201
13.2.6 The Water Swap Memorandum of Understanding
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (see Bismuth et al. 2015a , in this
volume, pp. 89–98) between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories concerning the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project is the latest and most concrete
agreement between the three parties. The negotiation process already for the agreement to launch the feasibility study supported and conducted by the World Bank has
turned out to be rather fastidious and time consuming as the Palestinians saw an
opportunity to gain more infl uence on the shared water resources between Israel and
the Palestinian Territories and to use the project as a bargaining chip in the peace
treaty negotiation process as well as an instrument to realise national sovereignty
(Fischhendler et al. 2013 ).
While the MoU constitutes an intelligent cost saving solution for Jordan and
Israel, based on mutual cooperation, the MoU does not provide any substantial solution for the manifold water management problems between Israelis and Palestinians.
The approach as foreseen in the MoU reduces the problems between the two parties
merely to quantitative aspects.
Detailed regulations will be fi xed in bilateral accords between the parties. This
facilitates the realisation of the Israeli–Jordanian agreements, as the approval to
build the most needed seawater desalination plant at Aqaba will no longer depend
on the Palestinians. But under the present political circumstances between the
Palestinians and the Israelis, it is more than unpredictable what this means for the
realisation of the conveyance and any other actions undertaken to halt the further
decline of the Dead Sea water level. Any common action for the safeguard of the
Dead Sea appears to need a more comprehensive approach.
13.3 Conclusions
The data on water uses, on abstractions and on available sources indicate clearly
that already in 2007 the three riparians have been in a defi ciency situation with
important impacts on groundwater resources, river and lake ecosystems and the
Dead Sea itself. The discussions within the RSDS Conveyance Study Programme
conducted by the World Bank revealed that a technical solution is only one of
the several assets required to halt the further decline of the Dead Sea. The results of
the RSDS Study Programme do not provide proposals for adequate management,
control structures and the fi nancial conditions for such a major project, but also cost
calculations specifi cally for the part of the energy generation remain unsettled.
The existing bases for international cooperation are the different agreements
between Israel and Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authorities and Jordan and
Syria. All three accords (the Jordanian–Syrian agreements, the Jordan–Israel Peace
Treaty and the Oslo II Agreement) have in common that they are ambiguous, vague
and voluntary and leave room for interpretation for each party (Mager 2015 ). Rules
13 Water Resources, Cooperation and Power Asymmetries in the Water Management…
13.2.6 The Water Swap Memorandum of Understanding
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (see Bismuth et al. 2015a , in this
volume, pp. 89–98) between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories concerning the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project is the latest and most concrete
agreement between the three parties. The negotiation process already for the agreement to launch the feasibility study supported and conducted by the World Bank has
turned out to be rather fastidious and time consuming as the Palestinians saw an
opportunity to gain more infl uence on the shared water resources between Israel and
the Palestinian Territories and to use the project as a bargaining chip in the peace
treaty negotiation process as well as an instrument to realise national sovereignty
(Fischhendler et al. 2013 ).
While the MoU constitutes an intelligent cost saving solution for Jordan and
Israel, based on mutual cooperation, the MoU does not provide any substantial solution for the manifold water management problems between Israelis and Palestinians.
The approach as foreseen in the MoU reduces the problems between the two parties
merely to quantitative aspects.
Detailed regulations will be fi xed in bilateral accords between the parties. This
facilitates the realisation of the Israeli–Jordanian agreements, as the approval to
build the most needed seawater desalination plant at Aqaba will no longer depend
on the Palestinians. But under the present political circumstances between the
Palestinians and the Israelis, it is more than unpredictable what this means for the
realisation of the conveyance and any other actions undertaken to halt the further
decline of the Dead Sea water level. Any common action for the safeguard of the
Dead Sea appears to need a more comprehensive approach.
13.3 Conclusions
The data on water uses, on abstractions and on available sources indicate clearly
that already in 2007 the three riparians have been in a defi ciency situation with
important impacts on groundwater resources, river and lake ecosystems and the
Dead Sea itself. The discussions within the RSDS Conveyance Study Programme
conducted by the World Bank revealed that a technical solution is only one of
the several assets required to halt the further decline of the Dead Sea. The results of
the RSDS Study Programme do not provide proposals for adequate management,
control structures and the fi nancial conditions for such a major project, but also cost
calculations specifi cally for the part of the energy generation remain unsettled.
The existing bases for international cooperation are the different agreements
between Israel and Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authorities and Jordan and
Syria. All three accords (the Jordanian–Syrian agreements, the Jordan–Israel Peace
Treaty and the Oslo II Agreement) have in common that they are ambiguous, vague
and voluntary and leave room for interpretation for each party (Mager 2015 ). Rules
13 Water Resources, Cooperation and Power Asymmetries in the Water Management…