20
serves essential functions within society and is inevitable. But the flip side
is that it accretes redundant requirements, conditions that are an artefact
of old ways but remain embedded in current protocols due to inadequate
adaptiveness by an organisation during sectoral change. Actors who have
to meet such bureaucratic residue might protest and push for a change in
formal requirements, an update, or they might find themselves in a position where they are unable to appeal due to limited time, financial wherewithal or a legal framework that, in turn, poses its own bureaucratic
challenges. Authorities imposing bureaucratic requirements are often
painfully well aware of the privilege their position accords them; depending on internal mechanisms to ensure checks and balances, particular individuals might even seek to abuse this privilege for personal gain, which is
usually referred to as petty corruption.
There are several other aspects to bureaucratic legitimation (cf.
Suchman 1995), such as a likely bias in favour of incumbent actors, and
against emergent actors, on whom falls the onus to validate themselves
and fulfil numerous existing requirements—to learn the rules of the game
(Geels and Schot 2007). This is a potentially desirable trait in a wellfunctioning system to ensure system reliability and security, but poses
challenges when change is imperative as in the case of energy transitions to
address the urgent climate challenge. Several other relational tendencies
also surface: there are likely to be information flow asymmetries, as practices in most sectors and contexts tend to feature a partially informal component. There is a risk that bureaucratic processes will extend processing
time for critical decisions (Crawford 2015), lowering policy visibility during sectoral change and disadvantaging actors who are worst affected by
ensuing uncertainty. And there is a further question concerning time and
positionality: those who are well placed to devise bureaucratic requirements have often been closely acquainted with a sector for a long period,
and hence, their embodied memory is of a certain mode of conducting
affairs that is liable to often resemble business as usual (Sareen 2018;
Szeman 2013). The bureaucratic mechanisms they proffer might thus
favour the status quo and incumbent actors, allowing tacit bias to creep in.
This risk is exacerbated by the fact that entrenched actors often occupy key
positions from which to lobby and influence decision-makers in their sector; they can challenge and effectively quash protests from emergent actors
by pointing to their superior experience and historically stellar credentials.
When changes do come about, such actors can again leverage their positions to modulate what new bureaucratic frameworks are put in play
S. SAREEN
serves essential functions within society and is inevitable. But the flip side
is that it accretes redundant requirements, conditions that are an artefact
of old ways but remain embedded in current protocols due to inadequate
adaptiveness by an organisation during sectoral change. Actors who have
to meet such bureaucratic residue might protest and push for a change in
formal requirements, an update, or they might find themselves in a position where they are unable to appeal due to limited time, financial wherewithal or a legal framework that, in turn, poses its own bureaucratic
challenges. Authorities imposing bureaucratic requirements are often
painfully well aware of the privilege their position accords them; depending on internal mechanisms to ensure checks and balances, particular individuals might even seek to abuse this privilege for personal gain, which is
usually referred to as petty corruption.
There are several other aspects to bureaucratic legitimation (cf.
Suchman 1995), such as a likely bias in favour of incumbent actors, and
against emergent actors, on whom falls the onus to validate themselves
and fulfil numerous existing requirements—to learn the rules of the game
(Geels and Schot 2007). This is a potentially desirable trait in a wellfunctioning system to ensure system reliability and security, but poses
challenges when change is imperative as in the case of energy transitions to
address the urgent climate challenge. Several other relational tendencies
also surface: there are likely to be information flow asymmetries, as practices in most sectors and contexts tend to feature a partially informal component. There is a risk that bureaucratic processes will extend processing
time for critical decisions (Crawford 2015), lowering policy visibility during sectoral change and disadvantaging actors who are worst affected by
ensuing uncertainty. And there is a further question concerning time and
positionality: those who are well placed to devise bureaucratic requirements have often been closely acquainted with a sector for a long period,
and hence, their embodied memory is of a certain mode of conducting
affairs that is liable to often resemble business as usual (Sareen 2018;
Szeman 2013). The bureaucratic mechanisms they proffer might thus
favour the status quo and incumbent actors, allowing tacit bias to creep in.
This risk is exacerbated by the fact that entrenched actors often occupy key
positions from which to lobby and influence decision-makers in their sector; they can challenge and effectively quash protests from emergent actors
by pointing to their superior experience and historically stellar credentials.
When changes do come about, such actors can again leverage their positions to modulate what new bureaucratic frameworks are put in play
S. SAREEN