Although it had not yet happened, the future catastrophe seemed real enough to him
to guide his actions. The destruction of an entire region—not simply an official
accident—constituted, at least a partial anchor point for the decisions that he took.
He repeated this point many times during the hearing, “it was clear that we were
heading for a major accident and we had to prepare for it” [2] (our translation). He
stated that he had always had such a situation at the back of his mind, beginning
with his initial instructions to prepare alternative cooling methods. Yoshida’s
decisions therefore took place in a sort of ‘projected time’ temporality. It would
therefore be wrong to say that he ‘expected’ the loss of the cooling systems, as this
would place his actions in a causal type of rationality and an ‘occurring time’
temporality. This idea is similar to that of Dupuy [28], who argues that temporality
should not be seen as a container in which human activities take place, but as a
result of human activities.
This observation may seem trivial. Naturally, where the cooling systems of a
nuclear reactor are damaged, the operator must consider the potential for disaster.
However, limiting the investigation to the critical bifurcations of the decisions as
the situation unfolded, and trying to understand the rationality of choices based on
available information or resources—an exercise that is at the heart of traditional
investigation processes—means that the disaster is only looked at in terms of its
potential, which is likely to significantly weaken its power of determination.
A contrario, when rationality is viewed in terms of ‘projected time’ it “is a fundamental existential problem that rears its head every time we are confronted with
absolute uncertainty concerning a variable on which our ‘salvation’ depends” [28].
By comparison, an approach in terms of scenarios sees the future as a distant
objective reality for the individual. In this context, the paradox highlighted by
Dupuy [26] is as follows: prospective methods make it possible to socially create an
image of the future; at the same time, they empty it of its physical dimension, they
do not acknowledge reality of any kind.
Difficulties arise when the decision is counterfactually examined using a
probabilistic-causal approach, with a view to arriving at a moral judgment. The
expression of a causal link is inherently relative. Core fusion, overpressure or leaks
in the containment vessel of Reactor 1, like the accumulation of hydrogen and the
failure of ventilation equipment, may be considered as the ‘causes’ of the explosion
of Reactor 1. Emphasising one over the other is relevant depending on the class of
situation in question, the context or the contrast to be established between a situation and an event. For this reason some authors have suggested the reformulation
of the counterfactual causal dependence as follows: If c* had occurred instead of c,
then e* would have occurred instead of e [27]. Whichever is the case, this observation shows that causality has no transcendent reality, except in the narrow field of
science (i.e. excluding human affairs). An assertion of causality requires adopting a
point of view, the mark of subjectivity. The a posteriori allocation of probabilities in
causal reasoning leads to short-circuiting the infinity of potential future bifurcations,
and the retention of only a few of them. Reasoning is thereby biased because, unlike
moral judgments, “the foundation for probabilistic judgment cannot include any
information that is only available after action has been taken” [26] (our
Decision-Making in Extreme Situations …
177
to guide his actions. The destruction of an entire region—not simply an official
accident—constituted, at least a partial anchor point for the decisions that he took.
He repeated this point many times during the hearing, “it was clear that we were
heading for a major accident and we had to prepare for it” [2] (our translation). He
stated that he had always had such a situation at the back of his mind, beginning
with his initial instructions to prepare alternative cooling methods. Yoshida’s
decisions therefore took place in a sort of ‘projected time’ temporality. It would
therefore be wrong to say that he ‘expected’ the loss of the cooling systems, as this
would place his actions in a causal type of rationality and an ‘occurring time’
temporality. This idea is similar to that of Dupuy [28], who argues that temporality
should not be seen as a container in which human activities take place, but as a
result of human activities.
This observation may seem trivial. Naturally, where the cooling systems of a
nuclear reactor are damaged, the operator must consider the potential for disaster.
However, limiting the investigation to the critical bifurcations of the decisions as
the situation unfolded, and trying to understand the rationality of choices based on
available information or resources—an exercise that is at the heart of traditional
investigation processes—means that the disaster is only looked at in terms of its
potential, which is likely to significantly weaken its power of determination.
A contrario, when rationality is viewed in terms of ‘projected time’ it “is a fundamental existential problem that rears its head every time we are confronted with
absolute uncertainty concerning a variable on which our ‘salvation’ depends” [28].
By comparison, an approach in terms of scenarios sees the future as a distant
objective reality for the individual. In this context, the paradox highlighted by
Dupuy [26] is as follows: prospective methods make it possible to socially create an
image of the future; at the same time, they empty it of its physical dimension, they
do not acknowledge reality of any kind.
Difficulties arise when the decision is counterfactually examined using a
probabilistic-causal approach, with a view to arriving at a moral judgment. The
expression of a causal link is inherently relative. Core fusion, overpressure or leaks
in the containment vessel of Reactor 1, like the accumulation of hydrogen and the
failure of ventilation equipment, may be considered as the ‘causes’ of the explosion
of Reactor 1. Emphasising one over the other is relevant depending on the class of
situation in question, the context or the contrast to be established between a situation and an event. For this reason some authors have suggested the reformulation
of the counterfactual causal dependence as follows: If c* had occurred instead of c,
then e* would have occurred instead of e [27]. Whichever is the case, this observation shows that causality has no transcendent reality, except in the narrow field of
science (i.e. excluding human affairs). An assertion of causality requires adopting a
point of view, the mark of subjectivity. The a posteriori allocation of probabilities in
causal reasoning leads to short-circuiting the infinity of potential future bifurcations,
and the retention of only a few of them. Reasoning is thereby biased because, unlike
moral judgments, “the foundation for probabilistic judgment cannot include any
information that is only available after action has been taken” [26] (our
Decision-Making in Extreme Situations …
177