201
strict rules, both technical and procedural, for handling cyanide along its life cycle.
Signatory companies are regularly third-party audited and certifi ed, with mandatory
incident reporting. Reports are publicly available. An independent institute administers the code. A particular feature of the Code is its total value chain reach: even
the upstream chemical manufacturers, suppliers and transporters must comply with
the Code requirements before the end-user mining company can purchase the substance. The Code is sharply focused; it deliberately addresses only a limited number
of sustainability objectives concerned with cyanide toxicity; it is not a ‘do everything’ code. Code membership brings operational benefi ts and public relations and
fi nancing advantages. A number of fi nancing institutions and planning bodies now
require code compliance before they deal with gold mining companies, while companies regularly mention the code in their public communications.
The code concept has also been used in related sectors, such as by diamond (the
so-called Kimberley process ( www.kimberleyprocess.com/ ) and jewelry suppliers
( www.responsiblejewellery.com/ ) who have put in place a ‘chain of custody’ control of operations by their members. In each case, the entire supply chain is subject
to the sustainability requirements of the end-user – pollution, risks, social conditions, etc. The selection of sustainability criteria varies among the different codes,
usually incorporating a strong emphasis on social issues (e.g. Kimberley) as well as
pollution-type factors (e.g. cyanide code). It may be criticized that these voluntary
codes only bind their members. In the case of the cyanide code, over half of world
gold production is now code compliant, an achievement that few other activity sectors can claim. In any case, a non-regulatory character is a feature of nearly all LCM
exercises.
The usefulness of sector-wide agreements such as the above becomes clear when
we consider LCM from a supplier perspective. Suppliers often have many different
clients. It would be overly burdensome if each client were to impose its own sustainability or quality standard on the supplier who is then not only faced with additional
administration but also a fragmentation of product quality requirements. Several
initiatives of sector-wide LCM are know in, for example, the international textile
trade, to coordinate diverse LCM requirements. These initiatives often focus on
social and labor issues, less so on environmental agenda although examples of this
are known also.
In some instances, government participation is necessary to ensure suffi cient
management buy-in. The UK’s Defra, for example, sponsored an LCM initiative in
the clothing sector to ensure better alignment with social and environmental
expectations.
The initiative has voluntary participation from all major stakeholder groups
implicated in the sustainable management of clothing, including at the supply end
in Asia. The structure is less rigid than the codes of ICMI or FSC; however, it has
the advantage of handling a broader range of sustainability issues (Fig. 14.1 ).
Another useful example comes from the electronics industry. The GeSI initiative
(GeSI 2015 ) brings telecoms, appliance manufacturers and service companies
together in an effort to improve traceability of materials used in manufacture of
appliances (as well as actual improved environmental and social performance along
14 Life Cycle Management Responsibilities and Procedures in the Value Chain
strict rules, both technical and procedural, for handling cyanide along its life cycle.
Signatory companies are regularly third-party audited and certifi ed, with mandatory
incident reporting. Reports are publicly available. An independent institute administers the code. A particular feature of the Code is its total value chain reach: even
the upstream chemical manufacturers, suppliers and transporters must comply with
the Code requirements before the end-user mining company can purchase the substance. The Code is sharply focused; it deliberately addresses only a limited number
of sustainability objectives concerned with cyanide toxicity; it is not a ‘do everything’ code. Code membership brings operational benefi ts and public relations and
fi nancing advantages. A number of fi nancing institutions and planning bodies now
require code compliance before they deal with gold mining companies, while companies regularly mention the code in their public communications.
The code concept has also been used in related sectors, such as by diamond (the
so-called Kimberley process ( www.kimberleyprocess.com/ ) and jewelry suppliers
( www.responsiblejewellery.com/ ) who have put in place a ‘chain of custody’ control of operations by their members. In each case, the entire supply chain is subject
to the sustainability requirements of the end-user – pollution, risks, social conditions, etc. The selection of sustainability criteria varies among the different codes,
usually incorporating a strong emphasis on social issues (e.g. Kimberley) as well as
pollution-type factors (e.g. cyanide code). It may be criticized that these voluntary
codes only bind their members. In the case of the cyanide code, over half of world
gold production is now code compliant, an achievement that few other activity sectors can claim. In any case, a non-regulatory character is a feature of nearly all LCM
exercises.
The usefulness of sector-wide agreements such as the above becomes clear when
we consider LCM from a supplier perspective. Suppliers often have many different
clients. It would be overly burdensome if each client were to impose its own sustainability or quality standard on the supplier who is then not only faced with additional
administration but also a fragmentation of product quality requirements. Several
initiatives of sector-wide LCM are know in, for example, the international textile
trade, to coordinate diverse LCM requirements. These initiatives often focus on
social and labor issues, less so on environmental agenda although examples of this
are known also.
In some instances, government participation is necessary to ensure suffi cient
management buy-in. The UK’s Defra, for example, sponsored an LCM initiative in
the clothing sector to ensure better alignment with social and environmental
expectations.
The initiative has voluntary participation from all major stakeholder groups
implicated in the sustainable management of clothing, including at the supply end
in Asia. The structure is less rigid than the codes of ICMI or FSC; however, it has
the advantage of handling a broader range of sustainability issues (Fig. 14.1 ).
Another useful example comes from the electronics industry. The GeSI initiative
(GeSI 2015 ) brings telecoms, appliance manufacturers and service companies
together in an effort to improve traceability of materials used in manufacture of
appliances (as well as actual improved environmental and social performance along
14 Life Cycle Management Responsibilities and Procedures in the Value Chain