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S. Lindbergh and J. Radke
exist and where response to disturbances can be non-linear. Here, resilient systems are
characterized by the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system
needs to rearrange the structures that control behavioral (or response) variables.
This concept has been since then adopted to understand emergence behavior in
environmental and other complex systems (IRGC 2018). Although the resilience
premise has been developing since the 1970s (Haas and White 1975) it was not until
the United Nations Hyogo Framework Action (Cutter et al. et al. 2013; United Nations
2005) that it was officially incorporated in DRR and climate change adaptation, by
specifically targeting the traits of persistence, reliability, redundancy, and flexibility.
Integrating the concept of resilience was one of the main changes of the 2013
NIPP in contrast to the former version that focused on the less holistic concept
of infrastructure protection. Resilience is increasingly referenced as a holistic goal
in DRR strategies, particularly in CI management and planning (Maliszewski and
Perrings 2012; Ayyub 2014; Chang et al. 2014; Forzieri et al. 2016; Hosseini et al.
2016; Zio 2016; OECD 2019).
Rinaldi et al. (2001) refers to CI as complex adaptive systems and differentiates
typologies of shared states or interdependencies. These typologies have been appropriated in much of the CI protection and resilience literature (Hokstad et al. 2012)
and will be used in this paper to better illustrate the case of the transportation energy
system as a CI: (1) physical interdependency refers to the physical interconnection
between inputs and outputs of a good or commodity. It can relate to intra-and interconnectivity of assets within a specific CI sector or between different CI sectors. (2)
Cyber interdependency corresponds to the shared states of infrastructures based on
information inputs and outputs. It is a result of the prevalence of remote operational
architecture that results in highly computerized infrastructure control systems such
as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). (3) Geographical interdependency where one of several components of CI occupy the same space so that they will
share any disturbances based on their proximity. (4) Logical interdependency refers to
reciprocal effects between infrastructures that are not related to their physical, cyber,
or geographical interconnections. One example is the economic relation between
disturbance on the fuel supply chain and the financial system that oscillates based on
the price of the oil barrel. Logical interdependency includes organizational characteristics of CI owners, operators, and regulators that are also key to explain CI resilience.
Some organizational characteristics can be described through legal and regulatory
regimes, safety standards, organizational culture, etc. Understanding organizational
structures, norms, and procedures that explain organizational resilience has been
the subject of business management, organizational behavior, and specifically High
Reliability Organization (HRO) research (Mitroff 1983; Roberts 1989; Schulman
et al. 2004; Berkhout 2012). Nevertheless, these ideal characteristics are seldomly
extrapolated to a network scale of organizations that coordinate and compete in a
supply chain system (Peck 2005; Heckmann et al. 2015; Mueller et al. 2017) or CI
with complex governance structures.
Other current CI resilience frameworks derived from complex adaptive systems
theory developed in Holling (2001), Adger (2005), and Folke (2006) point to a gap
S. Lindbergh and J. Radke
exist and where response to disturbances can be non-linear. Here, resilient systems are
characterized by the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system
needs to rearrange the structures that control behavioral (or response) variables.
This concept has been since then adopted to understand emergence behavior in
environmental and other complex systems (IRGC 2018). Although the resilience
premise has been developing since the 1970s (Haas and White 1975) it was not until
the United Nations Hyogo Framework Action (Cutter et al. et al. 2013; United Nations
2005) that it was officially incorporated in DRR and climate change adaptation, by
specifically targeting the traits of persistence, reliability, redundancy, and flexibility.
Integrating the concept of resilience was one of the main changes of the 2013
NIPP in contrast to the former version that focused on the less holistic concept
of infrastructure protection. Resilience is increasingly referenced as a holistic goal
in DRR strategies, particularly in CI management and planning (Maliszewski and
Perrings 2012; Ayyub 2014; Chang et al. 2014; Forzieri et al. 2016; Hosseini et al.
2016; Zio 2016; OECD 2019).
Rinaldi et al. (2001) refers to CI as complex adaptive systems and differentiates
typologies of shared states or interdependencies. These typologies have been appropriated in much of the CI protection and resilience literature (Hokstad et al. 2012)
and will be used in this paper to better illustrate the case of the transportation energy
system as a CI: (1) physical interdependency refers to the physical interconnection
between inputs and outputs of a good or commodity. It can relate to intra-and interconnectivity of assets within a specific CI sector or between different CI sectors. (2)
Cyber interdependency corresponds to the shared states of infrastructures based on
information inputs and outputs. It is a result of the prevalence of remote operational
architecture that results in highly computerized infrastructure control systems such
as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). (3) Geographical interdependency where one of several components of CI occupy the same space so that they will
share any disturbances based on their proximity. (4) Logical interdependency refers to
reciprocal effects between infrastructures that are not related to their physical, cyber,
or geographical interconnections. One example is the economic relation between
disturbance on the fuel supply chain and the financial system that oscillates based on
the price of the oil barrel. Logical interdependency includes organizational characteristics of CI owners, operators, and regulators that are also key to explain CI resilience.
Some organizational characteristics can be described through legal and regulatory
regimes, safety standards, organizational culture, etc. Understanding organizational
structures, norms, and procedures that explain organizational resilience has been
the subject of business management, organizational behavior, and specifically High
Reliability Organization (HRO) research (Mitroff 1983; Roberts 1989; Schulman
et al. 2004; Berkhout 2012). Nevertheless, these ideal characteristics are seldomly
extrapolated to a network scale of organizations that coordinate and compete in a
supply chain system (Peck 2005; Heckmann et al. 2015; Mueller et al. 2017) or CI
with complex governance structures.
Other current CI resilience frameworks derived from complex adaptive systems
theory developed in Holling (2001), Adger (2005), and Folke (2006) point to a gap