translation). This may explain the discrepancies between the questions of the
investigators and the action taken by Yoshida (see Sect. 2). The Commission’s
investigators mixed two interpretations: their causal analysis in an ‘occurring time’
frame (reconstructed a posteriori) support a value judgments of the actions taken by
the plant’s superintendent. This approach does not take full account of the decisions
made at Fukushima Daiichi. To make sense, Yoshida’s actions must be understood
in their entirety; it is impossible to separate decisions from the close connection that
the individual has with the realities they confront. When it comes to give it
meaning, action in extreme situation emerges at least in part within a ‘projected
time’ temporality.
5 From Decision Making to Taking Action in Extreme
Situations
The plant’s superintendent was unambiguous in his description of the relationship
between his staff and the production facility, which he characterised as a fight,
dominated by fear and suffering. His lexicon and register provide further evidence:
he speaks of “three monsters”, “three nuclear units that were unleashed”, and tries
to “achieve the impossible with very few staff” to “tame this thing” [21] (our
translation). In this context of sensory stimulation, impressions and perceptions had
a strong influence on his decisions. His order to evacuate the site is an example of
this (see Sect. 2).
However, emotions do not always disrupt the ambient order and well-regulated
planning. Damasio [29] showed that they are a key component in the development
of rational thinking. Several experiments have since confirmed the need to reintroduce emotion into the process of conceptualization. Similarly, it has been
demonstrated that individuals produce concepts according to their perceptual
experience [30]. Such studies show that the embodiment of emotion can ground
concepts. An illustration of this is found in Yoshida’s testimony. He stated that
following the explosion of Reactor 1 (when the pressure was about 500 kPa), the
number ‘500’ left him “ill at ease”. He went on to add, “I know this is totally
irrational, it was just a feeling” [2] (our translation); this feeling would influence
his decisions concerning the other reactors.
Leontyev [31] put forward similar arguments. He claimed that human activity
forms the foundation for consciousness—a back-and-forth process that operates
between an individual and an object, guided by a pattern and determined by sensual
contact with the outside world. Leontyev goes on to say that beyond this circular
process, which influences interactions between the organism and the environment,
mental representations of the objective world are governed by processes in which
the individual is in physical contact with it and thereby obeys its intrinsic properties
and its own relationships. It is the object that initially determines how actions
unfold and, secondly, it is how it appears as a subjective product of the action that
178
S. Travadel
investigators and the action taken by Yoshida (see Sect. 2). The Commission’s
investigators mixed two interpretations: their causal analysis in an ‘occurring time’
frame (reconstructed a posteriori) support a value judgments of the actions taken by
the plant’s superintendent. This approach does not take full account of the decisions
made at Fukushima Daiichi. To make sense, Yoshida’s actions must be understood
in their entirety; it is impossible to separate decisions from the close connection that
the individual has with the realities they confront. When it comes to give it
meaning, action in extreme situation emerges at least in part within a ‘projected
time’ temporality.
5 From Decision Making to Taking Action in Extreme
Situations
The plant’s superintendent was unambiguous in his description of the relationship
between his staff and the production facility, which he characterised as a fight,
dominated by fear and suffering. His lexicon and register provide further evidence:
he speaks of “three monsters”, “three nuclear units that were unleashed”, and tries
to “achieve the impossible with very few staff” to “tame this thing” [21] (our
translation). In this context of sensory stimulation, impressions and perceptions had
a strong influence on his decisions. His order to evacuate the site is an example of
this (see Sect. 2).
However, emotions do not always disrupt the ambient order and well-regulated
planning. Damasio [29] showed that they are a key component in the development
of rational thinking. Several experiments have since confirmed the need to reintroduce emotion into the process of conceptualization. Similarly, it has been
demonstrated that individuals produce concepts according to their perceptual
experience [30]. Such studies show that the embodiment of emotion can ground
concepts. An illustration of this is found in Yoshida’s testimony. He stated that
following the explosion of Reactor 1 (when the pressure was about 500 kPa), the
number ‘500’ left him “ill at ease”. He went on to add, “I know this is totally
irrational, it was just a feeling” [2] (our translation); this feeling would influence
his decisions concerning the other reactors.
Leontyev [31] put forward similar arguments. He claimed that human activity
forms the foundation for consciousness—a back-and-forth process that operates
between an individual and an object, guided by a pattern and determined by sensual
contact with the outside world. Leontyev goes on to say that beyond this circular
process, which influences interactions between the organism and the environment,
mental representations of the objective world are governed by processes in which
the individual is in physical contact with it and thereby obeys its intrinsic properties
and its own relationships. It is the object that initially determines how actions
unfold and, secondly, it is how it appears as a subjective product of the action that
178
S. Travadel