and we’re tackling administrative tasks, as the declaration of loss of all AC power,
the much talked about article 10. However, as I told you a bit earlier, as we carry out
these administrative tasks, emotionally, we’re devastated”. The team finds itself,
from this moment on, “in the face of a catastrophe” [2].
Devastation, nervousness, frustration and fear relate to an emotional anxiety
which comes into play in the decision making and the action taking in an accident
situation. The third aspect of the information found in the account of Yoshida is
complementary to the others. It relates to the actions undertaken in the field. The
manager underlines many times the complexity faced to see the tasks through to the
end. This inability to have an effect on their work tool, paired up with the lack of
understanding and the impatience of the off-site executives, contributes to the
extreme situation experienced by the workers [2]. The attempts to vent the reactor
2, mentioned in few institutional reports, illustrate perfectly the gap between the
field and the executives. TEPCO headquarters repeatedly issued orders to proceed
with venting; although teams worked through the night, no workable solution could
be found due to lack of suitable resources. Yoshida states his annoyance with this
lack of understanding, which was perceived by the emergency response centre as a
failure to acknowledge the work they were doing, and their ongoing efforts. This
only served to increase the frustration of teams who could not make the unit
respond to their actions. These strong emotions and the role they play in decision
making must be taken into account, if we are to have a better understanding of how
the accident was managed.
The analysis of the hearings permits to better take some factors inherent to the
“extreme situation” concept into account. For instance, the uncertainty of the situation, the lack and inappropriateness of the available resources to deal with the
accident, the social and hierarchy pressure, and the powerlessness facing the progressive decay of the facilities can be mentioned.
The factual lacks and the arrangement of facts in the reports do not convey
accurately the complexity and the stakes of the crisis as faced by the workers and
the onsite emergency response centre. Nevertheless, it should be made clear that the
testimony is a reflection of how the manager recalls the story and depends particularly on his memory and the representation he makes of the whole situation. Thus,
the account does not correspond to the objective succession of events, as they took
place in the Fukushima Daiichi plant following the arrival of the tsunami.
4 Conclusion
The account of the accident by Yoshida is a valuable material to understand the
Fukushima Daiichi accident management. The testimony makes up for some factual
shortcomings and clarifies some information given by the institutional reports.
The Account of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident …
239
the much talked about article 10. However, as I told you a bit earlier, as we carry out
these administrative tasks, emotionally, we’re devastated”. The team finds itself,
from this moment on, “in the face of a catastrophe” [2].
Devastation, nervousness, frustration and fear relate to an emotional anxiety
which comes into play in the decision making and the action taking in an accident
situation. The third aspect of the information found in the account of Yoshida is
complementary to the others. It relates to the actions undertaken in the field. The
manager underlines many times the complexity faced to see the tasks through to the
end. This inability to have an effect on their work tool, paired up with the lack of
understanding and the impatience of the off-site executives, contributes to the
extreme situation experienced by the workers [2]. The attempts to vent the reactor
2, mentioned in few institutional reports, illustrate perfectly the gap between the
field and the executives. TEPCO headquarters repeatedly issued orders to proceed
with venting; although teams worked through the night, no workable solution could
be found due to lack of suitable resources. Yoshida states his annoyance with this
lack of understanding, which was perceived by the emergency response centre as a
failure to acknowledge the work they were doing, and their ongoing efforts. This
only served to increase the frustration of teams who could not make the unit
respond to their actions. These strong emotions and the role they play in decision
making must be taken into account, if we are to have a better understanding of how
the accident was managed.
The analysis of the hearings permits to better take some factors inherent to the
“extreme situation” concept into account. For instance, the uncertainty of the situation, the lack and inappropriateness of the available resources to deal with the
accident, the social and hierarchy pressure, and the powerlessness facing the progressive decay of the facilities can be mentioned.
The factual lacks and the arrangement of facts in the reports do not convey
accurately the complexity and the stakes of the crisis as faced by the workers and
the onsite emergency response centre. Nevertheless, it should be made clear that the
testimony is a reflection of how the manager recalls the story and depends particularly on his memory and the representation he makes of the whole situation. Thus,
the account does not correspond to the objective succession of events, as they took
place in the Fukushima Daiichi plant following the arrival of the tsunami.
4 Conclusion
The account of the accident by Yoshida is a valuable material to understand the
Fukushima Daiichi accident management. The testimony makes up for some factual
shortcomings and clarifies some information given by the institutional reports.
The Account of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident …
239