237
waste issue was perfect for firing-up the political base on topics like interference by
the federal government on states’ rights and Washington over-reach, both popular
themes in Nevada and other western states. As a result, the Yucca Mountain program
ended up years behind schedule and significantly over budget.
Every potentially negative finding at Yucca Mountain, no matter how minor, was
amplified by opponents into a reason to shut down the site for good. For example,
minerals found inside a fault adjacent to the mountain were interpreted by one scientist as a hydrothermal deposit that had been brought up from below, which would
have caused serious problems with site suitability. Other investigators had determined that these mineral deposits originated from rainwater percolating downward
from above through calcite-rich soils, and had no effect on the performance of the
site to contain nuclear waste. Nevertheless, because of the media attention and political posturing, literally millions of dollars were spent to investigate the origin of
these fracture fillings. The fracture fill was eventually revealed from stable isotope
analyses to be a low-temperature mineral deposit very similar to existing soil minerals, and quite different from other known high-temperature hydrothermal deposits
in the region (Paces et al. 2001). Neither this issue nor other alarms raised during the
site characterization process were able to show any fatal flaws demonstrating that
Yucca Mountain was technically unsuitable as a repository for high-level radioactive waste.
The slow pace of site characterization at Yucca Mountain meant that the government was unable to take possession of powerplant high-level nuclear waste in 1998,
as required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The nuclear power industry
began legal proceedings against DOE for violating the law and forcing the industry
to continue to hold the waste in “dry cask” storage at nuclear power plant sites
around the country. The government settled by paying the electric utility companies
compensation of $300 to $500 million per year for retaining the waste. This money
was coming from funds that the utility companies had already paid into the nuclear
waste trust fund to construct a repository, so the solution was less than satisfying.
In 2011, the Obama administration withdrew the license application submitted to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by DOE for the Yucca Mountain Repository
and shut down all efforts to construct and operate a high-level radioactive waste
repository in Nevada. This action also ended spending from the nuclear waste trust
fund. The Nuclear Energy Institute and the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners filed a lawsuit in 2013 with the U.S. Court of Appeals for
nuclear utilities to stop paying fees into the nuclear waste trust fund until either
Yucca Mountain is opened as the official nuclear waste repository as designated by
the 1987 amendment to the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or Congress changes
the law. The court found in favor of the plaintiffs and the fee ended on May 16, 2014.
President Obama appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission after the shut-down of
Yucca Mountain to review possible options for nuclear waste disposal (Hamilton
and Scowcroft 2012). The report from the commission recommended pursuing a
multi-point strategy including state and local government consent prior to siting
future nuclear waste facilities, designating a new organization (i.e. anyone but DOE)
to implement a nuclear waste management program, and improving preparations for
12.1 Technological Solutions
waste issue was perfect for firing-up the political base on topics like interference by
the federal government on states’ rights and Washington over-reach, both popular
themes in Nevada and other western states. As a result, the Yucca Mountain program
ended up years behind schedule and significantly over budget.
Every potentially negative finding at Yucca Mountain, no matter how minor, was
amplified by opponents into a reason to shut down the site for good. For example,
minerals found inside a fault adjacent to the mountain were interpreted by one scientist as a hydrothermal deposit that had been brought up from below, which would
have caused serious problems with site suitability. Other investigators had determined that these mineral deposits originated from rainwater percolating downward
from above through calcite-rich soils, and had no effect on the performance of the
site to contain nuclear waste. Nevertheless, because of the media attention and political posturing, literally millions of dollars were spent to investigate the origin of
these fracture fillings. The fracture fill was eventually revealed from stable isotope
analyses to be a low-temperature mineral deposit very similar to existing soil minerals, and quite different from other known high-temperature hydrothermal deposits
in the region (Paces et al. 2001). Neither this issue nor other alarms raised during the
site characterization process were able to show any fatal flaws demonstrating that
Yucca Mountain was technically unsuitable as a repository for high-level radioactive waste.
The slow pace of site characterization at Yucca Mountain meant that the government was unable to take possession of powerplant high-level nuclear waste in 1998,
as required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The nuclear power industry
began legal proceedings against DOE for violating the law and forcing the industry
to continue to hold the waste in “dry cask” storage at nuclear power plant sites
around the country. The government settled by paying the electric utility companies
compensation of $300 to $500 million per year for retaining the waste. This money
was coming from funds that the utility companies had already paid into the nuclear
waste trust fund to construct a repository, so the solution was less than satisfying.
In 2011, the Obama administration withdrew the license application submitted to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by DOE for the Yucca Mountain Repository
and shut down all efforts to construct and operate a high-level radioactive waste
repository in Nevada. This action also ended spending from the nuclear waste trust
fund. The Nuclear Energy Institute and the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners filed a lawsuit in 2013 with the U.S. Court of Appeals for
nuclear utilities to stop paying fees into the nuclear waste trust fund until either
Yucca Mountain is opened as the official nuclear waste repository as designated by
the 1987 amendment to the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or Congress changes
the law. The court found in favor of the plaintiffs and the fee ended on May 16, 2014.
President Obama appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission after the shut-down of
Yucca Mountain to review possible options for nuclear waste disposal (Hamilton
and Scowcroft 2012). The report from the commission recommended pursuing a
multi-point strategy including state and local government consent prior to siting
future nuclear waste facilities, designating a new organization (i.e. anyone but DOE)
to implement a nuclear waste management program, and improving preparations for
12.1 Technological Solutions