73
Prospective Sensemaking
what went wrong, which can be somewhat detrimental to understand also the social
processes that are important when people cooperate and coordinate safety critical
activities among themselves. In this context, the study by De Boer and Dekker ( 2017)
is particularly intriguing. They have studied automation surprise within the airline cockpit, more specifically looking into two distinct perspectives with different
approaches to pilots’ cognitive processes regarding human–automation interaction.
They argue that to improve safety, a sensemaking approach focusing on systemic factors including the operative context will make more sense compared to a traditional
individualistic- and failure-centred focus on human performance.
However, this chapter goes beyond the traditional notion of sensemaking advocated by Weick ( 1995), Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld ( 2005) and De Boer and Dekker
( 2017), drawing on the idea of prospective sensemaking which foremost implies sensemaking processes understood analytically as primarily forward oriented ( Rosness
et al., 2015). Furthermore, prospective sensemaking in this chapter will be discussed
analytically in the context of how coordination per se becomes relevant among
the actors in Hjeltejorden, i.e., prospective sensemaking does entail social aspects
( Weick, 1995), but also needs a follow up via a distinct social-analytical focus.
The next section presents the events that unfolded prior to the collision between
Helge Ingstad and Sola TS based on the AIBN ( 2019) report. Thereafter, an account
is provided on traditional sensemaking, related concepts and the properties of prospective sensemaking followed by an account on how one can operationalize prospective sensemaking based on the AIBN ( 2019) report. The chapter concludes with
reflections on what can be learned by an operationalization of prospective sensemaking within complex organizational domains.
THE FRIGATE, THE TANKER AND THE SHIPPING CONTROL
CENTRE ( VTS) – COURSE OF EVENTS PRIOR TO THE COLLISION
The following section presents a simplified, descriptive review of the course
of events prior to the collision between KNM Helge Ingstad and Sola TS outside
Stureterminalen in Hjelteforden in 2018. The review is based on the events as
described in the AIBN ( 2019) report. The collision between the frigate KNM Helge
Ingstad and the tanker Sola TS occurred overnight on Thursday 8 November 2018
in Hjeltefjord in the waters off the Sture terminal. The frigate crew consisted a total
of 137 people, of which the bridge crew made up 7 people. Of these seven, two were
undergoing training. Sola TS had a crew of 24 people where 4 people were on the
bridge, including a pilot. The course of events in the AIBN report is mapped out by
obtaining technical and electronic information from both vessels, from Fedje VTS
including radio and radar recordings, as well as AIS log from the Norwegian Coastal
Administration. Interviews have been conducted with key people involved, central
documents were obtained, technical investigations aboard the frigate, and a similar
voyage with a ship of the same frigate class, and with Sola TS.
The accident occurred at night when KNM Helge Ingstad sailed south in Hjeltefjord
at a speed of just under 20 knots. The frigate did not send out an AIS signal as the
automatic identification system was set to passive mode; however, the crew had earlier notified Fedje VTS about positioning and intentions via mobile phone. At the
Prospective Sensemaking
what went wrong, which can be somewhat detrimental to understand also the social
processes that are important when people cooperate and coordinate safety critical
activities among themselves. In this context, the study by De Boer and Dekker ( 2017)
is particularly intriguing. They have studied automation surprise within the airline cockpit, more specifically looking into two distinct perspectives with different
approaches to pilots’ cognitive processes regarding human–automation interaction.
They argue that to improve safety, a sensemaking approach focusing on systemic factors including the operative context will make more sense compared to a traditional
individualistic- and failure-centred focus on human performance.
However, this chapter goes beyond the traditional notion of sensemaking advocated by Weick ( 1995), Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld ( 2005) and De Boer and Dekker
( 2017), drawing on the idea of prospective sensemaking which foremost implies sensemaking processes understood analytically as primarily forward oriented ( Rosness
et al., 2015). Furthermore, prospective sensemaking in this chapter will be discussed
analytically in the context of how coordination per se becomes relevant among
the actors in Hjeltejorden, i.e., prospective sensemaking does entail social aspects
( Weick, 1995), but also needs a follow up via a distinct social-analytical focus.
The next section presents the events that unfolded prior to the collision between
Helge Ingstad and Sola TS based on the AIBN ( 2019) report. Thereafter, an account
is provided on traditional sensemaking, related concepts and the properties of prospective sensemaking followed by an account on how one can operationalize prospective sensemaking based on the AIBN ( 2019) report. The chapter concludes with
reflections on what can be learned by an operationalization of prospective sensemaking within complex organizational domains.
THE FRIGATE, THE TANKER AND THE SHIPPING CONTROL
CENTRE ( VTS) – COURSE OF EVENTS PRIOR TO THE COLLISION
The following section presents a simplified, descriptive review of the course
of events prior to the collision between KNM Helge Ingstad and Sola TS outside
Stureterminalen in Hjelteforden in 2018. The review is based on the events as
described in the AIBN ( 2019) report. The collision between the frigate KNM Helge
Ingstad and the tanker Sola TS occurred overnight on Thursday 8 November 2018
in Hjeltefjord in the waters off the Sture terminal. The frigate crew consisted a total
of 137 people, of which the bridge crew made up 7 people. Of these seven, two were
undergoing training. Sola TS had a crew of 24 people where 4 people were on the
bridge, including a pilot. The course of events in the AIBN report is mapped out by
obtaining technical and electronic information from both vessels, from Fedje VTS
including radio and radar recordings, as well as AIS log from the Norwegian Coastal
Administration. Interviews have been conducted with key people involved, central
documents were obtained, technical investigations aboard the frigate, and a similar
voyage with a ship of the same frigate class, and with Sola TS.
The accident occurred at night when KNM Helge Ingstad sailed south in Hjeltefjord
at a speed of just under 20 knots. The frigate did not send out an AIS signal as the
automatic identification system was set to passive mode; however, the crew had earlier notified Fedje VTS about positioning and intentions via mobile phone. At the