133
The most obvious of such requirements were directly related to vessel construction
and retrofi tting. When new vessels are ordered, the purchaser needs to make sure
that it complies with the most recent IMO conventions; otherwise the Classifi cation
Society will not grant the needed permit. In other words, there is a rather effective
and effi cient mechanism for making sure that new vessels comply with existing
regulations . Interestingly, private actors – Classifi cation Societies – play a crucial
role in making these command-and-control measures effective.
The institutionalised system of Port State Control is undertaken on selected vessels so as to ensure that required safety installations are operational. The major
weakness of this system is that there are no guarantees that installed safety equipment actually are used in accordance with proper procedures. A major determining
factor of whether such equipment is used or not is the extent the operator has
economic or other incentives not to use installed equipment. When proper use is not
costly, or even benefi cial to the operators, it could be expected that intended procedures are adhered to. On the other hand, when operators gain from cutting corners
by not using installed equipment, technical requirements are typically not
suffi cient.
The ongoing international phasing out of single-hull tankers is probably the single most important initiative that has been taken to increase environmental safety in
relation to accidental large-scale oil spills. In what follows, the importance of phasing out single-hull tankers will be elaborated upon. Attention is also given to how
individual countries may take unilateral action in order to protect what is perceived
to be of national interest and how large-scale accidents can create momentum for
adoption of stricter regulation .
The fi rst initiative to phase out single-hull tankers was taken unilaterally in 1990
by the USA (Oil Pollution Act; OPA 90) as a direct consequence of the 1989 Exxon
Valdez accident. The US ban meant that neither new nor old tankers with single
hulls would be allowed to call on US ports after 2005. IMO reacted to the US ban
in 1992 when it accepted an amendment of MARPOL that stated that large tankers
(over 5,000 Deadweight tonnes) must have double hulls if ordered after July 1993
(MARPOL, Annex I, Regulation 19). However, the issue of how to phase out singlehull tankers which were in use without creating too much disruption in marine
transportation was more diffi cult to agree upon. Initially, it was decided in IMO that
existing tankers should either be converted or taken out of service before they were
30 years old (MARPOL, Annex I, Regulation 20).
4 EU authorities, faced by a situation where all single-hull tankers would be denied access to US ports in 2005 following the serious Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002) oil spills, realised that there was
a high probability that the unilateral decision by the USA would result in a redirection of single-hull ships from the USA to other parts of the world ( Summaries of EU
4 The 30 year limit was, however, not absolute but could be adapted to, e.g. bottlenecks in shipyards’ capability to handle conversions to double hulls and to whether the vessel had segregated
ballast tanks or not. Owners could therefore ask IMO for extension periods for their vessels on
individual basis. However, because of the diffi culties in retrofi tting existing vessels, it was assumed
that older tankers would rather be taken out of service than converted.
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…
The most obvious of such requirements were directly related to vessel construction
and retrofi tting. When new vessels are ordered, the purchaser needs to make sure
that it complies with the most recent IMO conventions; otherwise the Classifi cation
Society will not grant the needed permit. In other words, there is a rather effective
and effi cient mechanism for making sure that new vessels comply with existing
regulations . Interestingly, private actors – Classifi cation Societies – play a crucial
role in making these command-and-control measures effective.
The institutionalised system of Port State Control is undertaken on selected vessels so as to ensure that required safety installations are operational. The major
weakness of this system is that there are no guarantees that installed safety equipment actually are used in accordance with proper procedures. A major determining
factor of whether such equipment is used or not is the extent the operator has
economic or other incentives not to use installed equipment. When proper use is not
costly, or even benefi cial to the operators, it could be expected that intended procedures are adhered to. On the other hand, when operators gain from cutting corners
by not using installed equipment, technical requirements are typically not
suffi cient.
The ongoing international phasing out of single-hull tankers is probably the single most important initiative that has been taken to increase environmental safety in
relation to accidental large-scale oil spills. In what follows, the importance of phasing out single-hull tankers will be elaborated upon. Attention is also given to how
individual countries may take unilateral action in order to protect what is perceived
to be of national interest and how large-scale accidents can create momentum for
adoption of stricter regulation .
The fi rst initiative to phase out single-hull tankers was taken unilaterally in 1990
by the USA (Oil Pollution Act; OPA 90) as a direct consequence of the 1989 Exxon
Valdez accident. The US ban meant that neither new nor old tankers with single
hulls would be allowed to call on US ports after 2005. IMO reacted to the US ban
in 1992 when it accepted an amendment of MARPOL that stated that large tankers
(over 5,000 Deadweight tonnes) must have double hulls if ordered after July 1993
(MARPOL, Annex I, Regulation 19). However, the issue of how to phase out singlehull tankers which were in use without creating too much disruption in marine
transportation was more diffi cult to agree upon. Initially, it was decided in IMO that
existing tankers should either be converted or taken out of service before they were
30 years old (MARPOL, Annex I, Regulation 20).
4 EU authorities, faced by a situation where all single-hull tankers would be denied access to US ports in 2005 following the serious Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002) oil spills, realised that there was
a high probability that the unilateral decision by the USA would result in a redirection of single-hull ships from the USA to other parts of the world ( Summaries of EU
4 The 30 year limit was, however, not absolute but could be adapted to, e.g. bottlenecks in shipyards’ capability to handle conversions to double hulls and to whether the vessel had segregated
ballast tanks or not. Owners could therefore ask IMO for extension periods for their vessels on
individual basis. However, because of the diffi culties in retrofi tting existing vessels, it was assumed
that older tankers would rather be taken out of service than converted.
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…