other conservation problems throughout the world. In 2008, GNESA was recognized by the U. S. Department of Interior as an exemplary example of collaborative
conservation (USDOI 2008). Such collaboration is often the result of the right
people being in the right place at the right time. In 2004, an issue arose that would
test the limits of the collaborative efforts embodied in GNESA.
An Avalanche of Problems
On January 28, 2004, heavy snowfall resulted in avalanches in the GNESA corridor
that blocked the BNSF railroad for 29 h. These avalanches began in starting zones
within the GNP. During the storm, an empty 119-car freight train was struck by an
avalanche and derailed. While it was derailed, another avalanche in an adjacent
slide path struck the train again, derailing more cars. A third avalanche nearly hit a
clean-up crew, and a fourth avalanche hit a truck travelling the highway beneath the
railroad. Responding to continued snowpack instability and the need to ensure the
safety of its personnel, BNSF requested a special use permit from GNP that would
authorize explosive avalanche control in the John Stevens Canyon. After much
deliberation, GNP granted a 3-day emergency special use permit, but, as is often the
case, moderate weather allowed the snowpack to stabilize, and the avalanche risk
abated before any control measures could be implemented.
After the January 2004 incident, BNSF contracted with a company specializing
in avalanche control to analyze the avalanche hazard in the canyon. Their report
described the avalanche potential in 14 avalanche paths along the railroad in the
John Stevens Canyon (Hamre and Overcast 2004). Nine of those paths had some
level of protection provided by snow sheds, although seven of them were too short
to provide complete protection. Avalanche paths are dynamic, changing over time
with changes in vegetation growth. Most of the sheds were constructed around
1900, so for some of them, the paths had widened or altered position, so that the
sheds no longer provided complete protection (Fig. 18.5). The report identified
avalanche hazard reduction measures ranging from explosive control to snow shed
construction. From the viewpoint of BNSF and their consultants, explosive control
was the most expedient and cost-effective means to mitigate the avalanche risk.
However, the viewpoint of GNP was quite different.
Glacier National Park is congressionally mandated to protect the park from
impairment resulting from human-caused activities. Other legal mandates include
the protection of wilderness values (the Wilderness Act of 1964), protection of
threatened and endangered species, protection of scenic and cultural resources, and
maintenance of visitor enjoyment. The use of explosives generally ran counter to
these mandates and were inconsistent with the park’s status as a biosphere preserve
and world heritage site. In order to evaluate alternative courses of action, GNP
prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970. Four alternatives were evaluated in the EIS: a
“no action” alternative, by which no action by BNSF to mitigate avalanche hazard
302
J.S. Waller
conservation (USDOI 2008). Such collaboration is often the result of the right
people being in the right place at the right time. In 2004, an issue arose that would
test the limits of the collaborative efforts embodied in GNESA.
An Avalanche of Problems
On January 28, 2004, heavy snowfall resulted in avalanches in the GNESA corridor
that blocked the BNSF railroad for 29 h. These avalanches began in starting zones
within the GNP. During the storm, an empty 119-car freight train was struck by an
avalanche and derailed. While it was derailed, another avalanche in an adjacent
slide path struck the train again, derailing more cars. A third avalanche nearly hit a
clean-up crew, and a fourth avalanche hit a truck travelling the highway beneath the
railroad. Responding to continued snowpack instability and the need to ensure the
safety of its personnel, BNSF requested a special use permit from GNP that would
authorize explosive avalanche control in the John Stevens Canyon. After much
deliberation, GNP granted a 3-day emergency special use permit, but, as is often the
case, moderate weather allowed the snowpack to stabilize, and the avalanche risk
abated before any control measures could be implemented.
After the January 2004 incident, BNSF contracted with a company specializing
in avalanche control to analyze the avalanche hazard in the canyon. Their report
described the avalanche potential in 14 avalanche paths along the railroad in the
John Stevens Canyon (Hamre and Overcast 2004). Nine of those paths had some
level of protection provided by snow sheds, although seven of them were too short
to provide complete protection. Avalanche paths are dynamic, changing over time
with changes in vegetation growth. Most of the sheds were constructed around
1900, so for some of them, the paths had widened or altered position, so that the
sheds no longer provided complete protection (Fig. 18.5). The report identified
avalanche hazard reduction measures ranging from explosive control to snow shed
construction. From the viewpoint of BNSF and their consultants, explosive control
was the most expedient and cost-effective means to mitigate the avalanche risk.
However, the viewpoint of GNP was quite different.
Glacier National Park is congressionally mandated to protect the park from
impairment resulting from human-caused activities. Other legal mandates include
the protection of wilderness values (the Wilderness Act of 1964), protection of
threatened and endangered species, protection of scenic and cultural resources, and
maintenance of visitor enjoyment. The use of explosives generally ran counter to
these mandates and were inconsistent with the park’s status as a biosphere preserve
and world heritage site. In order to evaluate alternative courses of action, GNP
prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970. Four alternatives were evaluated in the EIS: a
“no action” alternative, by which no action by BNSF to mitigate avalanche hazard
302
J.S. Waller