180
water users’ consumption patterns does not even seem to exist. In fact, when such
ideas were presented by the author at a conference on water-related problems in
Central Asia in May 2014, for most conference participants they lay outside the
scope of their perceptions of water management practices for the region.
12.3.2 No Freedom for Individual Choice
A second obstacle to effi cient water pricing can be seen in the fact that the addressees of water prices do not have a chance to respond economically. While on paper
there have been attempts to transform the former Soviet Union central planning
system into a market economy, many changes in the economic and political system
in Uzbekistan have remained gradual. The economic and political system in
Uzbekistan was (and still is) shaped by the modes and characteristics of central
planning regimes. Abdullaev and Atabaeva ( 2012 ) therefore speak of a “slow transformation” process. “But the voluntary change of a state apparatus in the case of
Central Asian countries only happened with minor changes that remain to be surface changes” (Abdullaev and Atabaeva 2012 , p. 105). “All states of the [Central
Asian] region have returned in different forms back to control of agriculture in different forms” ( ibid , p. 108). Moss and Hamidov ( 2015 , in this volume) speak of a
“gradual approach to market reform”.
From an economic perspective, the decisive point is that private property in the
agricultural sector is not fully realised; farmers do not have full powers of decisionmaking regarding their inputs and outputs. To understand this issue, farmers’ decisions have to be seen in their specifi c institutional contexts: Farmers are obligated to
plant the two “cash crops”, cotton and wheat, on their land. They have to buy all the
necessary inputs (seed, fertilisers, etc.) on credit. They are even told what to plant,
when to plant and where to plant. In addition, they cannot decide by themselves
when and how to irrigate their fi elds. They are also told when to harvest the crops
(Weinthal 2006 , p. 20). There is hardly any autonomy with respect to the resources
they input or the quantity and quality of their output. The farmers receive a fi xed
price for their harvest which allows them to pay back their loans. However, the price
is far lower than the world price for cotton so that private profi ts cannot be made.
“Because the government has always granted [the farmers] debt relief, they have
little incentive to become more effi cient by reducing their inputs and managing their
level of debt like individual private farmers. […] As a result, [they] still operate
without any hard-budget constraints” (Weinthal 2006 , p. 21).
Certainly, there have been some changes in the system since independence. The
growing number of smaller farms (compared to the huge kolkhozes) has led to a
decrease of the previously centralised decision-making procedures in collective
farming that were dominated by the heads of agricultural units. Instead, decollectivisation has led former members of the collective farms as well as citizens
B. Hansjürgens
water users’ consumption patterns does not even seem to exist. In fact, when such
ideas were presented by the author at a conference on water-related problems in
Central Asia in May 2014, for most conference participants they lay outside the
scope of their perceptions of water management practices for the region.
12.3.2 No Freedom for Individual Choice
A second obstacle to effi cient water pricing can be seen in the fact that the addressees of water prices do not have a chance to respond economically. While on paper
there have been attempts to transform the former Soviet Union central planning
system into a market economy, many changes in the economic and political system
in Uzbekistan have remained gradual. The economic and political system in
Uzbekistan was (and still is) shaped by the modes and characteristics of central
planning regimes. Abdullaev and Atabaeva ( 2012 ) therefore speak of a “slow transformation” process. “But the voluntary change of a state apparatus in the case of
Central Asian countries only happened with minor changes that remain to be surface changes” (Abdullaev and Atabaeva 2012 , p. 105). “All states of the [Central
Asian] region have returned in different forms back to control of agriculture in different forms” ( ibid , p. 108). Moss and Hamidov ( 2015 , in this volume) speak of a
“gradual approach to market reform”.
From an economic perspective, the decisive point is that private property in the
agricultural sector is not fully realised; farmers do not have full powers of decisionmaking regarding their inputs and outputs. To understand this issue, farmers’ decisions have to be seen in their specifi c institutional contexts: Farmers are obligated to
plant the two “cash crops”, cotton and wheat, on their land. They have to buy all the
necessary inputs (seed, fertilisers, etc.) on credit. They are even told what to plant,
when to plant and where to plant. In addition, they cannot decide by themselves
when and how to irrigate their fi elds. They are also told when to harvest the crops
(Weinthal 2006 , p. 20). There is hardly any autonomy with respect to the resources
they input or the quantity and quality of their output. The farmers receive a fi xed
price for their harvest which allows them to pay back their loans. However, the price
is far lower than the world price for cotton so that private profi ts cannot be made.
“Because the government has always granted [the farmers] debt relief, they have
little incentive to become more effi cient by reducing their inputs and managing their
level of debt like individual private farmers. […] As a result, [they] still operate
without any hard-budget constraints” (Weinthal 2006 , p. 21).
Certainly, there have been some changes in the system since independence. The
growing number of smaller farms (compared to the huge kolkhozes) has led to a
decrease of the previously centralised decision-making procedures in collective
farming that were dominated by the heads of agricultural units. Instead, decollectivisation has led former members of the collective farms as well as citizens
B. Hansjürgens