158
This depends on the active participation of the farmers using irrigated water in
decision- making processes and management practices of WUAs. The ways in which
water users are represented in WUAs are, thus, of critical importance. In Uzbekistan,
the top-down, technocratic nature by which WUAs were created in the early 2000s
set the pattern for the hierarchical and largely unrepresentative design of WUAs in
the Fergana Valley and elsewhere. Although a prime task of WUAs is to resolve
disputes over water allocation, requiring close collaboration with farmers, water
users themselves were neither consulted nor informed about the creation of the
WUAs and the reorganisation of water management this implied. “Therefore the
water users considered the WUAs as another water administration imposed on
them, and not a way of introducing collective action water management” (Abdullaev
et al. 2010 , p. 1035).
Representation of water users within WUAs is generally very weak (Dukhovny
et al. 2008 ). Council members of WUAs are elected from amongst the water users
of the irrigation area served, but they are not active in the decision-making process.
Most WUA councils are ineffective, leaving authority in the hands of the management body of paid offi cials and, in particular, the WUA chairman. The infl uence of
individual farmers is limited, as a rule, to the annual general assembly of the WUA,
a platform for the WUA management to inform members rather than a forum for
open debate (WUA Tomchikul). The old Soviet-style command system tends to
stifl e participatory forms of governance (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov 2010 ). Noting
also the effects of limited funding, Schlüter et al. conclude from their research that:
WUAs in Uzbekistan have in reality a poor decision-making mandate, are strongly infl uenced by patronage networks and interventions of the khokims (local governors) into their
internal processes and suffer from a lack of fi nancial means which all contributes to their
malfunctioning. (Schlüter et al. 2010 , p. 629)
In the Uzbek context, then, the term “water users association” is something of a
misnomer. WUAs are de facto bodies set up by the government to secure state production targets for cotton and wheat by maintaining the existing irrigation system
and ensuring the required allocation of water to the farmers. In short, WUAs in
Uzbekistan may be acting on the behalf of water users but not at their behest.
One indictment of the ineffectiveness and unrepresentative nature of WUAs is the
recent emergence in the Fergana Valley of water user groups (WUGs) as self- help
initiatives organised by water users themselves (Dukhovny et al. 2008 ; Abdullaev
et al. 2010 ). Here, farmers “have taken water management into their own hands”,
developing their own modes of collective action at the local level to manage water as
a common pool resource (Abdullaev et al. 2010 , p. 1031). Created by farmers themselves, the WUGs in the Fergana Valley have received fi nancial support and advice
from the IWRM project funded by the SDC and implemented by SIC-ICWC and
IWMI. The number of WUGs in the South Fergana Canal area alone rose rapidly from
23 in 2006 to 160 in 2008 (Abdullaev et al. 2010 , p. 1039). Some have emerged out of
former collective farm brigades, some out of an extended family and others in response
to a local water distribution confl ict. WUGs not only own and maintain pumps and
clean the smaller irrigation canals but they also introduce their own rules for water
T. Moss and A. Hamidov
This depends on the active participation of the farmers using irrigated water in
decision- making processes and management practices of WUAs. The ways in which
water users are represented in WUAs are, thus, of critical importance. In Uzbekistan,
the top-down, technocratic nature by which WUAs were created in the early 2000s
set the pattern for the hierarchical and largely unrepresentative design of WUAs in
the Fergana Valley and elsewhere. Although a prime task of WUAs is to resolve
disputes over water allocation, requiring close collaboration with farmers, water
users themselves were neither consulted nor informed about the creation of the
WUAs and the reorganisation of water management this implied. “Therefore the
water users considered the WUAs as another water administration imposed on
them, and not a way of introducing collective action water management” (Abdullaev
et al. 2010 , p. 1035).
Representation of water users within WUAs is generally very weak (Dukhovny
et al. 2008 ). Council members of WUAs are elected from amongst the water users
of the irrigation area served, but they are not active in the decision-making process.
Most WUA councils are ineffective, leaving authority in the hands of the management body of paid offi cials and, in particular, the WUA chairman. The infl uence of
individual farmers is limited, as a rule, to the annual general assembly of the WUA,
a platform for the WUA management to inform members rather than a forum for
open debate (WUA Tomchikul). The old Soviet-style command system tends to
stifl e participatory forms of governance (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov 2010 ). Noting
also the effects of limited funding, Schlüter et al. conclude from their research that:
WUAs in Uzbekistan have in reality a poor decision-making mandate, are strongly infl uenced by patronage networks and interventions of the khokims (local governors) into their
internal processes and suffer from a lack of fi nancial means which all contributes to their
malfunctioning. (Schlüter et al. 2010 , p. 629)
In the Uzbek context, then, the term “water users association” is something of a
misnomer. WUAs are de facto bodies set up by the government to secure state production targets for cotton and wheat by maintaining the existing irrigation system
and ensuring the required allocation of water to the farmers. In short, WUAs in
Uzbekistan may be acting on the behalf of water users but not at their behest.
One indictment of the ineffectiveness and unrepresentative nature of WUAs is the
recent emergence in the Fergana Valley of water user groups (WUGs) as self- help
initiatives organised by water users themselves (Dukhovny et al. 2008 ; Abdullaev
et al. 2010 ). Here, farmers “have taken water management into their own hands”,
developing their own modes of collective action at the local level to manage water as
a common pool resource (Abdullaev et al. 2010 , p. 1031). Created by farmers themselves, the WUGs in the Fergana Valley have received fi nancial support and advice
from the IWRM project funded by the SDC and implemented by SIC-ICWC and
IWMI. The number of WUGs in the South Fergana Canal area alone rose rapidly from
23 in 2006 to 160 in 2008 (Abdullaev et al. 2010 , p. 1039). Some have emerged out of
former collective farm brigades, some out of an extended family and others in response
to a local water distribution confl ict. WUGs not only own and maintain pumps and
clean the smaller irrigation canals but they also introduce their own rules for water
T. Moss and A. Hamidov