To better understand the origins of GNSS, we should understand the political
and industrial situation of nineties into the 2000’s. In 1989, the collapse of the
Soviet Union gave Europeans the opportunity to reposition themselves in an international context. The reunification of the two German states, the western Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the eastern German Democratic Republic
(GDR), brought several consequences. One of those was the integration – unimaginable up to that moment – of the European aerospace and defence industries. In
2000, Paris and Berlin created European Aeronautics Defence and Space (EADS)
combining Franco-British Aerospatiale/Matra Marconi with German DASA, a
consortium between Daimler Benz, Dornier and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm.
The company was strongly supported by President Francois Mitterand and
Chancellor Helmuth Kohl, who were convinced that a common industry would
ensure that no country could independently rebuild its own military arsenal, as had
happened in the twentieth century.
During those same years, the newly formed EADS was developing on behalf of
ESA the future Ariane 5 launcher which, in the initial plans, was supposed to carry
a European-made crewed shuttle and a space station into orbit. However, the
increasing costs of these two projects prompted ESA to cancel them and to collaborate with NASA to build the ISS instead. So in practice, the space agency had
no long-term project apart from the Ariane 5 and few scientific exploration satellites. Galileo was just the kind of great space program that Europe was lacking. It
would have guaranteed the strategic independence needed by Paris, and it would
have provided the German automotive industry with a potential competitive
advantage.
To attract funding for the project, the Europeans emphasized three aspects of
the project in particular: its more advanced technology, its purely civilian management system and its considerable economic return. In 2000, the European
Commission presented the Galileo Business Plan
31
in a highly publicized event,
announcing significant economic returns and an employment growth of 100,000
new jobs within ten years
32
– numbers that still have not materialized after two
decades.
The US tried continuously to counter the European project with political pressure at all levels.
33
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took action on several
occasions with his European counterparts to block $4.2 billion that the European
31
Commission of the European Communities. 2000. Continuation of the Galileo Project: The
Commission Underlines the Need for Rapid Decisions. Press Release, November 22, 2000,
Brussels.
32
Price Waterhouse Coopers. 2001. Inception Study to Support the Development of a Business
Plan for the GALILEO Programme. TREN/B5/23-2001.
33
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/us-general-fuels-rift-over-galileo-satellite-9266198.html.
GPS: The Stellar Clock 61
and industrial situation of nineties into the 2000’s. In 1989, the collapse of the
Soviet Union gave Europeans the opportunity to reposition themselves in an international context. The reunification of the two German states, the western Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the eastern German Democratic Republic
(GDR), brought several consequences. One of those was the integration – unimaginable up to that moment – of the European aerospace and defence industries. In
2000, Paris and Berlin created European Aeronautics Defence and Space (EADS)
combining Franco-British Aerospatiale/Matra Marconi with German DASA, a
consortium between Daimler Benz, Dornier and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm.
The company was strongly supported by President Francois Mitterand and
Chancellor Helmuth Kohl, who were convinced that a common industry would
ensure that no country could independently rebuild its own military arsenal, as had
happened in the twentieth century.
During those same years, the newly formed EADS was developing on behalf of
ESA the future Ariane 5 launcher which, in the initial plans, was supposed to carry
a European-made crewed shuttle and a space station into orbit. However, the
increasing costs of these two projects prompted ESA to cancel them and to collaborate with NASA to build the ISS instead. So in practice, the space agency had
no long-term project apart from the Ariane 5 and few scientific exploration satellites. Galileo was just the kind of great space program that Europe was lacking. It
would have guaranteed the strategic independence needed by Paris, and it would
have provided the German automotive industry with a potential competitive
advantage.
To attract funding for the project, the Europeans emphasized three aspects of
the project in particular: its more advanced technology, its purely civilian management system and its considerable economic return. In 2000, the European
Commission presented the Galileo Business Plan
31
in a highly publicized event,
announcing significant economic returns and an employment growth of 100,000
new jobs within ten years
32
– numbers that still have not materialized after two
decades.
The US tried continuously to counter the European project with political pressure at all levels.
33
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took action on several
occasions with his European counterparts to block $4.2 billion that the European
31
Commission of the European Communities. 2000. Continuation of the Galileo Project: The
Commission Underlines the Need for Rapid Decisions. Press Release, November 22, 2000,
Brussels.
32
Price Waterhouse Coopers. 2001. Inception Study to Support the Development of a Business
Plan for the GALILEO Programme. TREN/B5/23-2001.
33
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/us-general-fuels-rift-over-galileo-satellite-9266198.html.
GPS: The Stellar Clock 61