Yoshida, “everyone was in shock, frozen, unable to think. So I got them all together
to talk to them. […] I also told them […] that if we did not respond, the situation
would become even more catastrophic […] It was at that point that I experienced
one of the most emotional moments of my life. They all wanted to go back, they even
pushed each other out of the way to get there” [2] (our translation).
The Fukushima accident demonstrates how difficult it can be to make decisions
when the realities of the situation are not conducive and the unfolding scenario
cannot be stopped (due to a serious lack of resources); at the same time, the physical
integrity of individuals cannot be guaranteed and the consequences of taking action
—or not—have societal significance. The inevitable catastrophe, the social pressure
it generates, the moral dilemmas it creates and the psychological drivers for action
are characteristic of an extreme situation, as described by Travadel and Guarnieri
[21]. In extreme situations, the action plan must be reinvented and individuals
mobilised to this end. Yoshida therefore stated that he initially had no solutions, no
idea how to react, and fell back on ‘administrative’ procedures in an attempt to
regain self-confidence [2]. Similarly, organizational theory tends to regard a crisis
as a situation where, “not only are there insufficient resources, but it is a situation
where the rules were not thought of yet” [22]. The new order must be acceptable,
when life itself—that of workers or of an entire population—is threatened.
Current models do not make it possible to deepen our understanding of the
practical management of such situations. To progress, the analysis must be based on
suitable metaphysics and integrate the world of the decision maker, in which their
decisions make sense. The following sections consider these two dimensions.
4 Decision Making and Catastrophe: Back
from the Future and Return
The concept of decision making inevitably refers to concepts of causation and
rationality. Through the introduction of probabilistic links between states of the
world and actions, expected utility theories opened up the debate on the causal link.
Savage’s axioms (for a discussion, see [7]) apply to actions that do not have a
causal influence on the state of the world in which their consequences are experienced.
8 Consequently, the final state of the system is often associated with a fixed
point,
9 which rules out many decision-making scenarios. To overcome this problem, (unconditional) utility was replaced by a concept of utility which conditions
the probabilities of states of the world (those leading to the expected consequences)
to the execution of the act. These probabilities are interpreted either in terms of
classical conditional probabilities, or causal probability [23]. In the first case,
8
The problem can be reformulated to make it the case [23].
9
This is the case in economic models such as the ‘perfect competition’ model in which the actions
of one agent do not change the overall balance.
Decision-Making in Extreme Situations …
175
to talk to them. […] I also told them […] that if we did not respond, the situation
would become even more catastrophic […] It was at that point that I experienced
one of the most emotional moments of my life. They all wanted to go back, they even
pushed each other out of the way to get there” [2] (our translation).
The Fukushima accident demonstrates how difficult it can be to make decisions
when the realities of the situation are not conducive and the unfolding scenario
cannot be stopped (due to a serious lack of resources); at the same time, the physical
integrity of individuals cannot be guaranteed and the consequences of taking action
—or not—have societal significance. The inevitable catastrophe, the social pressure
it generates, the moral dilemmas it creates and the psychological drivers for action
are characteristic of an extreme situation, as described by Travadel and Guarnieri
[21]. In extreme situations, the action plan must be reinvented and individuals
mobilised to this end. Yoshida therefore stated that he initially had no solutions, no
idea how to react, and fell back on ‘administrative’ procedures in an attempt to
regain self-confidence [2]. Similarly, organizational theory tends to regard a crisis
as a situation where, “not only are there insufficient resources, but it is a situation
where the rules were not thought of yet” [22]. The new order must be acceptable,
when life itself—that of workers or of an entire population—is threatened.
Current models do not make it possible to deepen our understanding of the
practical management of such situations. To progress, the analysis must be based on
suitable metaphysics and integrate the world of the decision maker, in which their
decisions make sense. The following sections consider these two dimensions.
4 Decision Making and Catastrophe: Back
from the Future and Return
The concept of decision making inevitably refers to concepts of causation and
rationality. Through the introduction of probabilistic links between states of the
world and actions, expected utility theories opened up the debate on the causal link.
Savage’s axioms (for a discussion, see [7]) apply to actions that do not have a
causal influence on the state of the world in which their consequences are experienced.
8 Consequently, the final state of the system is often associated with a fixed
point,
9 which rules out many decision-making scenarios. To overcome this problem, (unconditional) utility was replaced by a concept of utility which conditions
the probabilities of states of the world (those leading to the expected consequences)
to the execution of the act. These probabilities are interpreted either in terms of
classical conditional probabilities, or causal probability [23]. In the first case,
8
The problem can be reformulated to make it the case [23].
9
This is the case in economic models such as the ‘perfect competition’ model in which the actions
of one agent do not change the overall balance.
Decision-Making in Extreme Situations …
175