3.2 The Disclosures of the Manager
The analysis of the manager’s testimony shows correlations between the accident
management and the concept of “engineering thinking in extreme situations”. Some
of the information it contains is new, and can be divided into three aspects: factual,
representational and operational.
The institutional reports present the succession of events in the Fukushima
Daiichi plant with an a posteriori posture. They reflect a desire of comprehensiveness and explanation of all phenomena, notably from a technical point of view.
This approach makes the reports relate some of the facts as they were deduced by
simulation, especially when they concern chronological indications, as they were
established by TEPCO. Yet, the Fukushima Daiichi onsite emergency response
centre ignored about many of these phenomena until the simulations were performed. Indeed, certain phenomena were presumed to have happened only after the
event, for example that a high concentration of hydrogen was the reason for the
explosion of the first reactor building. Furthermore, Yoshida tells the investigators
many times that he cannot recall some details or that he did not know about facts
stated during the interview. This point is important, in particular to understand the
uncertainty that reigned at the Fukushima site after the tsunami hit. It means that
decisions must have been taken in the absence of knowledge about certain reactor
parameters. Furthermore, the emergency response centre had to coordinate multiple
tasks simultaneously, which cannot be effectively represented by a classic schema
where events follow each other in chronological succession. The decisions and the
actions that were taken, with a notable lack of resources, depended on one another.
Many important factors came into play, including slow progress in completing
tasks, the impact of events on the viability of the site, lessons learned from interventions at other plants, and the mobilization of resources for other activities.
From a representational point of view, some of the reports describe the
Fukushima Daiichi reactors one by one. As for the manager’s account, it reveals that
the emergency response centre had to deal with the whole site at the same time, in
order to avoid the deterioration of the different facilities. In addition, the evolution of
the emotional state of Yoshida shows extreme complications in the handling of the
situation. This can be proven by an excerpt of the hearings. After the earthquake, the
concerned employees gathered in the anti-seismic building and established an
informal emergency response centre. Since the tsunami warnings, this group considered the probability of an anomaly in the reactors’ cooling. However it is the loss
of the electric power resources following the tsunami that causes the distress of the
group
3 : “We’re so dismayed that we’re speechless. For the time being, we’re quiet
3
The plant manager has to warn the authorities in case of an emergency situation, such as the loss
of power resources. He then constitutes an emergency response center under his direction; in
accordance with the article 10 of the Japanese act No. 156 on the Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.
238
A. Afrouss
The analysis of the manager’s testimony shows correlations between the accident
management and the concept of “engineering thinking in extreme situations”. Some
of the information it contains is new, and can be divided into three aspects: factual,
representational and operational.
The institutional reports present the succession of events in the Fukushima
Daiichi plant with an a posteriori posture. They reflect a desire of comprehensiveness and explanation of all phenomena, notably from a technical point of view.
This approach makes the reports relate some of the facts as they were deduced by
simulation, especially when they concern chronological indications, as they were
established by TEPCO. Yet, the Fukushima Daiichi onsite emergency response
centre ignored about many of these phenomena until the simulations were performed. Indeed, certain phenomena were presumed to have happened only after the
event, for example that a high concentration of hydrogen was the reason for the
explosion of the first reactor building. Furthermore, Yoshida tells the investigators
many times that he cannot recall some details or that he did not know about facts
stated during the interview. This point is important, in particular to understand the
uncertainty that reigned at the Fukushima site after the tsunami hit. It means that
decisions must have been taken in the absence of knowledge about certain reactor
parameters. Furthermore, the emergency response centre had to coordinate multiple
tasks simultaneously, which cannot be effectively represented by a classic schema
where events follow each other in chronological succession. The decisions and the
actions that were taken, with a notable lack of resources, depended on one another.
Many important factors came into play, including slow progress in completing
tasks, the impact of events on the viability of the site, lessons learned from interventions at other plants, and the mobilization of resources for other activities.
From a representational point of view, some of the reports describe the
Fukushima Daiichi reactors one by one. As for the manager’s account, it reveals that
the emergency response centre had to deal with the whole site at the same time, in
order to avoid the deterioration of the different facilities. In addition, the evolution of
the emotional state of Yoshida shows extreme complications in the handling of the
situation. This can be proven by an excerpt of the hearings. After the earthquake, the
concerned employees gathered in the anti-seismic building and established an
informal emergency response centre. Since the tsunami warnings, this group considered the probability of an anomaly in the reactors’ cooling. However it is the loss
of the electric power resources following the tsunami that causes the distress of the
group
3 : “We’re so dismayed that we’re speechless. For the time being, we’re quiet
3
The plant manager has to warn the authorities in case of an emergency situation, such as the loss
of power resources. He then constitutes an emergency response center under his direction; in
accordance with the article 10 of the Japanese act No. 156 on the Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.
238
A. Afrouss