382
M. Svrˇ cek
(SSB). In the classical phenomenological picture of superconductors, the GinzburgLandau equation [77] exhibits quadratic and biquadratic functions of the order parameter, forming the well-known Mexican hat. We have also discussed similar Mexican
hat-like situations, i.e. the Norton dome [52] and the hydrodynamic problem of
Boussinesq [124]. These three cases have one thing in common, viz. the solutions
of the corresponding equations are not unique. However, in addition to the standard
causal solution also a teleological one is permitted. Maxwell was impressed by the
third case of Boussinesq to such an extent that he for the first time spoke about teleological principles that exist outside the known laws of physics and called it [51]
“some determining principle which is extra physical (but not extra natural)”.
Physicists, contrary to biologists, usually abandon the teleological principle as
unscientific, and they do therefore not agree with the problem raised regarding the
classical description of the Meissner effect and its relation to the phenomenon of
superconductivity. One discerns two camps of physicists. The first camp, following Meissner and Ochsenfeld [64] and London [66], claims that superconductivity
unlike ideal conductivity has no classical explanation, and that quantum physics is
necessary in order to explain it. The second camp following Cullwick [71] identifies
superconductors with perfect conductors. But they cannot both be right. Superconductors are not identical to perfect conductors and quantum physics (BCS theory)
does not explain the Meissner effect, without properly explaining superconductivity first. Electromotive forces, described by Faraday’s law of induction, are equal
to zero in the stationary conditions of the Meissner effect, whereas existing theories do not suggest any other electric forces needed to accelerate the electrons until
the steady state supercurrent is achieved. From the view of telicity, one concludes
that classical physics provides two solutions, one for perfect conductors and one for
superconductors. Undeniably classical physics can formulate, but not explain superconductivity. According to Peirce’s philosophical analysis [125] no physical theory
based on corpuscular philosophy can solve the problem of the SSB bootstrap. Even
if this analysis was written before the era of quantum physics, Peirce’s argument is
also applicable today. It builds on Democritus’ atomic ideas, which is essentially
the same corpuscular idea as in classical physics. It means that quantum physics in
the Copenhagen interpretation is incapable of solving the problem of the SSB trigger. As we have seen, the teleological problem, which relates to Leibniz’ principle
of sufficient reason [114], to the second form of van Fraassen’s argument [119],
and Peirce’s corpuscular philosophy argument [125], can be discounted in classical
physics. Unfortunately quantum physicists usually ignore this problem. But this attitude is uncalled for, since it is motivated by the conviction, that quantum physics
uses the same SSB archetype as the classical one.
In comparing classical and quantum physics, we conclude: classical physics does
not distinguish superconductors from ideal conductors and sees them as one system with two possible solutions, one teleological and one causal, while quantum
physics does recognize the difference, but, on the other hand does not separate them
from multi-ground-state insulators, i.e. is only able to describe the ground states of
superconductors, but never superconductivity itself, since the Bohr’s correspondence
principle does not account for teleological phenomena. Hence the application of the
M. Svrˇ cek
(SSB). In the classical phenomenological picture of superconductors, the GinzburgLandau equation [77] exhibits quadratic and biquadratic functions of the order parameter, forming the well-known Mexican hat. We have also discussed similar Mexican
hat-like situations, i.e. the Norton dome [52] and the hydrodynamic problem of
Boussinesq [124]. These three cases have one thing in common, viz. the solutions
of the corresponding equations are not unique. However, in addition to the standard
causal solution also a teleological one is permitted. Maxwell was impressed by the
third case of Boussinesq to such an extent that he for the first time spoke about teleological principles that exist outside the known laws of physics and called it [51]
“some determining principle which is extra physical (but not extra natural)”.
Physicists, contrary to biologists, usually abandon the teleological principle as
unscientific, and they do therefore not agree with the problem raised regarding the
classical description of the Meissner effect and its relation to the phenomenon of
superconductivity. One discerns two camps of physicists. The first camp, following Meissner and Ochsenfeld [64] and London [66], claims that superconductivity
unlike ideal conductivity has no classical explanation, and that quantum physics is
necessary in order to explain it. The second camp following Cullwick [71] identifies
superconductors with perfect conductors. But they cannot both be right. Superconductors are not identical to perfect conductors and quantum physics (BCS theory)
does not explain the Meissner effect, without properly explaining superconductivity first. Electromotive forces, described by Faraday’s law of induction, are equal
to zero in the stationary conditions of the Meissner effect, whereas existing theories do not suggest any other electric forces needed to accelerate the electrons until
the steady state supercurrent is achieved. From the view of telicity, one concludes
that classical physics provides two solutions, one for perfect conductors and one for
superconductors. Undeniably classical physics can formulate, but not explain superconductivity. According to Peirce’s philosophical analysis [125] no physical theory
based on corpuscular philosophy can solve the problem of the SSB bootstrap. Even
if this analysis was written before the era of quantum physics, Peirce’s argument is
also applicable today. It builds on Democritus’ atomic ideas, which is essentially
the same corpuscular idea as in classical physics. It means that quantum physics in
the Copenhagen interpretation is incapable of solving the problem of the SSB trigger. As we have seen, the teleological problem, which relates to Leibniz’ principle
of sufficient reason [114], to the second form of van Fraassen’s argument [119],
and Peirce’s corpuscular philosophy argument [125], can be discounted in classical
physics. Unfortunately quantum physicists usually ignore this problem. But this attitude is uncalled for, since it is motivated by the conviction, that quantum physics
uses the same SSB archetype as the classical one.
In comparing classical and quantum physics, we conclude: classical physics does
not distinguish superconductors from ideal conductors and sees them as one system with two possible solutions, one teleological and one causal, while quantum
physics does recognize the difference, but, on the other hand does not separate them
from multi-ground-state insulators, i.e. is only able to describe the ground states of
superconductors, but never superconductivity itself, since the Bohr’s correspondence
principle does not account for teleological phenomena. Hence the application of the