In particular, the deficit model, the way the polity is imagined as centralized, and
the way radiation risk bearers are concealed all persist.
For instance, despite the consistent majority opposition to restarting of reactors
in opinion polls
9 (all the commercial reactors in Japan were offline between
September 2013 and August 2015), the 2014 Strategic Energy Plan has paved ways
to restarting of NPPs whose safety has been confirmed by the Nuclear Regulation
Authority (NRA) under “the new regulatory requirements, which are of the most
stringent level in the world”.
10 The Plan presented nuclear power still as a primary,
“base-load” source for the country’s energy supply, emphasizing the same rationales as earlier (e.g., efficiency, stability, Japan’s scarce natural resources, less
greenhouse gas emission than fossil fuel-based energy). In case of restarting a
reactor, the government will “make best efforts to obtain the understanding and
cooperation of the host municipalities and other relevant parties.” With this new
framework, several reactors at three NPPs have been restarted since August 2015
(as of July 2017) regardless of fierce local and urban-area protests.
11
The new regulatory framework epitomizes the challenge of bringing about a
fundamental change. On the one hand, it incorporates some new openness,
emphasizing the significance of opening up the regulatory processes, increasing
transparency over the energy policy planning process, and obtaining public trust.
The 2014 Plan even calls for an end to the national government’s monopoly over
many decision-making processes, as well as more open engagement with various
stakeholders. On the other hand, the idea that the issue is communication with the
public, rather than the public’s democratic participation, still prevails in the Plan. In
this line of thinking, nuclear safety is presented as a domain exclusively for elite
efforts, whether scientific or managerial, and the public’s concerns and anxiety as
something to be resolved with explanation and communication. Such ideas of
unproblematized expertise and the deficit model still predominate, despite much
soul-searching that took place. Furthermore, as Juraku (this volume) points out,
extensive post-disaster efforts at reflection and investigation failed to address such
vital societal issues as ethics, responsibility, and social justice head-on.
9
See opinion polls published by major newspapers: e.g., Asashi Shimbun (March 18, 2014);
Tokyo Shimbun (September 20, 2015); Nikkei Shimbun (August 24, 2014; February 29, 2016);
Mainichi Shimbun (August 9, 2015; March 8, 2016); and Yomiuri Shimbun (March 9, 2016).
10
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf
(Last accessed on May 29, 2015).
11
The case of Takahama NPP illustrates the tensions between opposition and support of NPP
restarting. In April 2015, a district court issued a provisional injunction against the restarting of its
two reactors on the basis of safety concerns filed by local residents. However, this was overturned
by the same court in December 2015, and the two reactors were restarted in early 2016. In March
2016, however, another district court issued an in junction against their operation, siding with
residents who lived within 70 km from Takahama and raised safety concerns. This unprecedented
ruling, which led to the shutdown of an operating reactor, was followed by the June 2016 approval
by the NRA to operate Takahama’s two other reactors (one 40-year-old and the other 39-year-old)
for additional 20 years.
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
203
the way radiation risk bearers are concealed all persist.
For instance, despite the consistent majority opposition to restarting of reactors
in opinion polls
9 (all the commercial reactors in Japan were offline between
September 2013 and August 2015), the 2014 Strategic Energy Plan has paved ways
to restarting of NPPs whose safety has been confirmed by the Nuclear Regulation
Authority (NRA) under “the new regulatory requirements, which are of the most
stringent level in the world”.
10 The Plan presented nuclear power still as a primary,
“base-load” source for the country’s energy supply, emphasizing the same rationales as earlier (e.g., efficiency, stability, Japan’s scarce natural resources, less
greenhouse gas emission than fossil fuel-based energy). In case of restarting a
reactor, the government will “make best efforts to obtain the understanding and
cooperation of the host municipalities and other relevant parties.” With this new
framework, several reactors at three NPPs have been restarted since August 2015
(as of July 2017) regardless of fierce local and urban-area protests.
11
The new regulatory framework epitomizes the challenge of bringing about a
fundamental change. On the one hand, it incorporates some new openness,
emphasizing the significance of opening up the regulatory processes, increasing
transparency over the energy policy planning process, and obtaining public trust.
The 2014 Plan even calls for an end to the national government’s monopoly over
many decision-making processes, as well as more open engagement with various
stakeholders. On the other hand, the idea that the issue is communication with the
public, rather than the public’s democratic participation, still prevails in the Plan. In
this line of thinking, nuclear safety is presented as a domain exclusively for elite
efforts, whether scientific or managerial, and the public’s concerns and anxiety as
something to be resolved with explanation and communication. Such ideas of
unproblematized expertise and the deficit model still predominate, despite much
soul-searching that took place. Furthermore, as Juraku (this volume) points out,
extensive post-disaster efforts at reflection and investigation failed to address such
vital societal issues as ethics, responsibility, and social justice head-on.
9
See opinion polls published by major newspapers: e.g., Asashi Shimbun (March 18, 2014);
Tokyo Shimbun (September 20, 2015); Nikkei Shimbun (August 24, 2014; February 29, 2016);
Mainichi Shimbun (August 9, 2015; March 8, 2016); and Yomiuri Shimbun (March 9, 2016).
10
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf
(Last accessed on May 29, 2015).
11
The case of Takahama NPP illustrates the tensions between opposition and support of NPP
restarting. In April 2015, a district court issued a provisional injunction against the restarting of its
two reactors on the basis of safety concerns filed by local residents. However, this was overturned
by the same court in December 2015, and the two reactors were restarted in early 2016. In March
2016, however, another district court issued an in junction against their operation, siding with
residents who lived within 70 km from Takahama and raised safety concerns. This unprecedented
ruling, which led to the shutdown of an operating reactor, was followed by the June 2016 approval
by the NRA to operate Takahama’s two other reactors (one 40-year-old and the other 39-year-old)
for additional 20 years.
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
203