tor’s cannot act as the sorcerer’s apprentice, blithely dispensing with basic safety
requirements. It also taught us, a posteriori, that operators must learn from both
their own experience and that of others. The concept of ‘safety culture’ emerged
from the Chernobyl accident. It has since been widely popularized and reused to
demonstrate that the safety of a facility is the top priority for all operators [3–5].
What have we learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident?
Two Commissions of Inquiry were established: one at the initiative of Prime
Minister Naoto Kan, the other by the Japanese Diet. Both Commissions recognized
that the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi was “a man-made disaster” and not
simply caused by the earthquake and the giant tsunami that occurred on March 11,
2011 [6, 7]. The Commissions’ reports were voluminous, and supplemented by
international analyzes [8, 9]. Everything came down to the facts, causes and consequences of the accident. Finally, and as usual, everyone agreed (without actually
explicitly saying so) that the accident could be seen as useful, whether in terms of
how to regain ‘control’ of a system that was out of control, or as a way to learn from
each other’s mistakes, or as example of the intertwined decisions that were taken at
multiple levels (local, hierarchical, organizational, inter-organizational, political,
international, etc.). In other words, as a way to say that all of this could have been
avoided if only…
All of these Commissions produced a long list of recommendations that are both
sensible and helpful in improving safety. However, fundamentally they offer
nothing new—all are consistent with a ‘normative’ vision of nuclear safety.
Although it cannot be disputed that they are an invaluable source of knowledge and
progress, their very nature creates a form of myopia. This myopia is so pronounced
that it eventually produces expert and techno-centered analyses that only take into
consideration standards, laws, regulations and procedures. It excludes all forms of
humanity from a human activity, while accidents are clearly a departure from the
logical course of events.
Does this mean that the accident at Fukushima Daiichi will have taught us
nothing? Obviously not! Rather, it places the concept of resilience, which has
become particularly fashionable in many disciplines, at center stage in nuclear
safety. The concept was integrated into safety sciences in the early 2000s. It has
taken pride of place in the context of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Entering into
resilience assumes the system has survived, if not it has perished!
This chapter is organized into five sections. It identifies and describes the
determinants of the entry into resilience in a socio-technical system that is the
victim of an unprecedented accident which, without an adequate response, will
obliterate the system itself. The first section revisits the notion of the accident,
looking at it in terms of the ‘extreme situation’. The second introduces the concepts
of resilience and entry into resilience. The third and the fourth sections respectively
discuss the link between the entry into resilience and notions of time and space. The
last section discusses the human and organizational determinants of an organization’s entry into resilience. The Fukushima Daiichi accident, and in particular the
decisions taken by the engineering teams on the site between 11 and 15 March 2011
serve as a case study.
2
F. Guarnieri
requirements. It also taught us, a posteriori, that operators must learn from both
their own experience and that of others. The concept of ‘safety culture’ emerged
from the Chernobyl accident. It has since been widely popularized and reused to
demonstrate that the safety of a facility is the top priority for all operators [3–5].
What have we learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident?
Two Commissions of Inquiry were established: one at the initiative of Prime
Minister Naoto Kan, the other by the Japanese Diet. Both Commissions recognized
that the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi was “a man-made disaster” and not
simply caused by the earthquake and the giant tsunami that occurred on March 11,
2011 [6, 7]. The Commissions’ reports were voluminous, and supplemented by
international analyzes [8, 9]. Everything came down to the facts, causes and consequences of the accident. Finally, and as usual, everyone agreed (without actually
explicitly saying so) that the accident could be seen as useful, whether in terms of
how to regain ‘control’ of a system that was out of control, or as a way to learn from
each other’s mistakes, or as example of the intertwined decisions that were taken at
multiple levels (local, hierarchical, organizational, inter-organizational, political,
international, etc.). In other words, as a way to say that all of this could have been
avoided if only…
All of these Commissions produced a long list of recommendations that are both
sensible and helpful in improving safety. However, fundamentally they offer
nothing new—all are consistent with a ‘normative’ vision of nuclear safety.
Although it cannot be disputed that they are an invaluable source of knowledge and
progress, their very nature creates a form of myopia. This myopia is so pronounced
that it eventually produces expert and techno-centered analyses that only take into
consideration standards, laws, regulations and procedures. It excludes all forms of
humanity from a human activity, while accidents are clearly a departure from the
logical course of events.
Does this mean that the accident at Fukushima Daiichi will have taught us
nothing? Obviously not! Rather, it places the concept of resilience, which has
become particularly fashionable in many disciplines, at center stage in nuclear
safety. The concept was integrated into safety sciences in the early 2000s. It has
taken pride of place in the context of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Entering into
resilience assumes the system has survived, if not it has perished!
This chapter is organized into five sections. It identifies and describes the
determinants of the entry into resilience in a socio-technical system that is the
victim of an unprecedented accident which, without an adequate response, will
obliterate the system itself. The first section revisits the notion of the accident,
looking at it in terms of the ‘extreme situation’. The second introduces the concepts
of resilience and entry into resilience. The third and the fourth sections respectively
discuss the link between the entry into resilience and notions of time and space. The
last section discusses the human and organizational determinants of an organization’s entry into resilience. The Fukushima Daiichi accident, and in particular the
decisions taken by the engineering teams on the site between 11 and 15 March 2011
serve as a case study.
2
F. Guarnieri