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T. Neise et al.
are far less implemented by the SMEs, and the share of implementation is relatively
similar in Jakarta and Semarang.
Remarkably, more than every second enterprise (58.2%) that is adapting to floods
(n = 97) uses more than one adaptation form. Both in Jakarta and Semarang, the
enterprises apply on average two adaptation forms (2.2). Small firms implement on
average 1.8 adaptation measures (n = 75; SD 0.94), while the number of adaptation
measures of medium-sized firms is twice as high (3.6; n = 22; SD: 1.79). The higher
variety of adaptation measures applied by medium-sized enterprises can be explained
by the fact that the firms possess more financial resources and skills to organize a more
diverse adaptation strategy that includes soft options, such as an emergency response
team but also measures strengthening the built infrastructure (e.g., protective walls)
or technological solutions, such as pumps. While small enterprises need to channel
their scarce financial resources to fewer adaptation measures.
The interviews show that the SMEs both in Jakarta and Semarang predominately
rely on their long-established routines and hardly develop new competencies of
adaptation. The flood risk is relatively predictable, and the enterprises mentioned that
they could handle small flooding through elevation and other hard measures, such
as pumps. The firms do not see any need to extend their adaptation measures. The
firms barely invest more resources in adaptation or develop new skills to find other,
more effective measures. In Semarang, enterprises stated that they elevated their
plant several times and plan to continue doing so (e.g., SS-1; SS-7; SM-7). However,
the deficit of this adaptation choice became particularly apparent during large flood
events in Jakarta (e.g., 2007, 2012) and Semarang (2012). The enterprises mainly
pursued a ‘wait-and-see’-strategy because their preferred adaptation measures, such
as elevation of the plant or pumps, were largely ineffective against the high inundation
level over weeks.
Certainly, the elevation reduces the flood risk as it prevents the water from flowing
into the firm’s property or the access roads from being flooded. However, the concrete
used for the elevation increases the rate of land subsidence due to soil surface stress
and thus increases the long-term flood risk. The SMEs always fall back on their
established routine, i.e., alleviating the flood risk by elevation. For small surface and
tidal floods, the elevation is effective and can protect the plant in the medium-term.
However, the plant must be elevated again due to the continuous land subsidence, the
elevation of main streets or of adjacent premises which means that the water can flow
into their own plant. An exception is a food-processing firm (SM-14) at the harbor
of Semarang that anticipated its exposure to floods proactively. The company took
advantage of the expertise of a hired engineering officer. The enterprise constructed
all buildings on deep pillars so that they are not affected by the land subsidence
anymore.
A major reason that SMEs cannot develop new competencies or generate resources
for adaptation is their weak financial conditions. Especially, small enterprises that
produce metal, or plastic intermediate products face several business disadvantages
that also hamper their investment budget for adaptation. They have often not recovered from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, suffer from the weak value of the rupiah
that increases the prices for raw materials, and they have difficulties to compete with
T. Neise et al.
are far less implemented by the SMEs, and the share of implementation is relatively
similar in Jakarta and Semarang.
Remarkably, more than every second enterprise (58.2%) that is adapting to floods
(n = 97) uses more than one adaptation form. Both in Jakarta and Semarang, the
enterprises apply on average two adaptation forms (2.2). Small firms implement on
average 1.8 adaptation measures (n = 75; SD 0.94), while the number of adaptation
measures of medium-sized firms is twice as high (3.6; n = 22; SD: 1.79). The higher
variety of adaptation measures applied by medium-sized enterprises can be explained
by the fact that the firms possess more financial resources and skills to organize a more
diverse adaptation strategy that includes soft options, such as an emergency response
team but also measures strengthening the built infrastructure (e.g., protective walls)
or technological solutions, such as pumps. While small enterprises need to channel
their scarce financial resources to fewer adaptation measures.
The interviews show that the SMEs both in Jakarta and Semarang predominately
rely on their long-established routines and hardly develop new competencies of
adaptation. The flood risk is relatively predictable, and the enterprises mentioned that
they could handle small flooding through elevation and other hard measures, such
as pumps. The firms do not see any need to extend their adaptation measures. The
firms barely invest more resources in adaptation or develop new skills to find other,
more effective measures. In Semarang, enterprises stated that they elevated their
plant several times and plan to continue doing so (e.g., SS-1; SS-7; SM-7). However,
the deficit of this adaptation choice became particularly apparent during large flood
events in Jakarta (e.g., 2007, 2012) and Semarang (2012). The enterprises mainly
pursued a ‘wait-and-see’-strategy because their preferred adaptation measures, such
as elevation of the plant or pumps, were largely ineffective against the high inundation
level over weeks.
Certainly, the elevation reduces the flood risk as it prevents the water from flowing
into the firm’s property or the access roads from being flooded. However, the concrete
used for the elevation increases the rate of land subsidence due to soil surface stress
and thus increases the long-term flood risk. The SMEs always fall back on their
established routine, i.e., alleviating the flood risk by elevation. For small surface and
tidal floods, the elevation is effective and can protect the plant in the medium-term.
However, the plant must be elevated again due to the continuous land subsidence, the
elevation of main streets or of adjacent premises which means that the water can flow
into their own plant. An exception is a food-processing firm (SM-14) at the harbor
of Semarang that anticipated its exposure to floods proactively. The company took
advantage of the expertise of a hired engineering officer. The enterprise constructed
all buildings on deep pillars so that they are not affected by the land subsidence
anymore.
A major reason that SMEs cannot develop new competencies or generate resources
for adaptation is their weak financial conditions. Especially, small enterprises that
produce metal, or plastic intermediate products face several business disadvantages
that also hamper their investment budget for adaptation. They have often not recovered from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, suffer from the weak value of the rupiah
that increases the prices for raw materials, and they have difficulties to compete with