However, the superintendent immediately qualifies his comments by stating the
impossibility of conceiving an alternative solution. Through this remark, Yoshida
integrates his decision into a wider context of action.
This is to be compared with observations from current research in Natural
Decision Making (NDM) that aims to account for decision making in the presence
of changing conditions, ill-defined tasks, time pressure and significant personal
risks in the case of error [11]. In these conditions, the decision maker’s accounts of
their decision making “do not fit into a decision-tree framework”; they are not
“making choices”, “considering alternatives”, or “assessing probabilities”, but they
see themselves as acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience, generating
and modifying plans to meet the needs of the situation [12]. The decision maker
acts on the basis of heuristics, then develops a mental simulation to assess the
feasibility of the proposed response. These studies are consistent with those of
Gilboa and Schmeidler [8], who axiomatized a Case-Based Decision Theory, which
postulates that the decision maker acts by comparing the current situation to one
already experienced.
6 Coordination and leadership modalities also change when
tasks are unpredictable and interdependent, as is the case in an emergency context
[13].
However, if the context for the intervention of firefighters or emergency room
surgeons is sometimes called an ‘extreme situation’ [14], in practice these ‘dynamic’ situations constitute the predictable working environment of the decision
maker. The problem relates more to the definition of the case in question, than the
solution once the diagnosis has been made. Ultimately, the ‘extreme’ nature of a
situation is assessed differently by different researchers and does not necessarily
imply that the decision maker is completely overwhelmed or out of their depth [15].
Such individuals have substantial resources at their disposal, a well-established set
of procedures and the impact of their actions is limited at the scale of society.
In addition, whether they focus on decision making processes based on scenarios
or on more empirical approaches, investigations of the influence of stress [16], a
hostile physical or social environment [17], or the formal organization [18] on the
performance of the decision maker are simplistic. They lead the analysis to be
focused on the physical or emotional factors that could have led Yoshida to make
errors (for example his decision to evacuate the site). This cognitive approach is
indicative of the common sense meaning of ‘emotion’, i.e. a complex state of
consciousness, usually sudden and momentary, accompanied by physiological
disorders.
7
However, this perspective largely ignores the role played by emotions in decision making [19]. Ellis [20] considers that emotions and values are necessary
components of a decision, which does not mean that the decision becomes ‘irrational’. This assertion is illustrated by the way in which the plant’s staff decided to
return to the field following the explosion at Reactor 3 on 15 March. According to
6
However, this theory is not specific to an emergency situation.
7
Dictionnaire culturel, op. cit.
174
S. Travadel
impossibility of conceiving an alternative solution. Through this remark, Yoshida
integrates his decision into a wider context of action.
This is to be compared with observations from current research in Natural
Decision Making (NDM) that aims to account for decision making in the presence
of changing conditions, ill-defined tasks, time pressure and significant personal
risks in the case of error [11]. In these conditions, the decision maker’s accounts of
their decision making “do not fit into a decision-tree framework”; they are not
“making choices”, “considering alternatives”, or “assessing probabilities”, but they
see themselves as acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience, generating
and modifying plans to meet the needs of the situation [12]. The decision maker
acts on the basis of heuristics, then develops a mental simulation to assess the
feasibility of the proposed response. These studies are consistent with those of
Gilboa and Schmeidler [8], who axiomatized a Case-Based Decision Theory, which
postulates that the decision maker acts by comparing the current situation to one
already experienced.
6 Coordination and leadership modalities also change when
tasks are unpredictable and interdependent, as is the case in an emergency context
[13].
However, if the context for the intervention of firefighters or emergency room
surgeons is sometimes called an ‘extreme situation’ [14], in practice these ‘dynamic’ situations constitute the predictable working environment of the decision
maker. The problem relates more to the definition of the case in question, than the
solution once the diagnosis has been made. Ultimately, the ‘extreme’ nature of a
situation is assessed differently by different researchers and does not necessarily
imply that the decision maker is completely overwhelmed or out of their depth [15].
Such individuals have substantial resources at their disposal, a well-established set
of procedures and the impact of their actions is limited at the scale of society.
In addition, whether they focus on decision making processes based on scenarios
or on more empirical approaches, investigations of the influence of stress [16], a
hostile physical or social environment [17], or the formal organization [18] on the
performance of the decision maker are simplistic. They lead the analysis to be
focused on the physical or emotional factors that could have led Yoshida to make
errors (for example his decision to evacuate the site). This cognitive approach is
indicative of the common sense meaning of ‘emotion’, i.e. a complex state of
consciousness, usually sudden and momentary, accompanied by physiological
disorders.
7
However, this perspective largely ignores the role played by emotions in decision making [19]. Ellis [20] considers that emotions and values are necessary
components of a decision, which does not mean that the decision becomes ‘irrational’. This assertion is illustrated by the way in which the plant’s staff decided to
return to the field following the explosion at Reactor 3 on 15 March. According to
6
However, this theory is not specific to an emergency situation.
7
Dictionnaire culturel, op. cit.
174
S. Travadel