In this context, mothers who express concerns about the effects of low-dose
radiation exposure on their young children are portrayed as irrational and pressured
to be silent; uninformed workers are mobilized to participate in decontamination
efforts in a precarious, exploitative manner (e.g., [20, 30]); official discourses
continue to deny or undermine the harmful effects of radiation (e.g., [29, 38]);
evacuees from some areas with decreased radiation are nudged to return, with
financial support about to be reduced or cut; and municipalities within 30 km of a
NPP, although now part of emergency evacuation plans, still do not have a formal
say in its restarting. These are consistent with the earlier visions of nuclear technology, even though to some extent Japan’s nuclear imaginaries have forever been
changed by the accident.
5 Conclusions: Toward Democratic Imaginaries
If new nuclear imaginaries are to serve as resources for social resilience, they need
to allow those affected by the negative consequences of the disaster to feel that their
experience matters, that they are part of this social enterprise that explores new
relationships to nuclear technology, and that they have a say. Japan’s dominant
nuclear imaginaries have consistently excluded their voice, before and after
Fukushima, but new imaginaries need to include their voice, bolster their status, and
support their identities. The current situation can also be used as an opportunity to
reflect further on our general relationship to science and technology. While many
countries have incorporated public engagement in their science and technology policy processes, Japan has generally lagged behind in this, although some
provisionary attempts have been made since the disaster [34]. Nonetheless, the
deficit model and technocratic approaches still prevail, and what kinds of public
engagement would be productive in Japan needs to be explored. And if, in
addressing nuclear technology, we are also signaling and performing where we are
going as society, we should reexamine our approaches to nuclear governance more
carefully and explicitly. After all, the key issues are not simply whether we want
nuclear energy or not and how to proceed with the decision we make; it is also
about whether we want a society that exploits and neglects the vulnerable [33], as
well as about how we make decisions as a democratic society. At stake is what kind
of future we are creating.
Acknowledgements This chapter is based on the author’s research as part of a multi-year project
with Sheila Jasanoff and Michele Lamont, “The Fukushima Disaster and the Cultural Politics of
Nuclear Power in the United States and Japan,” funded with an STS grant from the National
Science Foundation (Award No. SES 1257117).
204
K. Sato
radiation exposure on their young children are portrayed as irrational and pressured
to be silent; uninformed workers are mobilized to participate in decontamination
efforts in a precarious, exploitative manner (e.g., [20, 30]); official discourses
continue to deny or undermine the harmful effects of radiation (e.g., [29, 38]);
evacuees from some areas with decreased radiation are nudged to return, with
financial support about to be reduced or cut; and municipalities within 30 km of a
NPP, although now part of emergency evacuation plans, still do not have a formal
say in its restarting. These are consistent with the earlier visions of nuclear technology, even though to some extent Japan’s nuclear imaginaries have forever been
changed by the accident.
5 Conclusions: Toward Democratic Imaginaries
If new nuclear imaginaries are to serve as resources for social resilience, they need
to allow those affected by the negative consequences of the disaster to feel that their
experience matters, that they are part of this social enterprise that explores new
relationships to nuclear technology, and that they have a say. Japan’s dominant
nuclear imaginaries have consistently excluded their voice, before and after
Fukushima, but new imaginaries need to include their voice, bolster their status, and
support their identities. The current situation can also be used as an opportunity to
reflect further on our general relationship to science and technology. While many
countries have incorporated public engagement in their science and technology policy processes, Japan has generally lagged behind in this, although some
provisionary attempts have been made since the disaster [34]. Nonetheless, the
deficit model and technocratic approaches still prevail, and what kinds of public
engagement would be productive in Japan needs to be explored. And if, in
addressing nuclear technology, we are also signaling and performing where we are
going as society, we should reexamine our approaches to nuclear governance more
carefully and explicitly. After all, the key issues are not simply whether we want
nuclear energy or not and how to proceed with the decision we make; it is also
about whether we want a society that exploits and neglects the vulnerable [33], as
well as about how we make decisions as a democratic society. At stake is what kind
of future we are creating.
Acknowledgements This chapter is based on the author’s research as part of a multi-year project
with Sheila Jasanoff and Michele Lamont, “The Fukushima Disaster and the Cultural Politics of
Nuclear Power in the United States and Japan,” funded with an STS grant from the National
Science Foundation (Award No. SES 1257117).
204
K. Sato