200
ment of the implementation of the study programme (World Bank 2013b ). The three
parties announced their agreement at the World Economic Forum at the Dead Sea in
May 2005. To fi nance the estimated costs of the study programme of USD 16 million, the World Bank established a multi-donor trust for fi nance. It took 5 years to
establish the trust in 2010. The donors were France, Greece, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States.
Initially, the study programme did not include the Study of Alternatives but
only a feasibility study and the environment and social assessment study. It was
due to the pressure of the environmental nongovernmental organisations that a
study of alternatives was conducted as the last study within a series of different
studies.
The terms of reference never considered investigating on the feasibility to generate energy from saline water, but the fi nancial benefi ces were considered in the
study of alternatives Malkawi and Tsur ( 2015 , in this volume, pp. 205–225). This
fact is crucial for the implementation of the polluters pay principle (Bismuth et al.
2015b , in this volume, pp. 253–275) and also for the overall costs of the project.
From the beginning of the study programme, the role of the Palestinian
Authorities had been quite ambiguous: On the one side, they saw in the project an
opportunity to achieve results for their creation of a Palestinian state, and, on the
other side, the Palestinians in their majority opposed the project, which resulted
in minor active participation in the Study of Alternatives. All three benefi ciary
parties proposed to the World Bank a list of experts to conduct the study, but on
the Palestinian list, only non-Palestinians appeared. It is not that the Palestinians
lack qualifi ed expertise among their scientists, but fi nally a British citizen (Tony
Allen) was chosen as the expert to represent the Palestinian’s interests. The stakeholder discussions on 20 and 21 February 2013 refl ect this ambiguous position of
the Palestinians between their needs for more water, their rights on land and
resources, their opposition to Israel and the acknowledgements of the Jordanian
water needs ( www.worldbank.org/rds ). The majority of the participants in the
stakeholder forum would have preferred to settle water questions in the peace
negotiation process, and they feared that with an agreement they would lose their
rights on water and land. Some of the participants demanded the rights of the
Palestinians to develop their own Potassium companies at the Dead Sea and to
construct their own hotel sector at the sea shore, but without outlining where the
additional water should come from. The stakeholder discussions in Israel on 18
and 19 February 2013 refl ected more on the environmental concerns but also on
Israel’s concern to support Jordan in its quest for new water sources, while the
Jordanian meetings on 14 and 17 February 2013 were centred around the questions of affordable water prices and the economic consequences of the project but
also on security and safety aspects.
Only few participants raised the questions on the possible management and controlling structures with regard to the complicated relational setting in the region.
This aspect was not adequately addressed neither in the terms of references nor in
the presented reports.
C. Bismuth
ment of the implementation of the study programme (World Bank 2013b ). The three
parties announced their agreement at the World Economic Forum at the Dead Sea in
May 2005. To fi nance the estimated costs of the study programme of USD 16 million, the World Bank established a multi-donor trust for fi nance. It took 5 years to
establish the trust in 2010. The donors were France, Greece, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States.
Initially, the study programme did not include the Study of Alternatives but
only a feasibility study and the environment and social assessment study. It was
due to the pressure of the environmental nongovernmental organisations that a
study of alternatives was conducted as the last study within a series of different
studies.
The terms of reference never considered investigating on the feasibility to generate energy from saline water, but the fi nancial benefi ces were considered in the
study of alternatives Malkawi and Tsur ( 2015 , in this volume, pp. 205–225). This
fact is crucial for the implementation of the polluters pay principle (Bismuth et al.
2015b , in this volume, pp. 253–275) and also for the overall costs of the project.
From the beginning of the study programme, the role of the Palestinian
Authorities had been quite ambiguous: On the one side, they saw in the project an
opportunity to achieve results for their creation of a Palestinian state, and, on the
other side, the Palestinians in their majority opposed the project, which resulted
in minor active participation in the Study of Alternatives. All three benefi ciary
parties proposed to the World Bank a list of experts to conduct the study, but on
the Palestinian list, only non-Palestinians appeared. It is not that the Palestinians
lack qualifi ed expertise among their scientists, but fi nally a British citizen (Tony
Allen) was chosen as the expert to represent the Palestinian’s interests. The stakeholder discussions on 20 and 21 February 2013 refl ect this ambiguous position of
the Palestinians between their needs for more water, their rights on land and
resources, their opposition to Israel and the acknowledgements of the Jordanian
water needs ( www.worldbank.org/rds ). The majority of the participants in the
stakeholder forum would have preferred to settle water questions in the peace
negotiation process, and they feared that with an agreement they would lose their
rights on water and land. Some of the participants demanded the rights of the
Palestinians to develop their own Potassium companies at the Dead Sea and to
construct their own hotel sector at the sea shore, but without outlining where the
additional water should come from. The stakeholder discussions in Israel on 18
and 19 February 2013 refl ected more on the environmental concerns but also on
Israel’s concern to support Jordan in its quest for new water sources, while the
Jordanian meetings on 14 and 17 February 2013 were centred around the questions of affordable water prices and the economic consequences of the project but
also on security and safety aspects.
Only few participants raised the questions on the possible management and controlling structures with regard to the complicated relational setting in the region.
This aspect was not adequately addressed neither in the terms of references nor in
the presented reports.
C. Bismuth