its full commercialization. To maintain a market share while waiting for the launcher’s reliability to be improved, Arianespace sold the vehicle at competitive prices
lower than production costs. Unfortunately, this decrease did not correspond with a
reduction in the production costs. The situation soon created a deficit quite evident
in the company’s budgets, which also reflected in the balance sheets of the many
European industries that were shareholders of the company itself.
Normally, such a situation would have led to the bankruptcy of any private
company, but in this case Europe could not bring down its launcher industry. The
industry stood as a geopolitically strategic sector; such economic failure would
have forced the nations to abandon the growing market of space-based telecommunications and Earth observation, which in just seven years grew from $38 billion to more than $200 billion.
22
To avoid general collapse, ESA in 2003 asked all
member states to finance a special program to cover the company’s losses.
23
The
European governments agreed to pay $180 million each year to balance the financial deficit of the launcher sector.
Initially, this procedure would have been in conflict with the rules of noncompetition and state-subsidies advocated by the European Commission. However,
the strategic imperative to maintain an autonomous launch capacity had no price
for the French government. The government lobbied the Brussels-based officials
of the Commission to enlarge their formal capabilities with regard to European
space exploration and to introduce the term independent access to space within all
official documents published by the Commission.
The sentence independent access to space is stated in most EU documents on
space policy
24
and is equivalent to the US strategic statement of space superiority.
25
France’s leadership in the launchers sector is a matter of fact from both a
political and industrial side,
26
and this leading role is strictly linked to the existence of the Ariane launcher itself. On this basis, the continuity of a European
subsidy for the maintenance of the launcher industrial base will never be
questioned,
27
as well as the opportunity to develop a new Ariane 6 even if commercially not competitive.
28
22
Satellite Industry Association. 2014. State of Satellite Industry.
23
http://www.esa.int/esapub/bulletin/bullet114/chapter1_bul114.pdf.
24
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament –
European Space Policy {SEC(2007) 504} {SEC(2007) 505} {SEC(2007) 506}.
25
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/u-s-in-space-superiority-not-dominance/.
26
Revol, Henri, and Christian Cabal. 2007. «Politique spatiale : l’audace ou le déclin – Comment
faire de l’Europe le leader mondial de l’espace», Rapport n° 223 Office parlementaire
d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques du Senat Francais.
27
Procaccia, Mme Catherine, and M. Bruno Sido. 2012. «Les enjeux et perspectives de la politique spatiale européenne», Rapport n° 114 Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques du Senat Francais.
28
https://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/ariane-6-reutilisable-la-fausse-bonne-idee-de-lacour-des-comptes.N803130.
30 Rocket Science: Globalization and Missiles
lower than production costs. Unfortunately, this decrease did not correspond with a
reduction in the production costs. The situation soon created a deficit quite evident
in the company’s budgets, which also reflected in the balance sheets of the many
European industries that were shareholders of the company itself.
Normally, such a situation would have led to the bankruptcy of any private
company, but in this case Europe could not bring down its launcher industry. The
industry stood as a geopolitically strategic sector; such economic failure would
have forced the nations to abandon the growing market of space-based telecommunications and Earth observation, which in just seven years grew from $38 billion to more than $200 billion.
22
To avoid general collapse, ESA in 2003 asked all
member states to finance a special program to cover the company’s losses.
23
The
European governments agreed to pay $180 million each year to balance the financial deficit of the launcher sector.
Initially, this procedure would have been in conflict with the rules of noncompetition and state-subsidies advocated by the European Commission. However,
the strategic imperative to maintain an autonomous launch capacity had no price
for the French government. The government lobbied the Brussels-based officials
of the Commission to enlarge their formal capabilities with regard to European
space exploration and to introduce the term independent access to space within all
official documents published by the Commission.
The sentence independent access to space is stated in most EU documents on
space policy
24
and is equivalent to the US strategic statement of space superiority.
25
France’s leadership in the launchers sector is a matter of fact from both a
political and industrial side,
26
and this leading role is strictly linked to the existence of the Ariane launcher itself. On this basis, the continuity of a European
subsidy for the maintenance of the launcher industrial base will never be
questioned,
27
as well as the opportunity to develop a new Ariane 6 even if commercially not competitive.
28
22
Satellite Industry Association. 2014. State of Satellite Industry.
23
http://www.esa.int/esapub/bulletin/bullet114/chapter1_bul114.pdf.
24
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament –
European Space Policy {SEC(2007) 504} {SEC(2007) 505} {SEC(2007) 506}.
25
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/u-s-in-space-superiority-not-dominance/.
26
Revol, Henri, and Christian Cabal. 2007. «Politique spatiale : l’audace ou le déclin – Comment
faire de l’Europe le leader mondial de l’espace», Rapport n° 223 Office parlementaire
d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques du Senat Francais.
27
Procaccia, Mme Catherine, and M. Bruno Sido. 2012. «Les enjeux et perspectives de la politique spatiale européenne», Rapport n° 114 Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques du Senat Francais.
28
https://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/ariane-6-reutilisable-la-fausse-bonne-idee-de-lacour-des-comptes.N803130.
30 Rocket Science: Globalization and Missiles