Safety of 5G Network Physical Infrastructures 189
most important variables that control the structural fragility and system resilience.
The need to protect critical infrastructure and save human lives in the case of a major
event must be balanced with the amount of available resources, for example technical
and financial. Usually, minimum levels of public services of communication are
defined based on a reliability criterion, where a maximum number of service disruption events per year are fixed, or based on an availability criterion, where maximum
service downtime hours per year are fixed. Even though the latter criterion is the
current state‐of‐the‐art, the approach used to define and demonstrate minimum
levels of communication services does not find support in a comprehensive and holistic approach, lacks the contribution of trans‐disciplinary disciplines, in particular of
structural engineering, and does not account for systems resilience, climate change
effects or other unexpected events.
As the frequency and severity of climate‐related natural catastrophes is expected to
increase and the current risks of disasters of geological origin pose a serious threat
to physical assets located in vulnerable locations, including critical infrastructures
along their life cycle, it is extremely important to develop a risk management framework
that could be used to assess and help to manage risk to which physical infrastructures
used for communication systems are exposed to.
In order to be able to prepare solutions, first it is necessary to consolidate the context of the problem. Therefore, the relevant technical, social, economic and regulatory
specificities, past, present, and in the predictable future, of communication systems
needs a proper discussion. For example, the characterisation of the key physical infrastructures, topology of the existing networks, and the precise identification of the
main challenges to be solved to attain the intended objectives are part of this evolving
process.
Next, risk assessment methods should be applied. This task encompasses risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. The former consists in the formal, systematic
and comprehensive compilation, review and use of the available information concerning relevant hazard scenarios; with appropriate consideration of the uncertainties
involved. Subsequently, links should be established between hazards, consequences and
causes, and their sensitivity to each individual contribution evaluated. The information
obtained from various sources relative to natural and man‐made hazard events relevant
to communication systems should be combined, for example, earthquakes, storms,
floods and terrorist attacks. In this regard, research is needed concerning hazards of
which existing data is incomplete, insufficient or even non‐existent, and taking into
account the present and foreseeable exposure level of the key physical infrastructures to
each hazard.
Risk analysis involves a suitable combination of numerical, experimental and monitoring methods. Nowadays, and due to the current state‐of‐the‐art, all the participants
in the construction and maintenance activities of communication structures use simplified procedures for the analysis and design of such structures. To meet the urgent and
necessary evolution in this field, it is important to combine different areas of knowledge
toward a common and primordial goal, that is the correct modelling and calibration of
numerical models based on the results of experimental tests such as wind tunnel tests
and the structural monitoring of existing structures. Currently, this interaction is very
limited or non‐existent. Consequently, the numerical models currently available and
commonly used by the industry do not reflect the actual field conditions and do not
most important variables that control the structural fragility and system resilience.
The need to protect critical infrastructure and save human lives in the case of a major
event must be balanced with the amount of available resources, for example technical
and financial. Usually, minimum levels of public services of communication are
defined based on a reliability criterion, where a maximum number of service disruption events per year are fixed, or based on an availability criterion, where maximum
service downtime hours per year are fixed. Even though the latter criterion is the
current state‐of‐the‐art, the approach used to define and demonstrate minimum
levels of communication services does not find support in a comprehensive and holistic approach, lacks the contribution of trans‐disciplinary disciplines, in particular of
structural engineering, and does not account for systems resilience, climate change
effects or other unexpected events.
As the frequency and severity of climate‐related natural catastrophes is expected to
increase and the current risks of disasters of geological origin pose a serious threat
to physical assets located in vulnerable locations, including critical infrastructures
along their life cycle, it is extremely important to develop a risk management framework
that could be used to assess and help to manage risk to which physical infrastructures
used for communication systems are exposed to.
In order to be able to prepare solutions, first it is necessary to consolidate the context of the problem. Therefore, the relevant technical, social, economic and regulatory
specificities, past, present, and in the predictable future, of communication systems
needs a proper discussion. For example, the characterisation of the key physical infrastructures, topology of the existing networks, and the precise identification of the
main challenges to be solved to attain the intended objectives are part of this evolving
process.
Next, risk assessment methods should be applied. This task encompasses risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. The former consists in the formal, systematic
and comprehensive compilation, review and use of the available information concerning relevant hazard scenarios; with appropriate consideration of the uncertainties
involved. Subsequently, links should be established between hazards, consequences and
causes, and their sensitivity to each individual contribution evaluated. The information
obtained from various sources relative to natural and man‐made hazard events relevant
to communication systems should be combined, for example, earthquakes, storms,
floods and terrorist attacks. In this regard, research is needed concerning hazards of
which existing data is incomplete, insufficient or even non‐existent, and taking into
account the present and foreseeable exposure level of the key physical infrastructures to
each hazard.
Risk analysis involves a suitable combination of numerical, experimental and monitoring methods. Nowadays, and due to the current state‐of‐the‐art, all the participants
in the construction and maintenance activities of communication structures use simplified procedures for the analysis and design of such structures. To meet the urgent and
necessary evolution in this field, it is important to combine different areas of knowledge
toward a common and primordial goal, that is the correct modelling and calibration of
numerical models based on the results of experimental tests such as wind tunnel tests
and the structural monitoring of existing structures. Currently, this interaction is very
limited or non‐existent. Consequently, the numerical models currently available and
commonly used by the industry do not reflect the actual field conditions and do not