ESA and the European Commission state publicly that space launchers are
tools for industrial cooperation and collaboration, but the reality is that national
policies always have a predominant role. One clear example of this is the European
small launcher Vega developed by ESA and funded mainly by Italy, the third ESA
contributing country after France and Germany. The Italian project of a small
launch vehicle dates back to the sixties, when the University of Rome built a
launch base on a floating platform off the coast of Kenya, near Malindi. From that
base, the Italians launched several home-built satellites using the US Scout rockets, furnished by NASA through a bilateral governmental agreement.
Later on, the African base was abandoned, but the Italian space agency, ASI,
managed to convince ESA to approve in 2003 the development of a small launcher,
designed in Italy, with the hope of finding a commercial marketplace alongside the
larger Ariane rocket. However, negotiations for the project’s approval were difficult and lengthy. It took several years to convince European partners to join and
fund the project, since most of them were sceptical about the idea of financing a
second launch vehicle while Arianespace was losing money every year. So, Italy
undertook the funding of 65% of the total budget of the project, originally estimated at about $1.2 billion. Germany decided not to participate, while France
agreed to finance a 12% share in exchange for the condition that the contracts for
two key technologies – the first-stage engine nozzle and the launcher guidance
software – be given to French industries. This seemed acceptable for Italy and the
project took off in 2003.
However, a few years later, the Franco-German industry EADS, which had
been contracted for the guidance software, informed ESA that it could not deliver.
The French Ministry of Defence would have banned this technology transfer, considering it potentially usable on nuclear ballistic missiles. The French government’s position was legally right, however it was applied to a product developed
by a civil space agency, which by statute could not build military systems.
Nevertheless, national export policy overruled European rules, and the whole
project ended in a deadlock.
CNES officials then proposed to the Italian space agency the delivery of an
encrypted program – an unreadable software code – to be uploaded into the
launcher’s onboard computer with a closed-eyes procedure. Understandably, this
caused a negative reaction from Italy, as the readable source of the software would
never have been delivered even after a well-remunerated contract. After tough and
risky negotiations, ESA was instructed by the Italians to close the contract with
EADS and assign a new one to Italian companies able to design a new software.
From 2012, Vega had a successful launching history that only recently has been
damaged by two failures. Apart from that, the story of the guidance software reveals
how political issues are common even within a collaborative European framework
such as ESA. The fact is that missile technology always has constraints that go
beyond any form of scientific or industrial cooperation. It is no coincidence that the
real pivot of the entire European space policy is in reality the Ariane launcher; the
Rocket Science: Globalization and Missiles 31
tools for industrial cooperation and collaboration, but the reality is that national
policies always have a predominant role. One clear example of this is the European
small launcher Vega developed by ESA and funded mainly by Italy, the third ESA
contributing country after France and Germany. The Italian project of a small
launch vehicle dates back to the sixties, when the University of Rome built a
launch base on a floating platform off the coast of Kenya, near Malindi. From that
base, the Italians launched several home-built satellites using the US Scout rockets, furnished by NASA through a bilateral governmental agreement.
Later on, the African base was abandoned, but the Italian space agency, ASI,
managed to convince ESA to approve in 2003 the development of a small launcher,
designed in Italy, with the hope of finding a commercial marketplace alongside the
larger Ariane rocket. However, negotiations for the project’s approval were difficult and lengthy. It took several years to convince European partners to join and
fund the project, since most of them were sceptical about the idea of financing a
second launch vehicle while Arianespace was losing money every year. So, Italy
undertook the funding of 65% of the total budget of the project, originally estimated at about $1.2 billion. Germany decided not to participate, while France
agreed to finance a 12% share in exchange for the condition that the contracts for
two key technologies – the first-stage engine nozzle and the launcher guidance
software – be given to French industries. This seemed acceptable for Italy and the
project took off in 2003.
However, a few years later, the Franco-German industry EADS, which had
been contracted for the guidance software, informed ESA that it could not deliver.
The French Ministry of Defence would have banned this technology transfer, considering it potentially usable on nuclear ballistic missiles. The French government’s position was legally right, however it was applied to a product developed
by a civil space agency, which by statute could not build military systems.
Nevertheless, national export policy overruled European rules, and the whole
project ended in a deadlock.
CNES officials then proposed to the Italian space agency the delivery of an
encrypted program – an unreadable software code – to be uploaded into the
launcher’s onboard computer with a closed-eyes procedure. Understandably, this
caused a negative reaction from Italy, as the readable source of the software would
never have been delivered even after a well-remunerated contract. After tough and
risky negotiations, ESA was instructed by the Italians to close the contract with
EADS and assign a new one to Italian companies able to design a new software.
From 2012, Vega had a successful launching history that only recently has been
damaged by two failures. Apart from that, the story of the guidance software reveals
how political issues are common even within a collaborative European framework
such as ESA. The fact is that missile technology always has constraints that go
beyond any form of scientific or industrial cooperation. It is no coincidence that the
real pivot of the entire European space policy is in reality the Ariane launcher; the
Rocket Science: Globalization and Missiles 31