21
(Grandin and Sareen in review). This not only equips them with a potential information advantage, it also suggests that key actors can orchestrate
sectoral change to unfold in a manner that works to their advantage over
others without being held to account for their self-serving exercise of
undue influence.
For instance, during energy sector transitions, solar developers might
find themselves faced with the need to secure a number of different
licences: to lease land for up to three decades, to conduct basic environmental impact assessments, to access grid infrastructure, to import solar
modules and to gain the right to provide a certain quantum of stable supply to the electric grid over a stated period or to enter into bilateral contracts with users, to mention a few examples. These constitute practices of
bureaucratic legitimation, and actors who are unable to navigate such
demands might find themselves shut out from being able to participate as
solar developers. An appropriate amount of bureaucratic process is important to secure requisite oversight over a number of interlocked functions
in a technical sector like energy (Sareen and Kale 2018); a well-conceived
bureaucratic system can feature in-built corrective measures that function
as accountability mechanisms, internalised checks and balances. But what
complicates matters is when bureaucratic requirements display overly zealous reach or are simply biased towards or against a particular technology
or set of actors—especially emerging ones who tend to have less social
capital—to an extent that interferes with the efficient functioning of
the sector.
Sometimes such bureaucratic interference is expressly permitted and
justified on normative grounds—renewable energy may be permitted to
go ahead up to a certain component of the total energy supply, so as to
meet clean energy targets as a percentage of the grid mix, consequently
loosening up bureaucratic requirements for renewable producers up to
this target. Yet, normative commitments are not always clearly articulated—fossil fuels are accorded numerous subsidies, both historically in
terms of existing energy infrastructure and directly at present, to an extent
that other sources would find it impossible to secure through any number
of bureaucratic processes (Asmelash 2015). Bureaucratic preferences are
not always easy to discern. Wholesale energy trading markets, for instance,
follow bureaucratic sets of rules that have evolved historically in energy
sectors with relatively small components of renewable energy, and as this
proportion changes, the rules do not necessarily change in ways that are
optimal for the grid or fair in terms of their effects on various actors, not
2 A TYPOLOGY OF PRACTICES OF LEGITIMATION TO CATEGORISE…
(Grandin and Sareen in review). This not only equips them with a potential information advantage, it also suggests that key actors can orchestrate
sectoral change to unfold in a manner that works to their advantage over
others without being held to account for their self-serving exercise of
undue influence.
For instance, during energy sector transitions, solar developers might
find themselves faced with the need to secure a number of different
licences: to lease land for up to three decades, to conduct basic environmental impact assessments, to access grid infrastructure, to import solar
modules and to gain the right to provide a certain quantum of stable supply to the electric grid over a stated period or to enter into bilateral contracts with users, to mention a few examples. These constitute practices of
bureaucratic legitimation, and actors who are unable to navigate such
demands might find themselves shut out from being able to participate as
solar developers. An appropriate amount of bureaucratic process is important to secure requisite oversight over a number of interlocked functions
in a technical sector like energy (Sareen and Kale 2018); a well-conceived
bureaucratic system can feature in-built corrective measures that function
as accountability mechanisms, internalised checks and balances. But what
complicates matters is when bureaucratic requirements display overly zealous reach or are simply biased towards or against a particular technology
or set of actors—especially emerging ones who tend to have less social
capital—to an extent that interferes with the efficient functioning of
the sector.
Sometimes such bureaucratic interference is expressly permitted and
justified on normative grounds—renewable energy may be permitted to
go ahead up to a certain component of the total energy supply, so as to
meet clean energy targets as a percentage of the grid mix, consequently
loosening up bureaucratic requirements for renewable producers up to
this target. Yet, normative commitments are not always clearly articulated—fossil fuels are accorded numerous subsidies, both historically in
terms of existing energy infrastructure and directly at present, to an extent
that other sources would find it impossible to secure through any number
of bureaucratic processes (Asmelash 2015). Bureaucratic preferences are
not always easy to discern. Wholesale energy trading markets, for instance,
follow bureaucratic sets of rules that have evolved historically in energy
sectors with relatively small components of renewable energy, and as this
proportion changes, the rules do not necessarily change in ways that are
optimal for the grid or fair in terms of their effects on various actors, not
2 A TYPOLOGY OF PRACTICES OF LEGITIMATION TO CATEGORISE…