74
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
same time, the frigate listened to VHF channel 80, which is Fedje VTS’ radio channel frequency. When the traffic controller at Fedje VTS became aware of the frigate,
the ship was logged but not plotted into Fedje VTS’ monitoring system. When the
frigate was 17 nautical miles from the Sture terminal, Sola TS was about to leave the
Sture terminal. On departure, the tanker had the navigational lanterns on but also
part of the deck lighting.
According to the accident report, Sola TS’s pilot reported the departure via VHF
radio to Fedje VTS, after which the traffic controller acknowledged the call and
zoomed in on the area around Sola TS on his screen. KNM Helge Ingstad was now
about 6 nautical miles north of Sola TS and at the same time off the screen of the traffic
controller at Fedje VTS. The screen continued to be zoomed in at the Sture terminal
even after Sola TS departed. At the same time, a change of Officer On Watch (OOW)
began on KNM Helge Ingstad’s bridge – while the frigate was controlled by an officer
under OOW training. After Sola TS left the Sture terminal, the tanker maintained
a speed of about 7 knots on an easterly course in Hjeltefjord before initiating a turn
towards the north, having both the navigational lanterns and the deck lights turned on.
The accident report points out that none of the messages sent on VHF channel 80 from
Sola TS to Fedje VTS were recorded by KNM Helge Ingstad. Sola TS was not tracked
electronically by KNM Helge Ingstad, and at the same time the frigate radar was not
used to monitor the surrounding waters. However, three other incoming vessels were
tracked on the frigate bridge. As the frigate and the tanker approached each other,
KNM Helge Ingstad’s OOW changed course to port several times to increase the distance to the n ow-observed “ object”. At the same time, neither KNM Helge Ingstad nor
any of the other vessels in Hjeltefjord were plotted on Sola TS’s radar.
About 4 minutes before the collision, Sola TS’s pilot responded to the object on
the opposite course. The distance between the ships was now down to 4 nautical
miles. KNM Helge Ingstad sailed without AIS signals, which meant that the identity of the frigate was not displayed on Sola TS’s screens. The pilot contacted Fedje
VTS for information on the oncoming vessel, but since the traffic controller had not
recently monitored the movement of the frigate, it was not possible to confirm the
identity of the frigate immediately. Sola TS then attempted to make contact using the
Aldis lamp, which was unsuccessful. Eventually, the pilot at Sola TS received feedback from Fedje VTS about which ship was coming towards t hem – the pilot then
tried to contact KNM Helge Ingstad but it took over 2 minutes before he succeeded.
The pilot asked the OOW to swing starboard, something the frigate did not comply
with. Consequently, when KNM Helge Ingstad did not change course, the machine
was first stopped on board the Sola TS, then full aft. At this point, however, a collision was inevitable.
THE TRADITIONAL NOTION OF ( RETROSPECTIVE) SENSEMAKING
The traditional approach to organizational sensemaking has involved foremost retrospective processes, i.e., provide meaning to what has already happened. One distinguishes between a cognitive approach to sensemaking, i.e., how individuals assign
meaning to own experiences, and an organizational perspective which involves
social dimensions or interactional processes between or among people. According to
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
same time, the frigate listened to VHF channel 80, which is Fedje VTS’ radio channel frequency. When the traffic controller at Fedje VTS became aware of the frigate,
the ship was logged but not plotted into Fedje VTS’ monitoring system. When the
frigate was 17 nautical miles from the Sture terminal, Sola TS was about to leave the
Sture terminal. On departure, the tanker had the navigational lanterns on but also
part of the deck lighting.
According to the accident report, Sola TS’s pilot reported the departure via VHF
radio to Fedje VTS, after which the traffic controller acknowledged the call and
zoomed in on the area around Sola TS on his screen. KNM Helge Ingstad was now
about 6 nautical miles north of Sola TS and at the same time off the screen of the traffic
controller at Fedje VTS. The screen continued to be zoomed in at the Sture terminal
even after Sola TS departed. At the same time, a change of Officer On Watch (OOW)
began on KNM Helge Ingstad’s bridge – while the frigate was controlled by an officer
under OOW training. After Sola TS left the Sture terminal, the tanker maintained
a speed of about 7 knots on an easterly course in Hjeltefjord before initiating a turn
towards the north, having both the navigational lanterns and the deck lights turned on.
The accident report points out that none of the messages sent on VHF channel 80 from
Sola TS to Fedje VTS were recorded by KNM Helge Ingstad. Sola TS was not tracked
electronically by KNM Helge Ingstad, and at the same time the frigate radar was not
used to monitor the surrounding waters. However, three other incoming vessels were
tracked on the frigate bridge. As the frigate and the tanker approached each other,
KNM Helge Ingstad’s OOW changed course to port several times to increase the distance to the n ow-observed “ object”. At the same time, neither KNM Helge Ingstad nor
any of the other vessels in Hjeltefjord were plotted on Sola TS’s radar.
About 4 minutes before the collision, Sola TS’s pilot responded to the object on
the opposite course. The distance between the ships was now down to 4 nautical
miles. KNM Helge Ingstad sailed without AIS signals, which meant that the identity of the frigate was not displayed on Sola TS’s screens. The pilot contacted Fedje
VTS for information on the oncoming vessel, but since the traffic controller had not
recently monitored the movement of the frigate, it was not possible to confirm the
identity of the frigate immediately. Sola TS then attempted to make contact using the
Aldis lamp, which was unsuccessful. Eventually, the pilot at Sola TS received feedback from Fedje VTS about which ship was coming towards t hem – the pilot then
tried to contact KNM Helge Ingstad but it took over 2 minutes before he succeeded.
The pilot asked the OOW to swing starboard, something the frigate did not comply
with. Consequently, when KNM Helge Ingstad did not change course, the machine
was first stopped on board the Sola TS, then full aft. At this point, however, a collision was inevitable.
THE TRADITIONAL NOTION OF ( RETROSPECTIVE) SENSEMAKING
The traditional approach to organizational sensemaking has involved foremost retrospective processes, i.e., provide meaning to what has already happened. One distinguishes between a cognitive approach to sensemaking, i.e., how individuals assign
meaning to own experiences, and an organizational perspective which involves
social dimensions or interactional processes between or among people. According to