104
8.2 Transformation and Path Dependencies in Fergana
Valley’s Post-Soviet Agriculture
The principal transformation of agriculture in Uzbekistan since independence
relates to land ownership on the one hand. Land reform was not immediate after
1991, as in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, but more gradual (Hamidov 2007 ).
Nonetheless, its effects were far-reaching, including on the irrigation system (see
below). Land reform in Uzbekistan began during the 1990s with the dissolution of
the large-scale collective farms ( kolkhozes ) and state farms ( sovkhozes ) following
their bankruptcy as a result of declining state subsidies and investment (Spoor
2004 ). They were replaced at fi rst by smaller semi-cooperative farms ( shirkats ), still
maintaining Soviet-style management. In the early 2000s, a further phase of land
reform replaced the shirkats with individual farms, a process completed by 2006
(Gunchinmaa and Yakubov 2010 ). As land was transferred by long-term lease to
individuals, a situation was created in which a huge number of people became small
landowners and farmers who often had little experience or expertise in agriculture.
The resulting problems for agricultural production prompted a fresh round of land
reform with the aim of reducing the number of small, ineffi cient farms. Within the
space of just 1 year, between 2006 and 2007, the number of individual farmers in
Uzbekistan was reduced from 200,000 to 100,000.
On the other hand, today’s agriculture system in Uzbekistan is marked by deeprooted path dependency relating in particular to state planning of agricultural production and the prioritisation of cash crops. Despite land reforms, state production
quotas for cotton and wheat continue to dominate the system (Abdullaev et al.
2009 ). For these two cash crops, regarded by the government as essential for national
(food) security, the state sets quotas for production, just as in Soviet times. The
national targets are sub-divided into targets for the individual provinces and districts, with the head of each administrative district being held personally responsible
for meeting his/her target. This creates enormous pressure to fulfi l the state plan,
pressure which is passed on down the line to the individual farmer. For these cash
crops, the farmer is further bound by the obligation to buy seed, pesticides and fertiliser from the state at a certain time and to sell cotton and wheat he/she produces
to the state at a fi xed price below market prices. From these production quotas,
water needs are calculated and a plan for water allocation from national to on-farm
level devised (see 8.3). Beyond the production of cotton and wheat, farmers are
permitted to grow other crops, such as rice, vegetables or fruit, but this is only feasible if it does not endanger meeting the cash crop quotas. In practice, there is generally too little time and too little water left after harvesting the cash crops, rendering
a second harvest diffi cult. Those private farms that specialise in products beyond
cotton and wheat are responsible for fi nancing all investments and marketing their
goods, yet often receive only poor quality water or none at all (Gunchinmaa and
Yakubov 2010 ).
In effect, there exists a dual agricultural structure characterised by a dominant,
yet ineffi cient state-driven system of cash-crop production on the one hand and a
much smaller, but emergent system of household plots and secondary harvests
T. Moss and P. Dobner
8.2 Transformation and Path Dependencies in Fergana
Valley’s Post-Soviet Agriculture
The principal transformation of agriculture in Uzbekistan since independence
relates to land ownership on the one hand. Land reform was not immediate after
1991, as in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, but more gradual (Hamidov 2007 ).
Nonetheless, its effects were far-reaching, including on the irrigation system (see
below). Land reform in Uzbekistan began during the 1990s with the dissolution of
the large-scale collective farms ( kolkhozes ) and state farms ( sovkhozes ) following
their bankruptcy as a result of declining state subsidies and investment (Spoor
2004 ). They were replaced at fi rst by smaller semi-cooperative farms ( shirkats ), still
maintaining Soviet-style management. In the early 2000s, a further phase of land
reform replaced the shirkats with individual farms, a process completed by 2006
(Gunchinmaa and Yakubov 2010 ). As land was transferred by long-term lease to
individuals, a situation was created in which a huge number of people became small
landowners and farmers who often had little experience or expertise in agriculture.
The resulting problems for agricultural production prompted a fresh round of land
reform with the aim of reducing the number of small, ineffi cient farms. Within the
space of just 1 year, between 2006 and 2007, the number of individual farmers in
Uzbekistan was reduced from 200,000 to 100,000.
On the other hand, today’s agriculture system in Uzbekistan is marked by deeprooted path dependency relating in particular to state planning of agricultural production and the prioritisation of cash crops. Despite land reforms, state production
quotas for cotton and wheat continue to dominate the system (Abdullaev et al.
2009 ). For these two cash crops, regarded by the government as essential for national
(food) security, the state sets quotas for production, just as in Soviet times. The
national targets are sub-divided into targets for the individual provinces and districts, with the head of each administrative district being held personally responsible
for meeting his/her target. This creates enormous pressure to fulfi l the state plan,
pressure which is passed on down the line to the individual farmer. For these cash
crops, the farmer is further bound by the obligation to buy seed, pesticides and fertiliser from the state at a certain time and to sell cotton and wheat he/she produces
to the state at a fi xed price below market prices. From these production quotas,
water needs are calculated and a plan for water allocation from national to on-farm
level devised (see 8.3). Beyond the production of cotton and wheat, farmers are
permitted to grow other crops, such as rice, vegetables or fruit, but this is only feasible if it does not endanger meeting the cash crop quotas. In practice, there is generally too little time and too little water left after harvesting the cash crops, rendering
a second harvest diffi cult. Those private farms that specialise in products beyond
cotton and wheat are responsible for fi nancing all investments and marketing their
goods, yet often receive only poor quality water or none at all (Gunchinmaa and
Yakubov 2010 ).
In effect, there exists a dual agricultural structure characterised by a dominant,
yet ineffi cient state-driven system of cash-crop production on the one hand and a
much smaller, but emergent system of household plots and secondary harvests
T. Moss and P. Dobner