Megascopic Quantum Phenomena
357
quantum mechanics appears as a rational generalization of classical physics, the
whole approach may be termed mechanistic. The question, however, is in what sense
such progress has removed the foundation for the application of so-called finalistic
arguments in biology. Here we must realize that the description and comprehension
of the closed quantum phenomena exhibit no feature indicating that an organization
of atoms is able to adapt itself to the surroundings in the way we witness in the
maintenance and evolution of living organisms. Furthermore, it must be stressed
that an account, exhaustive in the sense of quantum physics, of all the continually
exchanged atoms in the organism not only is infeasible but would obviously require
observational conditions incompatible with the display of life.”
This can undoubtedly be understood as the third complementarity, which, although
Bohr mentions here teleological (finalistic) arguments, has nothing to do with the
second one. Life is a mystery, and no hitherto available knowledge, as e.g. the discovery of DNA, and no finalistic arguments are sufficient to explain it. However,
Bohr becomes here aware of the teleological origin of Darwinian adaptation, in stark
contrast to his contemporary quantum scientists who did not see it at all. He, on
the other hand, was convinced that teleological adaptation only appeared in living
organisms and he never considered the possibility of its occurrence in inanimate matter, such as in all SSB phenomena. Yet by realizing the distinction between causal
and teleological phenomena, Bohr was very close to formulating the second kind
of complementarity [61]: “In biological research, references to features of wholeness and purposeful reactions of organisms are used together with the increasingly
detailed information on structure and regulatory processes that has resulted in such
great progress not least in medicine. We have here to do with a practical approach to
a field where the means of expression used for the description of its various aspects
refer to mutually exclusive conditions of observation. In this connection, it must
be realized that the attitudes termed mechanistic and finalistic are not contradictory
points of view, but rather exhibit a complementary relationship which is connected
with our position as observers of nature.”
Bohr states correctly, that attitudes termed mechanistic (causal) and finalistic
(teleological) are not contradictory, but fails, in my opinion, when saying that they
are in a complementary relationship. Actually there is no complementarity between
them because they do co-exist side by side. Summarizing, the first complementarity
represents a causal microscopic relationship between mechanical and field descriptions of elementary entities (the particle-wave dualism), the second complementarity
epitomizes the teleological megascopic relationship between the mechanical and the
field descriptions of the whole Universe, where these two descriptions deal with
the centre of gravity in different ways. This conclusion is a direct consequence of
the Goldstone theorem, proved by Goldstone, Salam, and Weinberg, incidentally in
the same year when Bohr died. Unfortunately, as already pointed out, a year later
the Goldstone theorem was misconstrued by Anderson, see Sect. 10, and as a result
there appeared an inconsistent Higgs mechanism, which would never reveal a second
complementarity.
357
quantum mechanics appears as a rational generalization of classical physics, the
whole approach may be termed mechanistic. The question, however, is in what sense
such progress has removed the foundation for the application of so-called finalistic
arguments in biology. Here we must realize that the description and comprehension
of the closed quantum phenomena exhibit no feature indicating that an organization
of atoms is able to adapt itself to the surroundings in the way we witness in the
maintenance and evolution of living organisms. Furthermore, it must be stressed
that an account, exhaustive in the sense of quantum physics, of all the continually
exchanged atoms in the organism not only is infeasible but would obviously require
observational conditions incompatible with the display of life.”
This can undoubtedly be understood as the third complementarity, which, although
Bohr mentions here teleological (finalistic) arguments, has nothing to do with the
second one. Life is a mystery, and no hitherto available knowledge, as e.g. the discovery of DNA, and no finalistic arguments are sufficient to explain it. However,
Bohr becomes here aware of the teleological origin of Darwinian adaptation, in stark
contrast to his contemporary quantum scientists who did not see it at all. He, on
the other hand, was convinced that teleological adaptation only appeared in living
organisms and he never considered the possibility of its occurrence in inanimate matter, such as in all SSB phenomena. Yet by realizing the distinction between causal
and teleological phenomena, Bohr was very close to formulating the second kind
of complementarity [61]: “In biological research, references to features of wholeness and purposeful reactions of organisms are used together with the increasingly
detailed information on structure and regulatory processes that has resulted in such
great progress not least in medicine. We have here to do with a practical approach to
a field where the means of expression used for the description of its various aspects
refer to mutually exclusive conditions of observation. In this connection, it must
be realized that the attitudes termed mechanistic and finalistic are not contradictory
points of view, but rather exhibit a complementary relationship which is connected
with our position as observers of nature.”
Bohr states correctly, that attitudes termed mechanistic (causal) and finalistic
(teleological) are not contradictory, but fails, in my opinion, when saying that they
are in a complementary relationship. Actually there is no complementarity between
them because they do co-exist side by side. Summarizing, the first complementarity
represents a causal microscopic relationship between mechanical and field descriptions of elementary entities (the particle-wave dualism), the second complementarity
epitomizes the teleological megascopic relationship between the mechanical and the
field descriptions of the whole Universe, where these two descriptions deal with
the centre of gravity in different ways. This conclusion is a direct consequence of
the Goldstone theorem, proved by Goldstone, Salam, and Weinberg, incidentally in
the same year when Bohr died. Unfortunately, as already pointed out, a year later
the Goldstone theorem was misconstrued by Anderson, see Sect. 10, and as a result
there appeared an inconsistent Higgs mechanism, which would never reveal a second
complementarity.