Finally, “managing” risk, but it is not the end of once-through cycle but the
beginnings of next cycle. Communication is the key element for all of these four
phases and not on-directional flow of the result of evaluation or decision made by
limited number of experts.
In this multi-dimensional process of risk governance, all of stakeholders is
encouraged to participate in the discussion about the distribution of mandate, role
and responsibility to keep risks smaller than tolerable level. This discussion should
be done on a daily basis to build consensus before something wrong happens.
Prescribed (formal and informal) agreement would help post-accident remedy
process by encouraging proactive collaboration among them to learn from and
overcome the disaster.
Considerations on ethical implications of accident and integration of the concept
of risk governance with risk communication will cultivate constructive and collaborative pathway towards more “resilient” engineering practices in the reality of
our societies.
Acknowledgements Part of this chapter is based on the author’s recently published and forthcoming book chapters [3, 16] and supported by the JSPS (Japan Society for Promotion of Science)
academic funding program “Higashi-Nihon Dai-shinsai Gakujutsu Chousa” (Academic Survey
Program for Great East Japan Disaster).
References
1. T. Taniguchi, Lessons learned from deficit analysis of nuclear governance, Proceedings of the
International Symposium on Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Risks after the accident of
TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations, Kyoto, Japan, 30 October 2014,
Research Reactor Institute, Kyoto University (2014)
2. T. Sata, Oi-hanketsu ga Toikakeru-mono (Implications of the judgment of the court on Oi
Nuclear Power Plant Case), J. At. Energ. Soc. Jpn., 57(2), 119–122 (2015) (in Japanese)
3. K. Juraku, S.G. Knowles, S. Schmid, in After Fukushima: Legacies of 3.11, ed. by S.G.
Knowles, K. Cleveland, R. Shineha. Learning from disaster: experts and the contested meanings
of 3.11 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Forthcoming)
4. J. Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1997)
5. Y. Ikeda, Problems on criminal negligence and aircraft accidents, Bull. Sch. High-Technol.
Hum. Welf. Tokai University, 4, 81–91 (Tokai University, 1995)
6. Science Council of Japan, Ningen to Kougaku Kenkyu Renraku Iinkai Anzen Kougaku
Senmon Iinkai Houkoku: Jiko-Chousa no Arikata ni kansuru Teigen (Report of the Safety
Engineering Expert Committee, Committee of Human and Engineering: Recommendations
on Practice of Accident Investigation). (Science Council of Japan, June 23, 2005) (in
Japanese)
7. NAIIC, Executive Summery of The Official Report of Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission, July 5, 2012, National Diet of Japan Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Tokyo, Japan (2012)
8. Bloomberg, Japan’s Unsatisfying Nuclear Report, Bloomberg, (July 9, 2012)
9. M. Dickie, Beware post-crisis ‘Made in Japan’ labels, (The Financial Times, July 8, 2012)
Why Is It so Difficult to Learn from Accidents?
167
beginnings of next cycle. Communication is the key element for all of these four
phases and not on-directional flow of the result of evaluation or decision made by
limited number of experts.
In this multi-dimensional process of risk governance, all of stakeholders is
encouraged to participate in the discussion about the distribution of mandate, role
and responsibility to keep risks smaller than tolerable level. This discussion should
be done on a daily basis to build consensus before something wrong happens.
Prescribed (formal and informal) agreement would help post-accident remedy
process by encouraging proactive collaboration among them to learn from and
overcome the disaster.
Considerations on ethical implications of accident and integration of the concept
of risk governance with risk communication will cultivate constructive and collaborative pathway towards more “resilient” engineering practices in the reality of
our societies.
Acknowledgements Part of this chapter is based on the author’s recently published and forthcoming book chapters [3, 16] and supported by the JSPS (Japan Society for Promotion of Science)
academic funding program “Higashi-Nihon Dai-shinsai Gakujutsu Chousa” (Academic Survey
Program for Great East Japan Disaster).
References
1. T. Taniguchi, Lessons learned from deficit analysis of nuclear governance, Proceedings of the
International Symposium on Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Risks after the accident of
TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations, Kyoto, Japan, 30 October 2014,
Research Reactor Institute, Kyoto University (2014)
2. T. Sata, Oi-hanketsu ga Toikakeru-mono (Implications of the judgment of the court on Oi
Nuclear Power Plant Case), J. At. Energ. Soc. Jpn., 57(2), 119–122 (2015) (in Japanese)
3. K. Juraku, S.G. Knowles, S. Schmid, in After Fukushima: Legacies of 3.11, ed. by S.G.
Knowles, K. Cleveland, R. Shineha. Learning from disaster: experts and the contested meanings
of 3.11 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Forthcoming)
4. J. Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1997)
5. Y. Ikeda, Problems on criminal negligence and aircraft accidents, Bull. Sch. High-Technol.
Hum. Welf. Tokai University, 4, 81–91 (Tokai University, 1995)
6. Science Council of Japan, Ningen to Kougaku Kenkyu Renraku Iinkai Anzen Kougaku
Senmon Iinkai Houkoku: Jiko-Chousa no Arikata ni kansuru Teigen (Report of the Safety
Engineering Expert Committee, Committee of Human and Engineering: Recommendations
on Practice of Accident Investigation). (Science Council of Japan, June 23, 2005) (in
Japanese)
7. NAIIC, Executive Summery of The Official Report of Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission, July 5, 2012, National Diet of Japan Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Tokyo, Japan (2012)
8. Bloomberg, Japan’s Unsatisfying Nuclear Report, Bloomberg, (July 9, 2012)
9. M. Dickie, Beware post-crisis ‘Made in Japan’ labels, (The Financial Times, July 8, 2012)
Why Is It so Difficult to Learn from Accidents?
167