Commission and ESA were about to invest in Galileo.
34
Washington’s influence
seemed to find ground with one of its closest allies, Great Britain, whose politicians questioned the usefulness of the project and openly criticized its management.
35
French President Jacques Chirac reacted firmly, declaring, “the US invests
more than six times in Space than Europeans, and if Galileo ends up not being
successful, European nations will concretely risk becoming scientific and technological vassals of America”.
36
The US was above all concerned that the Europeans really wanted to build a
technological system capable of breaking its GPS monopoly. In their satellites, the
Americans had used caesium and rubidium atomic clocks, despite the Naval
Research Laboratory’s push to use the hydrogen maser
37
, which guaranteed an
accuracy of less than a nanosecond. The hydrogen maser was an expensive and
heavy device, which is why the Air Force decided not to use it. Europe, on the other
hand, planned to use the hydrogen maser. It was rightly believed that the competitive advantage would not consist in building smaller satellites, but rather in having
a better clock than the American one. For ESA and the European Commission, this
choice became the political argument to justify the high investments, which were at
that point lacking enough that Brussels had to divert, amid much controversy, $2.5
billion – even in part from the budget for agriculture – to Galileo.
38
At the time however, maser technology in Europe was still at an experimental
stage. In 2001, ESA signed an agreement with the Russians to acquire an efficient,
cheap, lightweight maser clock. Yet political issues continued to influence the
bumpy path of the Galileo project. In 2003, the European Commission signed an
agreement with Chinese authorities
39
for a partnership in the satellite project. The
official reason was for unspecified industrial cooperation. In reality, Europe wanted
Beijing’s support to have Galileo’s transmission frequencies approved at the general assembly of the International Telecommunication Union of Geneva. The risk
34
Bradley, Graham. 2003. Rumsfeld Criticizes EU Defence Plan. Washington Post. December
3, 2003.
35
House of Commons-Transport Committee. 2007. Galileo Recent Developments: First Report
of Session 2007–2008. London: Authority of the House of Commons, 15–16.
36
Columbus, Frank (editor). 2002. European Economic and Political Issues, Vol. 6. New York:
Nova Science Publisher Inc., 62.
37
Acronym for Microwave Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation. Similar to a
laser, it operates in the microwave region of the electromagnetic spectrum and it has a very
high, stable resonance frequency.
38
The Economist. 2007. Lost in Space: Late, Over Budget and Unneeded, The Galileo SatelliteNavigation Scheme Ought to be Scrapped. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2007/05/10/
lost-in-space.
39
https://www.reuters.com/article/breakout-beidou/special-report-in-satellite-tech-race-chinahitched-a-ride-from-europe-idUSL4N0JJ0J320131222.
62 GPS: The Stellar Clock
34
Washington’s influence
seemed to find ground with one of its closest allies, Great Britain, whose politicians questioned the usefulness of the project and openly criticized its management.
35
French President Jacques Chirac reacted firmly, declaring, “the US invests
more than six times in Space than Europeans, and if Galileo ends up not being
successful, European nations will concretely risk becoming scientific and technological vassals of America”.
36
The US was above all concerned that the Europeans really wanted to build a
technological system capable of breaking its GPS monopoly. In their satellites, the
Americans had used caesium and rubidium atomic clocks, despite the Naval
Research Laboratory’s push to use the hydrogen maser
37
, which guaranteed an
accuracy of less than a nanosecond. The hydrogen maser was an expensive and
heavy device, which is why the Air Force decided not to use it. Europe, on the other
hand, planned to use the hydrogen maser. It was rightly believed that the competitive advantage would not consist in building smaller satellites, but rather in having
a better clock than the American one. For ESA and the European Commission, this
choice became the political argument to justify the high investments, which were at
that point lacking enough that Brussels had to divert, amid much controversy, $2.5
billion – even in part from the budget for agriculture – to Galileo.
38
At the time however, maser technology in Europe was still at an experimental
stage. In 2001, ESA signed an agreement with the Russians to acquire an efficient,
cheap, lightweight maser clock. Yet political issues continued to influence the
bumpy path of the Galileo project. In 2003, the European Commission signed an
agreement with Chinese authorities
39
for a partnership in the satellite project. The
official reason was for unspecified industrial cooperation. In reality, Europe wanted
Beijing’s support to have Galileo’s transmission frequencies approved at the general assembly of the International Telecommunication Union of Geneva. The risk
34
Bradley, Graham. 2003. Rumsfeld Criticizes EU Defence Plan. Washington Post. December
3, 2003.
35
House of Commons-Transport Committee. 2007. Galileo Recent Developments: First Report
of Session 2007–2008. London: Authority of the House of Commons, 15–16.
36
Columbus, Frank (editor). 2002. European Economic and Political Issues, Vol. 6. New York:
Nova Science Publisher Inc., 62.
37
Acronym for Microwave Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation. Similar to a
laser, it operates in the microwave region of the electromagnetic spectrum and it has a very
high, stable resonance frequency.
38
The Economist. 2007. Lost in Space: Late, Over Budget and Unneeded, The Galileo SatelliteNavigation Scheme Ought to be Scrapped. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2007/05/10/
lost-in-space.
39
https://www.reuters.com/article/breakout-beidou/special-report-in-satellite-tech-race-chinahitched-a-ride-from-europe-idUSL4N0JJ0J320131222.
62 GPS: The Stellar Clock