID 2012 , p. vii). MWI statistics for
1994–2010 (Fig. 15.1 ) also reveal continuing structural distortions in water
use: agriculture remained the dominant consumer (66 %), whilst contributing
only 3.5 % of GDP (MWI and WRG 2011 , p. 23); the municipal sector modestly increased its share (30 %) and industry/tourism use remained low
(4.5–7 %). Behind these data lie dangerous trends, namely continuing overpumping of groundwater aquifers; continuing ineffi cient water use in terms of
productivity and diminishing scope to cope with climate- change impacts.
V. Yorke