356
M. Svrˇ cek
almost all philosophical problems of contemporary quantum physics. Bell wrote a
very poignant parody relevant to this topic [136]: “It would seem that the theory is
exclusively concerned with “results of measurement” and has nothing to say about
anything else. When the “system” in question is the whole world where does one
find the “measurer”? Inside, rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies
some subsystems to play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump
for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or
did it have to wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer—with a
Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but idealized laboratory operations, are
we not obliged to admit that more or less “measurement-like” processes are going
on more or less all the time more or less everywhere? Is there ever then a moment
when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger equation applies?”
Bell was certainly correct in his view regarding “measurement-like” processes
above. Our “megascopic quantum jumps” do correspond to Bell’s request, and since
the origin of time is rooted in megascopic events, we are able to finally reunite time
and events on the quantum level. However, unlike events on the classical level those
in the quantum case will be foundational and time subordinate. This idea, in fact,
goes back to ancient times. Aristotle expressed this opinion in his Physics, Book I,
Part 14, where he defined time as “the number of movement in respect of before and
after”. Thus it cannot exist without a succession, and it does not exist on its own rather
it is relative to the motions of things [142]. Moreover, Aristotle’s concept of time is
more suitable for quantum theory than Newtonian classical mechanics, when he says
that time, in order to exist, requires the presence of a soul capable of “numbering”
the movement. This statement complies with the von Neumann–Wigner rule.
One might wonder why the Newtonian and Aristotelian concepts of time are so
different. Pondering this issue, one must not forget that the Greek language has two
expressions for time: χρ ´
oνoς , chronos, and καιρ ´
oς , kairos, while the Latin language
only one expression tempus. Our way of thinking is to a large extent influenced by
our spoken language. The Newtonian time concept is basically pragmatic, but it is
unable to explain the time arrow problem (see Sect. 3). If we accept the premise
that all processes in the Universe consist only of microscopic and megascopic events
and therefore that irreversibility is foundational, then the arrow of time naturally
develops from Aristotle’s definition of time as “the number of movement in respect
of before and after”. Emergent time reversibility can only appear in subsystems with
no SSB (mostly adiabatic systems), where a one-to-one correspondence between
the mechanical and the field states holds. These subsystems can then be described
by reversible evolution as formulated by the Schrödinger equation. This contradicts
Santilli’s claim, see Sect. 3, since irreversibility in the Universe has its origin in
irreversible microscopic and megascopic events.
Before ending this section we will focus on the second Bohr complementarity
asking: why did only Jordan call for it and not Bohr himself? Actually, Bohr did
put forward another type of complementarity between observational conditions of
animate and inanimate nature [61]: “In this promising development we have to do
with a very important and, according to its character, hardly limited extension of the
application of purely physical and chemical ideas to biological problems, and since
M. Svrˇ cek
almost all philosophical problems of contemporary quantum physics. Bell wrote a
very poignant parody relevant to this topic [136]: “It would seem that the theory is
exclusively concerned with “results of measurement” and has nothing to say about
anything else. When the “system” in question is the whole world where does one
find the “measurer”? Inside, rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies
some subsystems to play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump
for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or
did it have to wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer—with a
Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but idealized laboratory operations, are
we not obliged to admit that more or less “measurement-like” processes are going
on more or less all the time more or less everywhere? Is there ever then a moment
when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger equation applies?”
Bell was certainly correct in his view regarding “measurement-like” processes
above. Our “megascopic quantum jumps” do correspond to Bell’s request, and since
the origin of time is rooted in megascopic events, we are able to finally reunite time
and events on the quantum level. However, unlike events on the classical level those
in the quantum case will be foundational and time subordinate. This idea, in fact,
goes back to ancient times. Aristotle expressed this opinion in his Physics, Book I,
Part 14, where he defined time as “the number of movement in respect of before and
after”. Thus it cannot exist without a succession, and it does not exist on its own rather
it is relative to the motions of things [142]. Moreover, Aristotle’s concept of time is
more suitable for quantum theory than Newtonian classical mechanics, when he says
that time, in order to exist, requires the presence of a soul capable of “numbering”
the movement. This statement complies with the von Neumann–Wigner rule.
One might wonder why the Newtonian and Aristotelian concepts of time are so
different. Pondering this issue, one must not forget that the Greek language has two
expressions for time: χρ ´
oνoς , chronos, and καιρ ´
oς , kairos, while the Latin language
only one expression tempus. Our way of thinking is to a large extent influenced by
our spoken language. The Newtonian time concept is basically pragmatic, but it is
unable to explain the time arrow problem (see Sect. 3). If we accept the premise
that all processes in the Universe consist only of microscopic and megascopic events
and therefore that irreversibility is foundational, then the arrow of time naturally
develops from Aristotle’s definition of time as “the number of movement in respect
of before and after”. Emergent time reversibility can only appear in subsystems with
no SSB (mostly adiabatic systems), where a one-to-one correspondence between
the mechanical and the field states holds. These subsystems can then be described
by reversible evolution as formulated by the Schrödinger equation. This contradicts
Santilli’s claim, see Sect. 3, since irreversibility in the Universe has its origin in
irreversible microscopic and megascopic events.
Before ending this section we will focus on the second Bohr complementarity
asking: why did only Jordan call for it and not Bohr himself? Actually, Bohr did
put forward another type of complementarity between observational conditions of
animate and inanimate nature [61]: “In this promising development we have to do
with a very important and, according to its character, hardly limited extension of the
application of purely physical and chemical ideas to biological problems, and since