2 From Nuclear Accident to Extreme Situation
Fukushima Daiichi is a Japanese nuclear power plant, which on March 11, 2011
suffered, like the rest of Eastern Japan, the effects of a terrible earthquake followed
by a devastating tsunami. Before becoming a nuclear power plant, the site was a
training camp for the Japanese kamikaze during the Second World War [10]. At the
time of the accident, the Director of the plant was Masao Yoshida. The Daiichi
plant is a neighbor to the Dai Ini plant, where Naohiro Masuda was the Director,
and whose handling of the crisis was presented as a model of good management
[11]. Like Masuda, Masao Yoshida knew perfectly well how to handle the situation
(which we will later term ‘extreme’) he and his men were faced with, despite the
fact that the damage and losses were far more extensive at Daiichi than Daini.
Nevertheless his actions came under severe criticism. But that is the subject of
another story [12].
The management failures that occurred in the handling of the crisis at Fukushima
Daiichi are not the first of their kind: the accident at Three Mile Island, not to
mention Chernobyl had already highlighted the inability of crisis management
procedures to cope with ‘unthinkable’ situations. From this, it seems almost reasonable to conclude that few real lessons have been learned [13].
There appears to be a kind of illusion of safety, a fact underlined by the pertinent
observation of a TEPCO manager who explained the accident in terms of overconfidence, lack of imagination and various biases [14]. Despite all efforts to
overcome them, these three challenges lead to accidents that Perrow [15] describes
as “normal” or “systemic”, due to complex interactions and tight coupling within
the system. However, the phenomenon described by Perrow is not new. The historian Fressoz [16] describes its origins in the nineteenth century with the development of the railway system; catastrophes have proven to be inherent in systems
where “nobody is able to anticipate and ward off the effects” [17].
While it is recognized that failures are inevitable, contemporary approaches to
‘beyond-design-basis’ accidents in nuclear safety [18] must address ongoing
challenges. In the aftermath of extensive damage, actors must adopt innovative,
improvised solutions to return to a safe situation. Similarly, they must draw upon
resources that are not part of the usual frameworks and patterns for problem solving
[8]. It is clear that this postulate is far from being accepted. The numerous investigations into the accident repeatedly reaffirmed the benefits of the concept of
defense in depth [19], despite its inability to effectively evaluate events that lead to
the emergence of new sources of vulnerability [9].
The situation at Fukushima Daiichi goes beyond coping with an unthinkable
disaster, and concerns “a state of emergency which seems to have no end”, or even
“a slow, diluted catastrophe, an ongoing catastrophe” [20]. This has consequences
for how we handle the phenomenon. The Fukushima accident is not limited to the
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Entering …
3
Fukushima Daiichi is a Japanese nuclear power plant, which on March 11, 2011
suffered, like the rest of Eastern Japan, the effects of a terrible earthquake followed
by a devastating tsunami. Before becoming a nuclear power plant, the site was a
training camp for the Japanese kamikaze during the Second World War [10]. At the
time of the accident, the Director of the plant was Masao Yoshida. The Daiichi
plant is a neighbor to the Dai Ini plant, where Naohiro Masuda was the Director,
and whose handling of the crisis was presented as a model of good management
[11]. Like Masuda, Masao Yoshida knew perfectly well how to handle the situation
(which we will later term ‘extreme’) he and his men were faced with, despite the
fact that the damage and losses were far more extensive at Daiichi than Daini.
Nevertheless his actions came under severe criticism. But that is the subject of
another story [12].
The management failures that occurred in the handling of the crisis at Fukushima
Daiichi are not the first of their kind: the accident at Three Mile Island, not to
mention Chernobyl had already highlighted the inability of crisis management
procedures to cope with ‘unthinkable’ situations. From this, it seems almost reasonable to conclude that few real lessons have been learned [13].
There appears to be a kind of illusion of safety, a fact underlined by the pertinent
observation of a TEPCO manager who explained the accident in terms of overconfidence, lack of imagination and various biases [14]. Despite all efforts to
overcome them, these three challenges lead to accidents that Perrow [15] describes
as “normal” or “systemic”, due to complex interactions and tight coupling within
the system. However, the phenomenon described by Perrow is not new. The historian Fressoz [16] describes its origins in the nineteenth century with the development of the railway system; catastrophes have proven to be inherent in systems
where “nobody is able to anticipate and ward off the effects” [17].
While it is recognized that failures are inevitable, contemporary approaches to
‘beyond-design-basis’ accidents in nuclear safety [18] must address ongoing
challenges. In the aftermath of extensive damage, actors must adopt innovative,
improvised solutions to return to a safe situation. Similarly, they must draw upon
resources that are not part of the usual frameworks and patterns for problem solving
[8]. It is clear that this postulate is far from being accepted. The numerous investigations into the accident repeatedly reaffirmed the benefits of the concept of
defense in depth [19], despite its inability to effectively evaluate events that lead to
the emergence of new sources of vulnerability [9].
The situation at Fukushima Daiichi goes beyond coping with an unthinkable
disaster, and concerns “a state of emergency which seems to have no end”, or even
“a slow, diluted catastrophe, an ongoing catastrophe” [20]. This has consequences
for how we handle the phenomenon. The Fukushima accident is not limited to the
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Entering …
3